

Prospect of the European Union to become a Defence Union: Analysis of the major nation-state actors' perspectives on the European Security and Defence Policy

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The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is a very young and innovative structure of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Since its launch in 1999 at the Summit of Cologne it has developed at such an incredible pace that even Javier Solana rhapsodised about the ESDP evolving in the speed of light. Seven years later, this dynamic of integration has decelerated to normal speed and the coherency issues connected with the integration process of the European Union (EU) have also begun to affect the ESDP which is intergovernmentally organised and hence vulnerable to coherency cracks on certain topics. The Iraq crisis in 2003 was the exemplar of this fragility. The ESDP's decision-making process is based on the lowest common denominator among the EU member states. If these countries cannot agree, which was the case on the Iraq problem, the ESDP becomes less important as an EU forum of CFSP on defence issues.

In consideration of the intergovernmental nature of the ESDP and its unanimous decision-making procedure it appears that the future of the ESDP is to a large extent dependent on the co-operation and political orientation of the ESDP member countries. In particular, the big three ESDP members of the United Kingdom, France and Germany are very influential political actors within the EU framework. In the context of the ESDP these three nations lead in the possession of military and civilian capabilities and dictate the main political streams of Europeanism versus Atlanticism as well as Intergovernmentalism versus Supranationalism within ESDP.

However, despite their similarities in terms of their degree of political influence, derived from their capabilities in the ESDP, they differ in their political orientation of the main political streams. For instance, the diverging views on the transatlantic relationship appeared to be the bone of contention leading to the aforementioned Iraq crisis. In view of the conflicting positions one can ask where the ESDP is to go. Will it ever become a Defence Union?

Referring to the influential role of the big three and the centrality of nation-state action in ESDP this thesis attempts to give an answer to these two questions with a credible prospect of the ESDP from a nation-centred structural realist approach. Since the structural realist concept emphasises the importance of national sovereignty in high politics this thesis concludes that the notion of the ESDP to become a Defence Union is very unlikely to occur. In addition to the pessimistic neorealist/structural realist scenario, alternative scenarios, based on the holistic current situation of the ESDP, which predict a more optimistic and probably more relevant future of the ESDP are also presented.

ABC	atomic, biological and chemical
AIFV	Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
BA	Budget Authority (US Chart)
bn	Billion
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CVN	Aircraft Carrier Nimitz Class
DASA	DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG
DM	Deutsche Mark
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EADS	European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company
EAEC	European Atomic Energy Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EPC	European Political Co-operation
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
FYROM	former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNP	Gross net product
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
IR	International Relations
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
MCM	Mine Countermeasures
NAC-D	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NRF	NATO Response Force
PC	Political Committee
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PU	Policy Unit
QMV	qualified majority voting
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SEA	Single European Act
SITCEN	Situation Centre
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In crucial situations, the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security
(Waltz, 1990: 31).

With an economy larger than that of the United States of America (USA), the European Union (EU) is the world's biggest and most powerful trade bloc. Despite becoming a strong economic force over the past 50 years, the integration process of the EU has primarily remained within the realm of low politics. The integration of the foreign and security policy, representing high politics where sovereignty is at stake, tends to happen at a very slow pace. In terms of high politics, defence and security policy is an essential attribute for any politically sovereign actor in the international system.

The wars in the Balkans and the hesitation of the USA to become involved in these conflicts on European soil have displayed the weakness of the European military facilities. The EU member countries do not possess the necessary hard power to guarantee security on European territory. During and after the Balkan crises the EU member states realised that they were now under pressure to improve and create greater military capacities for common autonomous military action in order to prevent and overcome escalated violence in conflicts at the periphery of the European Union. These external pressures of the nineties have also forced the EU member states to recognise that the ultimate concern for their country in a new international system after the breakdown of the bipolar system must be a common autonomous military power on a European level "in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world" (European Council, 1992).

The British-French Joint Declaration on European Defence of St. Malo on 4 December 1998 was the initial date of the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This innovative structure incorporated in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was designed to strengthen the political dimension of the second pillar of the EU in the foreign and security policy by civilian and military means following the Petersberg tasks¹.

Since then the idea of an autonomous European defence has developed rapidly under the sceptical eyes of the USA, which feared that the emergence of the ESDP as a supplementary military structure in world politics could be detrimental to the North Atlantic Treaty

¹ The Petersberg tasks which were agreed upon at the Bonn summit in 1992 are established firmly in Article 17 of the TEU including humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, combat tasks in crisis management and peacemaking.

Organisation (NATO). Despite the scepticism of the USA, the basic institutional structures for the emerging ESDP were established at the Cologne summit in June 1999. The following Helsinki summit resulted in the “Headline Goal” for a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), capable of deploying troops in crisis management operations. The Santa Maria da Feira and Nice summits in the year 2000 contributed to further successful establishment of the ESDP. In contrast to NATO the newborn ESDP possesses military and civilian means of peace-making and peace-keeping promoting an autonomous European capability to act and to supplement NATO in its tasks.

The institutionalisation of the ESDP has made tremendous progress of incredible speed. Compared with the integration of low politics of the EU the ESDP has developed in the speed of light. Despite this and the fact that the first crisis management operations launched in 2003 in former Yugoslavia, Macedonia and a few months later in the Democratic Republic of Congo have been a success, the ESDP is still to be considered as an area of highly sensitive politics. Within this realm nation-states are expected to continue rejecting a decline of their sovereignty by a deeper integration as the following statement of former French Minister for Employment and Solidarity, Elizabeth Guigou, to that time member of the European Parliament, reveals. “*Man gibt seine (außenpolitische) Souveränität niemals ab, man teilt sie höchstens – und das nur dort, wo man alleine nicht weiterkommt*”² (Guigou in Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 1995: 356). Hence, the main questions of this thesis will be identifying what the varying national perspectives in the ESDP are and how they influence ESDP development. Furthermore, the intention is to analyse in what kind of security environment the ESDP is manifested.

1.1 Defining the Object of Research

Just as economists define markets in terms of firms, so I define international political structure in terms of states...So long as the major states are the major actors, the structure of international politics is defined in terms of them (Waltz, 1979: 94).

Despite a solidarity clause in the constitutional treaty and the membership in the Western European Union (WEU), obliging member states to assist any other member state instantaneously with civilian or military means in accordance with Article 5, the EU is no military alliance. Furthermore, there were only ten member states which belonged to the WEU before it was completely incorporated by the EU. For instance, Denmark never

² One never gives up one's sovereignty (in foreign policy). At most one would share sovereignty, but only when one cannot succeed alone.

belonged to the WEU and aligns its security and defence policy solely with NATO. It has no interest in engaging itself militarily in the ESDP for politically sovereign reasons (Missiroli, 2004: 67). Denmark has represented the prototype example for the basic problem of a common security and defence policy since the beginning of the European integration: are issues concerning life and death such as the deployment of troops rather to be ranged in a European than a national framework based on a national identity and coherence of values? This is especially so, when the ESDP is viewed as a platform onto which power aspirations of the important European countries are projected.

After the institutionalisation of the ESDP is accomplished, its future development will very much depend on the perspectives of each individual nation, since the ESDP is based on the seemingly imperturbable principle of intergovernmental decision-making. This implies that in the majority of decisions consensus is necessary, which as a result provokes unanimity of the lowest common denominator. In particular, it is the three most important countries – the United Kingdom (UK), France and Germany – which will have a strong impact on the future of the ESDP. These countries form a league of supremacy within the EU due to their enormous demographic, economic and political power compared, for instance, with the aforementioned nation of Denmark or other member states.

Each of these three powerful European countries utilises the ESDP for maximising their own influence in the EU. The UK tries to balance the perceived Franco-German influence by taking the lead, while France attempts to occupy the centre of the “European ‘cobweb’ of security relationships” and while Germany intends to be the promoter of supranational European solutions in the ESDP (Lindley-French, 2002: 793).

Generally, arrangements among the EU member countries are difficult as they are intrinsically connected to the external balancing. However, the three great European countries are representative of the main political views on the external relations of the ESDP among the EU member states. On the one hand, there is the UK which promotes an ESDP being complementary to NATO and integrated into the European pillar of NATO and on the other hand, there is France orientating towards an autonomous European military and civilian capacity. Germany promotes the ESDP as a civilian force complementing NATO’s military power, a similar stance to the Scandinavian and neutral EU countries. It also represents a more moderate and integrative position stressing an advanced integration of the ESDP into the supranational structures of the EU than the other two militarily superior EU countries. All three positions influence the ESDP politics to a very high degree. Whether the ESDP will become the military and civilian basis for the EU as a powerful global player as France has in mind or the core for the EU as a civilian power focussing on crisis management as Germany sees the ESDP will be examined from a neorealist view in the analysis of Part II. The UK,

France and Germany will definitely have to come to an arrangement if the ESDP is to become an effective and powerful tool for strengthening the political role of the EU in the world.

The political finality of the ESDP is also linked with the EU relations to the USA. Adjacent to the theoretical reflection of the positions of the three big Europeans, it is also mandatory to include the position of the most powerful actor in international politics. This aspect is important, since the American hegemony on the level of hard power³ affects the perspectives of the three European countries to a large extent.

Consequently, this thesis will seek to avoid dispensable national views of other EU members and merely focus on the positions of the three most powerful European countries and the USA, being the most powerful military actor in world politics, in order to achieve a relevant prospect to the guiding question of how the ESDP will develop as a military actor in view of national interests.

State power is traditionally expressed and guaranteed by military means. The civilian dimension of the ESDP representing soft security is of minor importance to this thesis as the object of research will be analysed through a neorealist lens, where power and hard security⁴ are the central terms. The reduction to four national perspectives on hard security policy will never yield all the intricacies of international relations affecting the prospect of the ESDP. However, it will surely expose the main influences leading to the most probable prospect of ESDP development in the international system.

1.2 Outlining the Concept of Analysis

The principles of the Union's political regime cannot be understood without bearing in mind that the original Community was conceived within a fundamentally intergovernmental logic. The 'Founding Fathers' were not idealistic federalists, but realistic politicians (Milward in Magnette, 2005: 65).

With regard to the fact that the nation-states in the ESDP are the key actors and that these are individually and differently linked to international politics, the author is certain that the most appropriate theoretical approach of International Relations (IR) for analysing the perspectives of the three most important EU countries, which play the main roles in determining the future

³ According to Joseph S. Nye Jr. one should distinguish between different types of power. There is on the one hand soft power, which is based on attracting countries that allow themselves to be influenced, and on the other hand there is hard power referring to capabilities, particularly speaking of military capabilities, which pose a coercive influence on other countries (Joseph S. Nye Jr., 1990: 267). Therefore, to Nye the USA definitely has a hegemonic position in hard power, but not in soft power since Japan, China and some European countries are able to compete with the USA in this power realm. For the structural realist approach of this thesis, only Nye's hard power concept is of relevance.

⁴ Chapter 2 will provide insight of the mentioned central terms of neorealism.

development of the ESDP on an intergovernmental level, would be from a neorealist point of view. In this study structural realism serves as the neorealist theoretical schema for analysing the national views. It will also be used as a reference point for supplementary theoretical constructs enhancing the explanatory power of the ESDP prospect in the final chapter.

Nowadays, it may appear like an anachronism to write a thesis about the ESDP through the neorealist lens of Waltz. All the same, in the author's opinion, neorealist theory can provide a solid basis for understanding contemporary events on global and European security. Despite the harsh critique over the past 30 years neorealism still symbolises theoretical relevance for explaining and predicting outcomes in IR.⁵ Nevertheless, successful prediction is only one attribute of a powerful theory and so neorealist theory is limited in its use and will eventually require the help of neorealist modifications and elements of other theories to increase the validity of its prediction. One stream of theoretical reflection will never comprise all the facets which contribute to a nation-state's action in the international system. However, in the sphere of high politics the neorealist approach enables a concentration of the major incentives of state interaction in an anarchic political system.

In the international system, states act based on their national interests. Primary interests of every nation-state are autonomy and security. Beyond these interests there are also secondary interests which marginally influence the high politics in the international system. Structural realism according to Waltz is reduced to the essential incentive and behavioural pattern of countries operating in the international realm. Hence, this theoretical approach manages to deliver a compact layout of the positions of the big three.

Many critics of structural realism believe that this neorealist theory became obsolete after the end of the Cold War. They prefer neoliberal, neofunctional and constructivist theoretical reflection of the EU, since these approaches regard the nation-state and international system through a more refined lens than neorealism.

Structural realism is a theory prioritising high politics in the international realm and focussing on military power as one of the main capabilities leading to a state's relative power position in the international arena. Nations act upon power and security in an anarchic international system which is unpredictable and can be prone to war as no world government exists to prevent wars. Due to this permanent possibility of war, nation-states will seek to protect themselves through various means, of which military power still plays an important role.

⁵ For instance, Carlo Masala exemplifies the war in Iraq and the dominance of the USA in spring 2003 leading to problems and challenges in world politics. These observations by Masala have already been major issues in neorealist debate of scholars tying on Waltz theory since the beginning of the 90's. However, it is to say that Waltz never intends to develop a theory to predict wars, but rather the propensity to war (Keohane, 1986: 331, 344).

This thesis aims to concentrate on the relations of the most powerful and therefore, most influential nation-states which have initiated and developed the ESDP to serve their national interests. The neorealist approach as a theory focussing on the interaction of nation-states appears to be the most comprehensive approach to the topic.

1.3 The Literature and Structure

This thesis does not seek to glorify and justify structural realism as the one and only theoretical concept for analysing national perspectives in the ESDP. However, in this discussion, it is unavoidable to use nation-centred theoretical concepts as the basis for examining national views. Similar to the subjective selection of the theory and of the object of analysis, the author has also restrictively selected a range of primary and secondary sources, based on her subjective emphases of importance.

The topic of this thesis enjoys great interest among academics and therefore there is a vast range of empirical as well as theoretical publications on structural realism as well as ESDP. Despite the large amount of literature on the individual components of the topic, a purely structural realist approach to the big three in terms of defence and security policy is rarely found. Volker Rittberger is one of the few remaining academics drawing out neorealist assumptions to explain the past or present and to predict the future of countries in their foreign and security policy behaviour by observing capabilities and then making a rational assessment. Rittberger's as well as Jolyon Howorth's publications proved to be very useful for this thesis. Whether the author has managed to incorporate successfully the ideas of these brilliant academics and revive the relevance of structural realism in conjunction with all three major nations in ESDP and whether a Defence Union can be achieved from this perspective will be analysed in the following steps.

The first part of this thesis will present the theoretical reflection, followed by a historical and contextual framework of the ESDP preparing for the analysis of Part II.

Neither neorealism by Waltz nor the modifications by Schweller and Walt can be fully understood without some comprehension of Morgenthau's attempt to construct a theory of foreign policy. Among the most important theorists of the School of Realism was Morgenthau, whose notion of realism was adopted and altered by Waltz and other theorists to create neorealism. Part I will start with Morgenthau's conception of realism and continue with neorealism à la Waltz and its modifications. The presentation of Waltzian neorealism will be mainly centred around his work, the *Theory of International Politics* 1979.

In addition to the theoretical framework, the next chapter delivers a definition of the term 'security' and a characterisation of the new global threats as perceived by the EU after the end of the Cold War. Following the presentation of the security environment in which the ESDP is manifested, is the historical context of the evolution and institutionalisation of the ESDP. Finally, Part I which serves as a basal framework for Part II ends with the position of the USA as the dominant leader in world politics. The USA is the key actor in international politics whose superpower status in realist and neorealist reflection make it an important reference for the power and security politics of the big three Europeans.

Following the theoretical and historical basis in the context of security, Part II encompasses chapters 6, 7, and 8, which impose neorealist theory on an empirical level of the main nation-state actors in the ESDP and in international politics. Firstly, the British perspectives on the ESDP and its power position will be observed in chapter 6. Secondly, the thesis aims to show the contrary position to the UK in the ESDP by explaining the French Europeanist interests. Then a discussion of the German position completes the three main perspectives in the ESDP. The focus in the final chapter will shift from the synthesis of theory and empiricism to a brief overview of the three positions and to the evaluation of the analysis. This will provide a valid prediction of the future development of the ESDP and an assessment of the theoretical implications and intricacies, thus highlighting the relevance of structural realism in this context.

Realism and Neorealism: the ESDP an Instrument of State Power

Over the past centuries the nation-state has advanced to be the main political actor in world politics. Nowadays, globalisation has given birth to international institutions, transnational corporations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) relativising the dominance of state action in the international political system. However, the nation-state remains *sui generis* due to its territoriality and its possession of armed forces (Giddens, 1995: 92). This actor, which is primarily understood as a territorial corporation exerting territorial sovereignty in a limited area of the Earth's surface, is exclusively considered as the responsible body in the ESDP, even in international relations.

Over the past 60 years the international arena that had once been observed by Morgenthau for his theoretical concept has changed dramatically: the international realm then was dominated by state actors, which have now given space to international institutions and non-state actors. Just as important as on the unit-level are changes in the nature of state power in international politics. Today, the impact of economic power on international politics seems to supersede military power as the most important medium of international politics. Nevertheless, realists rightly state that economic or financial means will never displace the deterrence and coercion of military force. For instance, economic sanctions were not effective enough to replace military force in order to keep Iraq away from Kuwait. The military capacity of countries is a factor which is usually not mentioned openly, but plays a significant role in bargaining situations as the statesmen will always be aware of it in the back of their minds. Beyond controversy, state action still influences international politics tremendously. This implies that realist and neorealist theory revolving around the state as the main actor with the focus on the medium of military force in the international defence and security realm may seem static. However, they remain *de facto* highly appropriate theories to explain state interaction of the ESDP.

Guiding questions in the academic discussion on the ESDP are mainly centred around the national views, the institutional development, the operational capacities of EU military forces and the transatlantic relationship. The theoretical analysis of the ESDP has not been a major issue of research so far, but it is in the author's opinion inevitable that the intergovernmental nature of the ESDP is put into a basic theoretical framework of action for national policy.

2.1 Basic Assumptions of classical Realism

The acknowledgement of fundamental realist assumptions conceptualised in the 40s and 50s of the past century is necessary for articulating the enhancements of neorealism by Kenneth N. Waltz in the 70s. Political realism depicts no consistent theory and is associated with renowned names such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Edward H. Carr and Henry Kissinger. Among the most important representatives of political realism was Hans J. Morgenthau whose thoughts on countries striving for power and at the same time balancing power in anarchy became the essence of neorealist theory in all its modifications.

The understanding of a political theory always begins with the comprehension of the political circumstances which led to its genesis. The generation of Morgenthau's classical realism is generally explained by two schemes which are not all-embracing, but are the two major outstanding factors to have led Morgenthau to his theory of realism. On the one hand, one is dealing with a theoretical and historical explanation, which considers realism as a direct reaction to the bankruptcy of political Idealism and historical Optimism. Before the Third Reich, neither the idealistic hope of a international harmonisation based on universal moral standards nor the catharsis of world politics predicted by historical Optimism have come true and have even been proved ad absurdum with the catastrophe of World War II later on. This reinforced the notion of power in international relations. On the other hand, the political constellation in world politics of the 30s and 40s characterised by American hegemony provoked Morgenthau to a new assumption of international politics. Traditionally, countries were regarded as acting upon morality and international law. Contrarily, however, World War II and the Cold War displayed pure power and security interests. Specifically, the American foreign policy to that time illustrated to Morgenthau the actual incentive of acting upon national interest in international relations in the sense of power politics (whole paragraph refers to Siedschlag, 1997: 44-48). Robert Keohane summarises the essence of realism by Morgenthau as "the language of political realism – that is, the language of power and interests rather than of ideals or norms" (Keohane, 1986: 9).

By analysing American foreign policy after World War II, Morgenthau concludes that nation-state action in international politics is motivated by maximising national power and that the realm of foreign and security policy must be detached from spheres of morality, economy, legacy etc. *Politik [ist] wesentlich immer mit Macht verbunden und daher notwendigerweise auch immer Machtpolitik*⁶ (Morgenthau, 1946: 9).

⁶ "Politics [are] essentially always linked to power and hence, they are always power politics"

In the realist view, wars arise from states trying to acquire power and security in an anarchic realm. States will always promote their own security leading to arms races, consolidating alliances and competition over strategic territory. As a result of his observations and of his critique on contemporary theories of international politics Morgenthau tried to develop a new theory of foreign policy in his book *Politics Among Nations* relying on the concepts of power, rationality and the balance of power.

2.1.1 Power

Power in international politics is like weather. Everyone talks about it, but few understand it. Just as farmers and meteorologists try to forecast storms, so do leaders and analysts try to understand the dynamics of major changes in the distribution of power among nations (Joseph S. Nye Jr., 2004: 53).

The term ‘power’ plays a central role in Morgenthau’s theory and is vaguely characterised by eight elements of national power: geography, industrial capacity, natural resources, military, population, quality of diplomacy, national character and national morale (Rittberger, 2001: 43). In international politics statesmen “think and act in terms of interest defined as power” (Morgenthau 1948/1967: 5). Morgenthau views international politics as a competitive realm. It is in the nature of that realm to be characterised by the notion of struggle for power. Additionally, it is also because of the “limitless character of the lust for power reveal[ed] [as] a general quality of the human mind”, which fuels the struggle for power (Morgenthau 1946:194). Morgenthau deflected his theory from the selfish and power-striving human nature as conceived by Hobbes. Thus, human-beings make war so they can satisfy both qualities of human nature. Morgenthau regards power not only as an instrument for attaining ends in a competitive realm, but sees it as an end in itself, due to human nature.

To Morgenthau, power is a ubiquitous factor in human action constituting and making human action comprehensible. According to Morgenthau there are only three ideal types of politics: power maintenance, the gain of power or the affirmation of power (Masala 2005: 27).

Morgenthau believes that the individual tends to identify itself with a collective (nation), because the individual will always seek to find the most excessive and highest amount of power satisfaction which can only be found in the realm of the foreign policy of a nation. The international system is an anarchic arena of nation-states directed by the collectivity of power-striving individuals. (Morgenthau/Thompson in Siedschlag 1997: 53) Nation-states striving for power can only be restricted by Morgenthau’s mechanism of a *balance of power* which constitutes the core momentum of Waltzian neorealism developed in the 70s.

2.1.2 Balance of Power

Morgenthau describes the concept of balance of power as a “necessary outgrowth” of power politics (Morgenthau, 1948: 161). Balance of power refers to a situation where compensatory state actions of power in the international realm take place or have taken place. Nation-states will always maximise power and feel threatened by other nations pursuing the same ends to survive. Classical realism considers the chance that states might overcome this condition and advance to more co-operative political forms. According to Morgenthau “super-intelligent moral diplomacy” will eventually determine the gains of co-operation among states in the future (Hobson, 2000: 18). In that case, realism admits that co-operation can be learnt, if mutual interests or a long-term co-operation suggest greater gains. Despite the optimism, the international realm will constantly be dominated by balancing power interests for a maximum of security.

2.1.3 Rationality

State action is interpreted on the premise that nation-states are seeking to maximise their power rationally to maintain their essential security interests. The action of a state is based on rationality: states have “consistent, ordered preferences, and [...] they calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximize their utility in light both of those preferences and of their perceptions of the nature of reality” (Keohane, 1986: 11).

In realist theory, states are not unitary actors. They are shaped by state-society relations and international norms which alter through time, and state rationality alters with them.

Since politics is based on human action and since power symbolises the constant incentive of politics Realism analyses the effects of politics on the power of a state in the anarchic realm of international politics. The international system lacks a central power structuring the realm of international politics. Instead the international system is anarchic and dominated by nation-states as actors. Consequently, nation-states act upon their national interests in their foreign policies in order to survive in anarchy.


Morgenthau’s basic assumptions provide the premises for the neorealist approach two decades later. Neorealists adapted and modified the concept of balancing developed by Morgenthau into other theoretical variants. The most important and influential representative of neorealism until today is Kenneth N. Waltz. With his neorealist theory also considered as structural realism, he tries to explain state behaviour causing war and peace in the international realm. In this way, he puts his focus exclusively on the anarchic system and the high politics of a nation.

2.2 The structural realist Lens for explaining State Interaction in international Politics

In structural realism, a state's security policy behaviour is the result of its power position in the international system, which is the independent variable. The dependent variable, which is the security policy behaviour is divided into two categories of power politics: "autonomy-seeking" and "influence-seeking" policy behaviour, which are determined by the polarity of the system and the individual state's degree of power possession (Rittberger, 2001: 38). States are aware that the international system is anarchic and that they rely on self-help. As states are interested in their survival, they will try to gain more power, hence more security and more autonomy than other states in order to secure their power position relative to other states. In this domain "no sovereign can prevent states from doing what they are able to do in international politics" and therefore "war is possible.... [and] the key to survival in war is military power, generated either internally or through alliances, usually both" (Barry R. Posen, 2004: 6). In structural realism military power receives high importance among the capabilities determining the power position.

Generally speaking, nation-states will act according to the structural constraints of the international system based on simple cost-benefit calculations (Rittberger, 2001: 38). This rationality is the most important connection between the structure of the international system and the state's behaviour. In contrast to Morgenthau's classical realism, neorealism can be considered as a top-down theory, because the anarchic system is ontologically superior to the units.

Figure 1: Structural Realism



For neorealists, the state is imprisoned within an international structure that does not allow the states to construct policies free of the structural requirements of the international realm. States act and learn by responding to the structural environment and its changes. State behaviour is the result of adjustments to the structure of the system. The number of great powers in an anarchic system determines the polarity in anarchy. As a result, this polarity constitutes the degree of freedom of the security policy behaviour of a state.

Waltz focuses solely on a systemic approach exclusively for international politics while Morgenthau stresses the importance of human-nature and the influence of the individual-society-state relationships determining a state's "bottom-up" foreign policy and allowing the state an ontological superiority over the system (Hobson, 2000). In Waltz's structural systemic theory, reference to mankind pursuing power as an end is substituted by the premise that the pursuit of power is regarded as a means of achieving a maximum of security in anarchy.

Waltz's concept of neorealism separates the state from society, such that the state acquires absolute levels of autonomy from social actors. Anarchy dictates that states conform to the system and forces insulation from society. The state is a unitary actor as differentiation among nations is only relevant in terms of power measurement. Other attributes such as monarchy, democracy, dictatorship or other factors distinguishing states from one another are suppressed. Waltz assumes that countries are like units whose main interest is survival. Waltz's concept of structural realism can be compared to a game of billiards. Nation-states are unitary and hermetically sealed actors represented by billiard balls which interact on a billiard table symbolising the international sphere. As billiard balls generally tend to repel one another, nation-states behave in the same manner in their foreign policy and tend to cause conflict instead of co-operation in order to survive. However, above all, similar to billiard balls the internal characteristics of units are irrelevant to state behaviour and international politics. The "game one has to win is defined by the [anarchic] structure that determines the kind of player who is likely to prosper" (Waltz, 1979: 92, 128).

In neorealism the units are viewed as passive or adaptive to the system. Relatively constant patterns of international politics are created by the structural similarity of nation-states. This structural similarity exists because all nation-states have to cope with identical functions *a priori* the survival in the international system. A state which deviates from structure conforming behaviour is doomed to fail in the international system. Correspondingly, the field of international action of nation-states is very confined and states tend to resemble to one another in their behaviour in the international system.

A system consists of structures and interacting units. Waltz writes,

[i]nteractions, as I have insisted, take place at the level of the units. How units stand in relation to one another, the way they are arranged and positioned, is not property of the units. The arrangement of units is a property of the system (Waltz, 1979: 80).

Waltz considers structure devoid of the nation-state and its interactions. He cuts down the structure of the international system on “a purely positional picture of society.... Since structure is an abstraction, it cannot be defined by enumerating material characteristics of the system. Instead, it must be defined by the arrangement of the system’s parts and by the principle of this arrangement” (Waltz, 1979: 80). Hence, Waltz regards structure as a positional arrangement of relations of the units in the system. To avoid reductionism, yet without losing the theoretical credibility of structural realism Waltz defines the international political structure only on a systemic level. There are three basic features, which elaborate his concept of structure: *ordering principles*, *character of units* and *distribution of capabilities*.

2.2.1 Ordering Principles

The underlying notion of order in the international system is either anarchy or hierarchy. Under hierarchy the units specialise in a harmonious division of labour establishing interdependence and co-operation, as a higher authority exists to solve the problem of security. *Per contra*, in anarchy there is no binding arbitration compelling the units to rely on self-help. Since there is no hierarchy and central power to create order, nation-states pursue vital national interests activating order in the same way that economic units spontaneously create a market system. Just as Adam Smith declares that “the market selects appropriate behaviour for survival by rewarding those who conform to the logic of the market with high profits and those who do not with bankruptcy”, Waltz states that the international structure determines the behaviour according to anarchy (Hobson, 2000: 22). Those who conform are likely to be rewarded with survival and greater power whereas the states which do not comply experience a decline of power or even extinction (Waltz, 1979: 89-93). In order for states to secure their survival in this system, they are prone to act similarly: “[t]o say, ‘the structure selects’ means simply that those who conform to accepted and successful practices more often rise to the top and are likelier to stay there” (Waltz, 1979: 92). By referring to microeconomics, Waltz views the international political system like the spontaneously generated economic market system as a platform for the ‘co-action’ of units maintained by the principle of self-help. This principle as well as Waltz’s theory as a whole becomes obsolete once the system has transformed to hierarchy.

2.2.2 Character of Units

Secondly, the structures are defined by the specification of functions of differentiated units. Hierarchic systems change if functions are differently defined and allotted. In contrast, on the basis of anarchy the units are functionally not differentiated. Waltz's assumption of anarchy in the international system coerces nation-states to focus primarily on their own survival since they cannot rely on a 'world government' or the goodwill of other nation-states. Waltz claims, "[t]he international imperative is: take care of yourself" (Waltz, 1979: 107). To Waltz, anarchy is grasped as the international domain without a sovereign to organise and lead.

In neorealism the structure determines the functions of the units, which are virtually identical among the units. In his theory Waltz sees "the major states as the major actors [and that] the structure of international politics is defined in terms of them" (Waltz, 1979: 94). Thus he neglects the relevance of other non-state actors in the international system. Consequently, this thesis will concentrate on the major states in the ESDP.

2.2.3 Distribution of Capabilities

The third element that characterises the structure of the international system is the distribution of capabilities across units. In Waltz's view, nation-states only differ in the amount of capabilities which determine a state's performance of its functions in the international system. Changes in the distribution of capabilities simultaneously alternate the structure. The power of a unit is estimated by comparing the capabilities of other units. Thus, states are differently placed by their degree of power in view of the distribution of capabilities (Waltz, 1979). The distribution of capabilities reflects the distribution of power which is inherent in the system and not in each single unit. According to Waltz, the distribution of capabilities or rather power is sufficient to explain the arrangement of the units in the international system (Waltz, 1979: 99). Unfortunately, the Waltzian like the Morgenthau idea of power is not clearly elaborated and remains an undefined abstract concept measured by: population, territory, resource endowment, military potential, economic strength, political stability and competence, of which the latter two will be difficult to measure and relatively similar in their value among the big Western nations. Hence, they are of little importance in the study of the individual nations in the analytical part of this thesis (Waltz, 1979: 131).

Waltz identifies three possible scenarios of the distribution of power: unipolar, bipolar or multipolar. The international system could be unipolar which means that there is only one very powerful state dominating the system. Bipolar describes the situation of the Cold War where two very powerful states kept the system in balance. Multipolar signifies that more than two powerful nations dominate and determine the structure. Waltz argues that a bipolar

system is more stable than a unipolar system, since the other nations will build an alliance to settle any preponderance of one nation. It is also more stable than a multipolar system because “the opponents and their relative power are clearer, and shifts in alliances make less difference” (Joseph S. Nye Jr., 2004: 15). Thus, in bipolarity distribution of capabilities are clearly laid out. The probability of a misinterpretation of the opponents’ capabilities is low. Waltz himself admits that the bipolar stability he deduces from the Cold War period could be ascribed to the nuclear technology threat on the unit-level (Keohane, 1986: 327). Therefore, bipolar stability determined by the structural level cannot be automatically concluded by Waltz as it actually might have been a consequence of the balance of nuclear terror on the unit-level. Waltz’s theory sharply separates the structural level from the unit-level. Undoubtedly, this task is important to maintain theoretical credibility, but on the other hand a theory has to be explanatorily appropriate in empiricism. The following paragraph will present the effects of the structure on unit action in the international system.

2.2.4 Balance of Power Principle by Waltz

In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if the survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquillity, profit and power. Because power is an [sic] means and no end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions....If states wished to maximize power, they would join the stronger side, and we would see not balances forming but a world hegemony forged. This does not happen because balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behaviour induced by the system. The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system (Waltz, 1979: 126).

Nation-states wanting to survive in a system of anarchy are forced to maximise their security. Maximum security and stability in the system is achieved when there is a balance of power in the international system. The behaviour of balancing power by states is predicted from the structure of the system. When a balance of power is attained, the probability of one state attacking another state is very low as the states would fear a possible defeat. Arising from this deliberation is the idea that states will always try to equilibrate power imbalances in the international system. At the first sign of power imbalances, nation-states will always attempt to balance or counterbalance by it since the survival of a state is at stake when the counterpart becomes too powerful. In neorealism, the described state action is generally known as the principle of balancing, that is, “[s]tructural constraints explain why the methods are repeatedly used despite differences in the persons and states which use them. Balance-of-power theory purports to explain the result that such methods produce...If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-of-power is it” (Waltz, 1979: 117). In Waltz’s opinion the structure and the state’s functions in anarchy will always induce

weak nation-states to ally themselves with the weak state or states in order to equilibrate power imbalances and maintain the highest possible degree of security for each individual country.

As a consequence of a state's security priority, nation-states will permanently have to compare their distribution of capabilities with that of other nation-states in order to determine their positional arrangement. This will help to reveal whether a state needs to arm or ally with others. If a very powerful nation-state, attempts to upgrade its position, it is very likely that no state would dare to act unilaterally but rather in an alliance of the weaker states to create balance. Building an alliance is the only form of co-operation thinkable in structural realism. Co-operation beyond this kind of alliance could jeopardise one's independence and security. The other scenario would be if there exists another equivalent powerful unit to counterbalance the other powerful unit by also improving its capabilities. According to Waltz, both common cases manifest that power in the international system underlies the principle of balancing. Translating the balancing principle into power politics would mean that the execution of an autonomy- and influence-seeking policy is dependent on a state's power disposition. The stronger a state, the more it seeks influence and autonomy to guarantee its power position. Therefore, power is the presupposition of any security policy behaviour varying in intensity from actor to actor.

In contrast to the following forms of neorealism, Waltz states in his theory that the principle of bandwagoning makes up the counter-strategy to the balance of power strategy. It is either perceived as the last resort for weak states to appease stronger states, containing an eventual threat of conflict administered by the weaker nations, or as a means to gain more power and resources. This is the case, if it is evident that joining the stronger coalition would guarantee a better positional arrangement in the international system. In Waltz's opinion, bandwagoning is a makeshift strategy unlikely to occur as nation-states do not want to become subject to other states. To Waltz, co-operations will always hold the danger of beguilement or dependency between the co-operating parties. These eventualities demonstrate a higher risk of declining or losing autonomy to the states than possible co-operation gains. In Waltz's theory, security interests will always determine and narrow down the field of state action in the international realm.


2.3 Modifications of Structural Realism

Many neorealist theorists distance themselves from Waltz's structural realism and have developed variations of neorealism more relevant to empiricism. Waltz fundamentally presumes that every nation-state will always act upon their security interests and attempt to compensate the power hegemony of any other country. In reality, as Stephen M. Walt points out, states do not frequently counterbalance power inequalities in the international system and that a more powerful state, which is geographically far away, poses no immediate threat (Walt, 1987: 17-29). To him, it is more likely that countries initiate action or reaction only when they feel an actual threat by another country. Walt says that, "[w]hen confronted by a significant external threat, states may either balance or bandwagon. Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat; bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger" (Walt, 1987: 17). Walt asserts that balancing predominates and that power is an important element of balancing, but in the end the perception of threat will be pivotal for any balancing action of the state (Walt, 1987: 19).

In contrast to Waltz and Walt, Schweller argues that empiricism proves that neither security as the primary aim nor the balancing principle is often put into practice. In fact, weak states rather side with stronger states than join an alliance counterbalancing hegemony, since they can benefit more from this kind of co-operation.

2.3.1 Bandwagoning

The reality of the twentieth and twenty-first century has displayed that the principle of balancing power is rarely found in international politics. Given the historical observation of state reactions to structural constraints it becomes evident that the Waltzian notion of "balancing predominates" is erroneous. As a matter of fact, the analysis of recent history abandons the balancing principle as the most common political process in the international realm. In reality, a phenomenon that occurs more frequently according to Randall L. Schweller is the principle of bandwagoning. In contrast to the principle of balancing, bandwagoning describes the opposite state behaviour: nation-states tend to ally with the stronger coalition. Nonetheless, Waltz as well as Walt see bandwagoning as an anomaly in their concepts of international politics. They merely see denominate it as a strategy of countries facing a dilemma and unable to raise funds for balancing. Consequently, these countries are willing to sacrifice their independence as they do not want to experience extinction by the stronger states.

Figure 2: Balancing and Bandwagoning

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2.3.2 Balance of Interest

Schweller refers to Waltz in his theory, but condemns the principle of balancing of power or threat and replaces it with the strategies of balancing of interest and bandwagoning (Schweller, 1994). This stems from the notion that nation-states do not primarily merely act upon security interests. In his opinion, the changes of state interest concerning the modern state's survival must be taken into account since the importance of the hard power of a state seemingly diminishes. This implies that there is more room for other state interests beyond hard power to prosper and actually have a rising impact on the system. Schweller emphasises the necessity to affiliate the unit and system level into his modification of neorealism.

To Schweller, bandwagoning and balancing pose no counter-strategies. Both strategies serve to guarantee the security of a state. The difference of the strategies lies within their goals: balancing seeks to preserve one's current power and security position and aims to avoid any loss of capabilities whereas bandwagoning offers the opportunity to gain resources and improve the positional arrangement. Traditionally, bandwagoning displays neorealist relevance on the systemic level; moreover, it represents an economic strategy of fulfilling state interest on the unit-level.

Status quo and revisionist States

Schweller differentiates between states according to their varying interests. *Status-quo*-states have a high quantity of power at their disposal and consequently are keen to maintain the *status quo* whereas revisionist states are keen to create a new world order by redistribution, so they can gain the goods and resources they desire. Revisionist states are capable of using all means including military means, so they can change the *status quo* as they do not want to keep their present positional arrangement in the international system. In general, state interest is determined by a benefit-cost calculation of either the value of revision or the value of the *status quo*. By means of this rationality, states evaluate possible outcomes and decide what strategies they will pursue.


Actual stability of a system characterised by Schweller depends predominantly on the balance between revisionist and conservative forces. As long as the *status-quo* states are evidently more powerful than the revisionist states the system remains stable.

Furthermore, Schweller distinguishes between four types of bandwagoning. All forms of bandwagoning have in common that they are initiated by the incentive to make gains.

Table 1: Different Types of Bandwagoning according to Schweller

Jackal Bandwagoning	Piling-on Bandwagoning	Wave-of-the-future Bandwagoning	Domino-effect
States involved in this type of bandwagoning have a strong urge to change the <i>status quo</i> . They are usually weak revisionist states aiming for a better power distribution in the international system.	This type of bandwagoning usually occurs at the final phase of a war, when states team up with the designated winner, so they can profit from its victory and inhibit any eventual aggression from the victorious country.	In this scenario states choose collaboration between two coalitions. The coalition stipulating the most appealing political, social and economic model for the future is considered to be more efficient as a coalition partner.	The domino effect is a result of strongly politically and socially linked countries in a region. Once external effects induce a bandwagon in this region, it usually unleashes a very high magnitude of force within this bandwagon.

With his modified version of neorealism, Schweller distances himself from the systemic Waltzian approach and constructs a semi-permeable border between state and society. By leaving the purely systemic analytical level and emphasising state interests on the unit-level, Schweller on the one hand diminishes theoretical credibility and on the other hand, actually extends the scope of meaning to empiricism.

Figure 3: Walt's and Schweller's simplified Neorealism

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2.3.3 Alternative State Behaviour

Based on structural realism and historical observation from the peace of Westphalia in 1648 until the end of World War II, Paul W. Schroeder develops two strategies which countries pursue in the international realm more often than balancing and bandwagoning. He identifies the strategy of *hiding* when states ignore threat, when they declare neutrality in a crisis and when they isolate themselves. In general, this strategy refers to states as being passive in order to avoid any inconvenience.

The other strategy is *transcending*. This term describes unconventional and innovative conflict solutions founded on norms and co-operation on the international level. By overcoming the neorealist principle of self-help through co-operation and the division of functionality among states, anarchy is dismantled step by step.

Conclusion

Structural realism by Waltz has been incessantly criticised. However, his works have also been the most cited and referred to over the past three decades in the theoretical debate of IR elevating his theory to the foundational concept of international politics. In essence, structural realism claims the status of a grand theory in IR discussing the units as 'passive bearers' of the international political structure. They are subject to the international structural constraints of the system and they also lack high international agential power to possibly overcome this condition. By reducing his approach to a purely systemic level, Waltz manages to create a theory specifically for international politics.

The modifications of Waltz's theory have showed that his theory merely seems theoretically credible but there still exist explanatory defects and unclear terminology. In particular, when transferring his theory into reality, the majority of state interaction in international politics remains unexplained. Whether structural realism truly serves as the most compatible concept for predicting the future development of the ESDP will crystallise in the analytical and empirical chapters of Part II.

Table 2: Summary of the main Structural Realist Assumptions for Part II

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In anarchy nations rely on self-help and the system compels nations to resemble one another in their behaviour in IR since no functional differentiation is possible • Prime functionality of a nation in IR is acting upon its security interests • A state guarantees its security through power politics of influence- or autonomy-seeking • • The power position determines the security behaviour of a nation in an intergovernmentally organised ESDP • The power position stems from: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <i>1. Population</i> <i>2. Territory</i> <i>3. Resource Endowment</i> <i>4. Military Potential (most relevant for ESDP analysis)</i> <i>5. Economic Strength</i> <i>6. Political Stability and Competence</i> • Key to survival is military power • Depending on the power disposal of a nation, the intensity of its power politics vary • Generally, states try to achieve a balance of power in IR because this provides the most stable environment for nations • The balance of power principle implies that weaker nations will always try to build alliances to counterbalance the hegemonic state in a unipolar sytem as well as in a bipolar or multipolar system of multiple power centres. Nation-states will always attempt to equilibrate power imbalances <p>→ The nations with the strongest power positions in the ESDP will mainly influence the future development of the ESDP</p>

The extensive inspection of European security and defence policy in this thesis requires some study of the fundamental clarification of the term ‘security’. The following will generally define security in the structural realist context of this thesis, which is not necessarily in correlation with the definition used in the official documents of the ESDP or NATO.

3.1 Defining Security

The term security is derived from the Latin word *securas* originating in two words signifying a state without (*se*) worries (*curas*) (Lutz, 2000: 624). Generally, one can state that human-beings have always looked for ways to minimise risks and threats in order to secure their survival. Risks and threats are of a manifold nature, of which military threat by another state only portrays a fraction of the enormous amount of threat to the individual and also to the nation-state. As already mentioned in the theoretical part of this thesis, the idea of individual security by Morgenthau is also transferable to a society and a state attempting to achieve invulnerability for survival. Security is a fundamental interest of any state in anarchy. From a structural realist point of view anarchy hinders complete security ever to be achieved and so nation-states will permanently seek to increase their security. It is evident that seeking maximum security is an ongoing process in the international realm. Buzan similarly defines security and argues that security is “the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity” (Buzan, 1991: 18-19).

Furthermore, in the political context of a nation-state the term security is distinguished by an internal and external dimension. The internal dimension of security refers to threats affecting the security within a state or society whereas the external dimension of security refers to the protection of states from external military violence, pressure, threat, boycott, embargo or extortion. Protection from these threats can be assured by treaties, alliances and the sustenance of military troops. Security guaranteed by military is only one aspect of security, but it is the most crucial to this thesis.

In addition, security can be diversified into two variants of security: national security and international security. The latter can be further classified into three different types of security ranging from collective through common to comprehensive security.

3.1.1 National Security

The oldest concept of security has been that of national security which normally refers to state security. According to Archer's definition of national security, it

is seen as the security of a sovereign state, meaning its ability to act within the wider system. National security is defined by governments and elites, and has traditionally been sought through national means (having a national defence) or by alliances and the balance of power. Not only can it exist within an anarchic system; it positively encourages such a system – one state pursues its security often at the cost of the security of another state, which in turn tries to ensure its own security and thus makes the first state even more insecure (Archer, 2001: 9).

Consequently, a nation-state will use any means given – in extreme cases even military power – to protect its essential, corporate values from external threats.

In this concept of security associated with neorealism and realism, anarchy and self-help are the key principles. A state will always pay attention to its capabilities and that of other states as they can eventually become a potential threat. The possibility of co-operation is low, because of the distrust among nations in this sensitive field, where the very existence of a state may be at stake. In the modern world the concept of national security increasingly loses worldwide attraction. But, under the condition of anarchy in international politics state power in terms of military power still plays an important role. As Art puts it:

[i]n anarchy, force is integral to foreign policy because military power can be wielded not only forcefully but also 'peacefully'. The forceful use of military power is physical: a state harms, cripples, or destroys the possessions of another state. The peaceful use of military power is intimidating: a state threatens to harm, cripple, or destroy, but does not actually do so. To use military power forcefully is to wage war; to use it peacefully is to threaten war. Only when diplomacy has failed is war generally waged (Art & Waltz, 1999: 3).

Military power whether forceful or peaceful remains central to statecraft. Despite the increasing efficiency of soft power in a globalised world, military power remains the ultimate defence of a state's security. Military power is coercive and varies in amount from state to state. Since there is no legitimate coercive authority above the nation-states on the international level, Waltz declares that, "in politics force is said to be the ultima ratio. In international politics force serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one" (Art & Waltz, 1999: 5-6). In international politics military power is not under the control of a central world government, but a monopoly of each individual state constituting an important element of force for a stable international political order. Force remains integral to statecraft since the international realm is anarchic.

Current developments in the international system have relativised the clear determination of the term security. Security still mainly provided by the state for its people through defence, depends on the perception of threat and thus varies in its interpretation from state to state.

3.1.2 International Security

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the security concept has changed from a primary military issue to a problem interwoven with all fields of human action. The new global threats putting global security at risk are more complex as well as more likely to occur than the threat of states to attack other states. Therefore, it is also necessary to put international security concepts into perspective, since the classical territorial understanding of security has become less absolute.

International security concepts encompass all forms of intergovernmental appendages and concepts for the protection of the external security of the member states involved in this, either intergovernmentally organised or supranationally organised co-operative policy. The idea of international security first came up in the form of collective security in the nineteenth century (Archer, 2001: 9). This concept recognised the interdependence of each state's security in an international system and fostered the idea of alliances on the basis of collective defence. The Cold War period was defined by this security concept, that is, when countries aligned with NATO to collectively protect themselves from the common communist adversary.

At the end of the 80s a new concept named common security was introduced by the Commission into international politics. This concept was less focussed on the threat by the Eastern bloc. Its main concern revolved around the threat of nuclear weapons and their proliferation around the world, which basically posed a scenario of 'overkill' to the European continent as well as the entire world if the East-West conflict escalated. With the demise of the Soviet Union, co-operative security replaced the common security concept which attempted to bundle common threats. Co-operative security continued the path taken by common security and promoted co-operation in defence among the former adversaries which ended, for example, in the Open Skies agreement.

Transferring the sometimes abstract-appearing terminology into ESDP jargon, one can view ESDP as an alliance of nation-states pursuing an international co-operative security policy which transcends traditional forms of national and international security. ESDP members take preventive action to scotch new global threats and go beyond traditional territorial boundaries. In addition, European security is not only founded on military power, but also on civilian power, which endows ESDP with a versatility of peace-making and peace-keeping tools superior to NATO. European defence policy embraces fields beyond purely political and military nature. This is largely due to the comprehensive perception of regional and global security which is also manifested in the European Security Strategy (ESS). Nowadays, security is still influenced by state interdependence. However, there is also increasing

influence by the interdependence of various fields ranging through societal, cultural and environmental aspects. Globalisation has definitely made an impact on security and defence perception. Today, the ESDP recognises these interdependencies and pursues a policy of comprehensive security.

As the security agenda broadened, a distinction between *hard* and *soft security* was made in the late 90s. In 1996 the Danish Foreign Minister made a distinction between the two terms when discussing the EU. He distinguished between soft security, referring to “all aspects of security short of military combat operations including the defence of the national territory” and hard security, mainly concerned with the “territorial defence against an outside aggressor” (Archer, 2001: 11). Furthermore, Lindley-French states that the “neat dividing lines hard and soft security, civil and military are rapidly dissolving, requiring far more flexibility on the part of Western state security institutions than has hitherto been the case” (Lindley-French, 2005: 2). For Americans, hard security remains the *leitmotif* and NATO the toolbox. Contrarily, ESDP is a child of this new revolutionary security era and has successfully incorporated hard and soft security tools and policies. The security concept of ESDP is multi-layered and of broad scope. In order to comprehend the holistic contiguity of ESDP security, it is essential to grasp the perceived threats shaping European security and defence understanding.

3.2 New Global and Regional Threats at the Beginning of the 21st Century

Since the change of the Cold War polarity the EU is facing an entirely different security environment. The danger of a nuclear or massive conventional strike between the antagonistic blocks dominating world security policy over 40 years has now become obsolete. This has unveiled a variety of more diverse and less predictable global security threats around the world. These threats are increasingly posed by non-state actors and are characterised by asymmetrical methods of the use of force (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2004: 6). The key threats for the European countries are manifested in the *European Security Strategy: A secure Europe in a better World*.

As a response to the new global threats, the EU members have accepted the ESS presented by the High Representative Javier Solana at the end of 2003. This document sets a guideline for a more cohesive political development of the ESDP. The threats identified in it correspond to the threats articulated in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the USA in 2002 and 2006.

The EU shares to a high degree the same perception of the major threats as the USA. The ESS addresses the interwoven problems of conflict, insecurity and poverty. It identifies five main threats to European security: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD), regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime, which will be further discussed in the following paragraphs according to the ESS.

The recent wave of terrorism with Europe as both the target and logistical base for terrorist attacks⁷ visualises the enormous threat of global terrorism for Europe and therefore “concerted European action is indispensable” (Solana, 2003: 3). Democratisation of technology enabled the privatisation of war replacing traditional state-centric conflicts. Putting pressure on states sponsoring terrorism is a minor part of the solution. In fact, the privatisation of war by individuals such as the Aum sect in Tokyo calls for measures beyond the intergovernmental level to avert the worst case threat scenario for the EU which would be the combination of terrorist groups acting with WMD. The proliferation of WMD signifies the greatest threat to global security. International treaty regimes and export control arrangements have decreased the spread of WMD. However, in a time of terrorism and regional conflicts a WMD arms race is possible. The technological advances in biological and technological sciences enable even small groups to inflict the same damage as was previously possible only for states.

Regional insecurity such as in Kashmir, the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East and the Great Lakes Region can fuel the demand for WMD. The nearer these conflicts are to the EU territorial periphery, the more threatening they are for the regional stability of the EU. Regional conflicts destroy human lives, social and physical infrastructures, ethnic minorities and they jeopardise fundamental freedoms and human rights. State failure adds to regional instability and can be associated with ethnic conflicts, terrorism and organised crime. The bad governance of a state implying corruption, weak institutions, the abuse of power and other phenomena corroding the state from within could cause a state to implode. Organised crime is often associated with weak or failing states. In comparison with the proliferation of WMD and terrorism, organised crime and state failure pose subordinate threats. Organised criminal activities undermining law and order are a phenomenon of the Eastern periphery of the EU destabilising the Balkan region.

These new global threats identified in the ESS form a highly complex condition of a variant of non-state threats, which are an important driving force in shaping ESDP. Furthermore, the ESS acknowledges that achieving security requires more than just a military response. The ESS approach to fighting these threats is very different from the USA. The EU emphasises the importance of multilateral *modus operandi* and the relevance of military action only as a “preventive engagement” option in conjunction with a decision from the UN Security Council (Solana, 2003: 11).

⁷ The terrorist bombings in London on 7 July 2005.

Conclusion

The EU and its members are facing a new global security environment, where regional stability has replaced the concept traditionally focussed on national stability. The EU has recognised this new situation and reacted with the formulation of the ESS, and in particular, with the creation of ESDP providing CFSP with the necessary united military and civilian capabilities to fight the new global threats. The ESS is a European testimony that the EU members have the political will to combat these common threats together within a multilateral framework.

The new security environment is an important and complex factor, which has an impact on the state behaviour of the big three within ESDP. Whether the post-Cold War security environment of hard power unipolarity will lead to the abdication of national sovereignty within ESDP for the common welfare of a European Defence Union balancing American hegemony will be analysed in Part II. The following chapter will provide a closer historical and institutional perspective on ESDP which will show that this notion can be considered as wishful thinking, because there is an obvious incongruousness between national sovereignty and communalisation of the high politics.

4.1 During the Cold War Period

The post-war situation compelled the Western European countries to reclassify themselves into the American security architecture. The USA pressed for Germany's rearmament, leading to the European Defence Community plans by the French Prime Minister, René Pleven. He believed that German rearmament should be set in an integrated European framework. European stability depended on the inclusion of West Germany into this security structure in order to restrain reburgeoning German power aspirations and build a solid front of interdependent national forces against the Eastern bloc.

The economic co-operation at the end of World War II had been a success among the West European countries and so the first attempts envisaging co-operation on foreign and security policy were made with the Pleven Plan in 1954 and the Fouchet Plans in 1961 and 1962. However, these plans failed due to the lack of alacrity of the European Community (EC) members to promptly transfer their sovereignty. In fact, the Pleven Plan had already been ratified by five of the six founding countries of the Union (France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries). It was the very initiator, French Prime Minister himself who faced strong Gaullist and communist opposition within his own country, leading to a failure of the Pleven Plan.

A contrario, French partners refused the following Fouchet Plans, because of the emphasis on French interests. These interests were mainly concerned with the denial of the UK application for the European Economic Community (EEC) and the adoption of the flexible response measure in NATO, which replaced the strategy of massive retaliation favoured by the French (Tsakaloyannis, 1996: 47).

The collapse of the plans made evident that national sovereignty was jealously guarded by the EC member countries. Transferring national sovereignty was and remains a difficult task that could only be achieved gradually. As a start, activities in forming defence policy co-operation were put on hold and Western European integration continued to take place on the economic field.

NATO/WEU Development

The European failure was not pose a big loss, since NATO had been established in 1949. It already provided a transatlantic security framework for Western Europe. NATO brought together the USA, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the Benelux states, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Portugal and Italy. Since 1949 all these countries, including West Germany

which joined the Alliance in 1955, were the bearers of the most important guarantor of European security. The Alliance formed the Western military bloc, which was dominated by the USA agenda against the Warsaw Pact. European interests were subordinate to the transatlantic agenda. In spite of this, NATO served as the primary military defence organisation for Western Europe during the Cold War period. In this framework the Western European Union (WEU) was developed as the European pillar in NATO in 1954, based on the Brussels Treaty in 1948. Since then it performed as the European military arm working on behalf of NATO. In reality, WEU had little competence, since military policy was up to NATO and foreign policy was in the hands of the states.

It was not until the Davignon Report, also known as the Luxembourg Report, of the Luxembourg Summit of the EC foreign ministers on 27 October 1970 that the Western European countries agreed upon relaunching their own co-operation of foreign and security policy in the form of the European Political Co-operation (EPC). The EPC is to be considered as a small step towards an eventual Defence Union. Until then, the 60s were dominated by Franco-German duopoly and particularly by de Gaulle's vision of a strong independent French Republic with the same power aspirations as the USA. This can be traced back to 1954 when the Pleven Plan was turned down by the very same nation which promoted the creation of the EDC. The fear of a decline of national sovereignty was a major concern of the de Gaulle presidency. De Gaulle's political reluctance for Europeanisation reached its peak in 1965 when the French government carried out the policy of the empty chair until the French achieved a compromise to maintain the unanimous voting modus. This cemented intergovernmentalism in European co-operation.

The 70s offered a different political landscape. With the end of de Gaulle's era and the membership of the United Kingdom there was a new opportunity for the communitarian approach of the integration process. The 60s have demonstrated the dependency of the European integration to the willingness of the individual nation-states to abandon their national sovereignty. In the 70s foreign policy co-ordination progressed rapidly. At the Copenhagen summit in 1973, a European correspondent group for the Political Committee (PC), a communication system known as the COREU system for the foreign ministers as well as regional and topical working groups were arranged. The Copenhagen and Paris summits provided the rudimentary legal and institutional basis for a common foreign policy. The following Helsinki Final Act displayed European political coherence and developed measures which promoted European foreign policy identity. The London Report in 1981 was the third document institutionalising EPC. It contained novelties such as the full participation of the Commission and the permission for emergency sessions. The Troika composed of the

presidency, the presidency in office and the forthcoming presidency and as well as the EPC Secretariat, which is a small team of officials seconded from preceding and succeeding presidencies to support the foreign ministry were introduced with this report. However, defence and military issues in the EPC had remained peripheral and only the Genscher-Colombo Plan in the same year had actually pushed towards a European hard power identity. The Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 was also an essential step towards a common defence and security policy and a growing *Brusselisation*. The EPC Secretariat ensuring consistency and continuity between the EC and EPC position, made its base in Brussels. Prior to that, the officials of the Troika had been travelling from European capital to capital. The gradual transfer of national competencies from a nation's capital to Brussels effectively provided more coherence. Most importantly, this Act brought together the EPC and the Communities under the same legal umbrella which was essential for a coherent representation in the domain of foreign policy. Previously two separate external policies existed: the foreign policy of the Community on the one hand and on the other hand, foreign policy co-operation of the individual nation-states. The SEA finally enabled legal status for the EPC.

4.1.1 Reactivation of the WEU

The 80s also witnessed the reactivation of the WEU which since its creation in 1954 had remained sidelined by NATO. This reactivation was an attempt of the new French president, François Mitterrand, to bring the idea of an autonomous European defence institution into the picture again. The revival of the WEU was an essential complement to the finality of a political union. Issues on Western Europe's security and the transatlantic relations were reraised to the agenda. In particular, during the 90s when the European security environment was altered by the ending of the Cold War, new questions about a European defence arose among the Europeanists who faced strong opposition by the UK-led Atlanticists. In TEU it was agreed that the WEU would serve as a bridge between NATO and EU. This solution still kept WEU remaining a passive actor with a very weak dynamic to improve WEU military capabilities. In the beginning and until the middle of the 90s the WEU acted on behalf of the EU member states in co-ordination with NATO on minor tasks in the Balkans. During the Balkan operations in the mid-90s it became evident that the WEU was operationally limited and that it was dependent on the American-led NATO and would very likely not develop an enhanced role in European security policy if it maintained its current status. French attempts to strengthen WEU independent from NATO failed due to British resistance.

4.2 After the Cold War

As hinted in the preceding chapter, the end of the Cold War portrayed a new political scenario for the European countries. The American dependency and the possibility of the finality of European integration are now in sight. Since the failure of EDC 30 years ago, the final breakthrough to mark a change in foreign and security policy after the Cold War for the European Community was formed by Title V of the Treaty of Maastricht. Title V managed to extend foreign policy of the European Community (now changed to EU), which used to be mainly concerned with economic issues, to all aspects of foreign and security policy. The transformation from EPC to CFSP was legally established in 1993 and allowed a relaunch of the idea of a Defence Community. Until then, most people saw the European integration as an economic project. Suddenly the public became aware that this economic project ranges from currency, to foreign and security policy, to agriculture, to environment and even to transport. Maastricht marked a turning-point in the history of European integration. With the creation of the CFSP in the TEU of 9/10 December 1991 the EU had extended its political responsibility to an international level for the first time.

During the period of the Cold War, security policy issues played a subordinate role in the EU unification process and took place in the framework of NATO or WEU. It was not until the revolutionary change of the years 1989/90 that the European Community was given the opportunity to be an actor in international security policy. According to Howorth, “there has been no such thing as ‘national defence’ in Europe” during the Cold War period, because of the involvement in NATO’s security and defence strategy (Howorth, 1997b: 11). Only France and Britain with their nuclear arsenal could truly claim national security as part of their national sovereignty. Other European countries did not have the luxury of manoeuvring space outside of NATO’s doctrine. On 19 June 1992 the WEU Ministerial Council met at Petersberg near Bonn to define the Petersberg tasks outlining WEU responsibilities as a military actor. However, the EU prospect to create a regional Defence Community via WEU independent from NATO did not happen. In contrast to the opinion of many neorealists, who “expected NATO to weaken after the Cold War....NATO has turned into a principal instrument of US hegemony on the Eurasian land mass” (Barry R. Posen, 2004: 9).

The NATO Berlin Council of 3 June 1996 marked an important date for transatlantic military co-operation. NATO foreign ministers agreed upon closer collaboration between the WEU and NATO and designed the European Security and Defence Identity as the European pillar in NATO in order to keep French autonomy aspirations outside of NATO mute. After that, NATO structures and assets were made available for WEU military action.

Finally, on 16/17 June 1997, with Article 17 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the WEU could become fully integrated into the EU, in spite of British protest. Furthermore, the position of

the High Representative, the General Affairs Council and the Strategy and Policy Unit were created as part of the treaty. The institutional completion of the CFSP prepared the ground for the possibility of a common defence. When the revised Amsterdam Treaty came into force in May 1999 the Kosovo tragedy had already demonstrated the need for a common defence in the CFSP.

The European disgrace and the American pressure on the major European members to improve military capabilities prompted the United Kingdom to drop its objections to EU defence. For the first time the UK drew near the French position on EU defence at an informal EC meeting on 24/25 October 1998 in Pörschach. By December 1998, Blair and Chirac issued a Joint Declaration on European Defence that demanded autonomous EU military capacities (50 years ago this notion had been brought up for the first and last time) which were now put into effect in the form of the ESDP in Cologne the following year. With St. Malo the idea of incorporation of the WEU into EU structures was suddenly possible. This idea implies that the EU would be given a defence component to its internal structures for the very first time. So, it was not until in 1999 that Article J.4 of TEU of Maastricht paved the way for an autonomous European security and defence policy by stating that “the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence” and hence made the absorption of the WEU into an autonomous European security and defence policy become a reality (European Council, 1992). At the Cologne and Helsinki summits, the EU member states agreed upon the inefficiency of continuing the operation of the WEU as a separate institution between the EU and NATO and came to terms with the gradual integration of the WEU into the Union. The ESDP has now replaced the WEU functionality in world politics.

4.3 Seven Years of ESDP

The development of the ESDP from 1999 until now can be divided into two phases. The first phase was ignited by external pressures challenging the EU to new and better security structures and instruments on a European level. Following the capability-building phase is the second phase of trying to define the purpose of the capabilities, which are to match up with the new world security situation. As aforementioned in the ESS, European security has to break out of the regional mould and adapt to the dramatically evolving international arena of new threats.

4.3.1 Institutionalisation Phase of the main ESDP Bodies⁸

At the European Council summit on 3/4 June 1999 the German presidency managed to transfer the agreement between two EU states into a European success story of an unseen dynamic. At Cologne, the member states agreed

that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence...The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO (European Council, 1999).

In order to reach these aims Cologne provided institutional changes and innovations for ESDP. Since Cologne the ESDP has developed the following bodies.

ESDP Bodies

The ESDP provides a political “framework [for defence issues] where governments come together to establish joint policies” (Magnet, 2005:12) of CFSP on behalf of the EU members. Like any EU polity, the ESDP is composed of executive and legislative bodies. The general EU executive is made up of an institutional triangle: the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament (EP). This trio holds the power of political decision-making of the EU. According to Article 13.1 of TEU, this role falls solely to the European Council in ESDP. In CFSP/ESDP the decision-making process is based on consensus and on the unanimity principle. The European Council is the supreme emitter of the political guidelines in the CFSP/ESDP. It assesses the common strategies and its presidency also sets the agenda. The presidency changes every six months among the member states. External representation is also the function of the European Council comparable with the head of state.

Governance and development of the CFSP/ESDP is the responsibility of the General Affairs Council. As a rule, the Council, consisting of Foreign and Defence ministers, meets for a conference every month. Commission members also attend these conferences and take part in negotiation.

In addition to the European Council, the innovation of “Mr. CFSP” or the High Representative, positioned by former Spanish Foreign Minister and former Secretary-General of NATO, Javier Solana, represents the EU externally, specifically on matters of CFSP/ESDP. Javier Solana incorporates the General Secretary of the Council and the Secretary-General of the WEU until its full integration and the High Representative in one person, who is the most

⁸ A detailed chronology of the main ESDP institutionalisation agreements and conferences can be viewed in Appendix 1 (ESDP chronology: from Cologne to Nice).

important individual in CFSP/ESDP. He represents the EU on behalf of the member states to the world and confers it with coherence. Solana is supported by the Policy Unit (PU) and the Directorate General E to monitor the new ESDP bodies. Solana, the Commission and the presidency compose the Troika representing the EU to third party countries. In the bureaucratic hierarchy of ESDP policy-making a Political and Security Committee (PSC) formerly known as the Political Committee was sketched at Cologne to serve as the linking point between the EU Military Committee (EUMC), NATO's military committee, the High Representative and Policy Unit. The PSC consists of national representatives at an ambassadorial level and of a representative of the Commission who is familiar with ESDP matters. These representatives have the task to develop military crisis management concepts, to provide a forum for NATO dialogue, to monitor policies, to delegate EUMC and give advice to GAERC (Ambos, 2004: 171-172). Due to the high degree of co-ordination with other EU institutions, PSC can be considered as the heart of ESDP.


The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) were drafted to support PSC and provide expertise and help for the defence policies of the GAERC. The EUMC is the highest military body. The EU member states endow the EUMC with general staff chiefs who provide the PSC with the necessary military advice and who control all military operations and direct the EU Military Staff. The EUMC conducts assessments for risk of potential crises and capabilities and it conducts operational planning. It is noteworthy that some of these Chiefs of Defence also sit in the Military Committee of NATO. In crisis situations, the EUMC and EUMS collaborate and give the PSC strategic advice. The EUMS conducts the crisis management operations of the ESDP, while the EUMC monitors the operations and exercises command responsibility (Ambos, 2004: 175-176). The EUMS officers provide the ESDP with the main source of military expertise. Its functions are "early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning, and also identification of European national and multinational forces for possible operations" (Missiroli, 2002: 65). The EUMS is part of the Council Secretariat and is directly answerable to the High Representative. In contrast to the PSC, both military bodies are not anchored in any European treaties. All of these new military structures draw mainly upon former WEU staff.

Another innovation in the Council Secretariat is the Situation Centre (SITCEN) monitoring the new ESDP bodies. On the Council General Secretariat level, the CFSP section was restructured into a political-military unit known as the Directorate General (DG E), of which its sub-directorate concerning the ESDP and its military and civilian operations is important for the military dimension of this thesis.

Also, but to a lesser extent involved in the policy-shaping process of the ESDP is the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), or rather COREPER II. In contrast to

COREPER I, which is concerned with the first EU pillar, COREPER II deals with the intergovernmental second and third pillar of the EU. It co-operates with PSC in formulating recommendations to GAERC and is responsible for the administrative and financial aspects of CFSP/ESDP.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) signifies the youngest but, nevertheless, an essential institution for ESDP since its creation in 2004. It was implemented five years after Cologne in order to reduce the deficiencies of European armament, which particularly exist in the areas of electronic warfare systems, communications, logistics, strategic air- and sealift (Dempsey, 2004: 197). The European armament market also poses various issues of duplication and inefficiency due to the unco-ordinated procurement of EU members and the free market principle. Unnecessary defence expenditures on duplicating capabilities can be avoided through a stronger co-ordination among ESDP members via EDA. As a result of joint EDA armament procurement and R&D programmes, the defence expenditure of individual nation-states can be minimised while attaining the Headline Goal 2010. EDA's aim is to synergise and create greater efficiency through pooling of disposable resources and combined procurement investments. This also implies that the ESDP military operations will benefit from the successful synergy on a resource level as well as on an operational level that is higher because of its higher degree of interoperability. The development of EDA is a cornerstone on the way to a Defence Union. Co-operation on this small scale can eventually spill over to other ESDP policies. At the end of 2006, EDA published a document providing a long-term vision and guidelines for ESDP members to orient to in terms of ESDP capabilities. Finally, the former WEU organs, the Satellite Centre (SATCEN) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) are to be mentioned as they are of autonomous status. However, they are attached to ESDP. SATCEN is an important institution to be enhanced in order to establish a certain degree of ESDP independence from NATO/US assets, for this is a domain of future military warfare, where the European capabilities are underdeveloped. In this regard, it is especially the *Galileo* project which has contributed enormously to the fortification of the European pillar in NATO.

Figure 4: ESDP Bodies

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In the second half of 1999, Finland was the holder of the presidency. Since Helsinki, the three major bodies working for the GAERC, namely the PSC, EUMC and EUMS, were finalised. So this period marked the completion of the new ESDP bodies of Cologne and also the formulation of the ERRF as part of the European Headline Goal, which gave a temporal and quantitative capability guideline: by 2003, the EU member states should be capable to deploy up to 60 000 soldiers in less than 60 days for operations of at least one year. The EC summit in Santa Maria da Feira 19-20 June 2000 was more concerned with civilian aspects of ESDP and the modalities for NATO assets and consultation mechanisms. During the following French presidency the Capabilities Commitment Conference was held in Brussels 20-21 November 2000. The EU member states committed themselves to contributing to the rapid reaction capabilities according to the Helsinki Force Catalogue (view Appendix 2). However, aspiring EU candidates, mainly from Eastern Europe, also voluntarily committed to the Headline Goal Plus in order to improve EU military power. The commitment of the EU members to the Helsinki Force Catalogue highlights Italy, France, the UK and Germany as the main contributors. The big three are among the top five contributors. This further justifies the selection of these nations for the analysis by the author.

The 6-12 of December 2000 marked the end of the French presidency, when the EC Council in Nice finalised the TEU as well as the political and military structural implementation of the ESDP. The EC summit in Nice can be viewed as the end of the ESDP institutionalisation phase. It is also seen as the commencement of the actual political use of the newly military equipped CFSP and the advent of the ESDP placement procedure in international security.

Until the Iraq crisis in 2003, the ESDP development had advanced at a very fast pace. The terrorist attacks in New York City and at the Pentagon intensified the EU-NATO relations and promoted greater convergence of the idea of national and global security not only among the EU member states, but also between the USA and the EU member countries. 9/11 added a dynamic to the ESDP development. The institutionalisation of the ESDP was completed in 2001 and the fulfilment of the first Headline Goal was attained at the EC summit in Laeken on 14-15 December 2001, where the ESDP was announced operational. It was now time for the second phase of the ESDP to prove itself in the international realm as a coherent and functional military actor. In 2003, military operations were launched and successfully completed.

4.3.2 First ESDP Operations

One year after the ESDP was proclaimed operational, the first EU-led civilian operations outside the EU began on a small scale in January 2003. By March 2003, the first EU military forces were deployed to FYROM to take over NATO's operation of *Allied Harmony*. The tasks of the soldiers included patrolling, reconnaissance, surveillance, situational awareness, reporting and liaison activities. The soldiers were organised into 22 light field liaison units travelling in non-armoured vehicles. Additional support was provided by helicopters, partly responsible for medical evacuation, and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal capability. This mission known as *Concordia* was led by France acting as the framework nation until EUFOR took over until the termination of this mission on 15 December 2003. *Concordia* was the first EU military mission abroad; it included planning and logistical support from NATO as agreed upon in Berlin Plus.

The next European military mission putting EU capabilities to a test, *Artemis*, started June 2003, when approximately 2,000 peacekeeping troops were deployed to Ituri in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to stabilise the region. Ituri had been the tragic centre of a long conflict among the ethnic militias for a decade. Again this mission was under French leadership until its termination in early September 2003 (Lindstrom, 2004: 116-129).

On 2 December 2004, the EUFOR-*Althea* mission, which was decided in the Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP mid-2004, succeeded the NATO-led multinational stabilisation force

(SFOR) mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to ensure a smooth transition from NATO leadership and to prepare Bosnia and Herzegovina for eventual EU membership. EUFOR-*Althea* is still ongoing and will finalise when stability and peace in the region are secured (The Council of the European Union, 2005).

In total, there have been 17 civilian and military ESDP operations so far, and ten of which are ongoing: three in the Balkans, three in sub-Saharan Africa, three in the Middle East and one in Aceh.

4.3.3 Challenges

The military operations outside of the EU, stretching as far as the African continent, have displayed operational, financial and planning challenges that the EU confronted when deploying troops over a long distance for a period of several months.

Operational Challenges

Although the DRC mission had been a success, it also crystallised the logistical challenge of deploying troops far from the European continent and sustaining them. The *Artemis* engagement in the DRC had to be limited in duration and be very specific, for EU capabilities were restricted. Sustainability in a different environment ranges from basic needs, for example, in the DRC purified water issues to more complex tasks concerning hard power capabilities. Such issues pose a greater challenge in an unknown environment than in a familiar environment that is a minor distance from the homeland. Furthermore, external as well as internal communication and communication facilities are challenged. On the one hand, there is the internal problem of multilingual troops and different national standards and, on the other hand, there is the external lack of communication capabilities when engaged in a high-intensity environment. This contributes to the limits of communication. Over time, these operational difficulties are likely to be abolished and the military capabilities, be improved. The EU has a long way to catch up, but in view of the ECAP panels (view Appendix 3) the first steps to identify capability shortfalls and to improve European capabilities and to decline the capabilities-expectation gap have been taken (Hix, 1999: 347).

Financial Challenges

The launch of the first ESDP operations in 2003 concurrently meant a rise of the CFSP expenditure. The EU budget for the CFSP can be availed for civilian ESDP operations, whereas military ESDP operations are mainly financed by the member states or participating third countries. With the creation of *Athena* on 1 March 2004, the EU produced a permanent

mechanism replacing the former ad hoc system to handle the costs of EU military operations of any scale, complexity and urgency. *Athena* is managed by a Special Committee of participating member states including Denmark. These countries and third countries financially contribute to *Athena* and, to a minor extent, financial support also comes from sources, such as, interest revenue.

Athena, acting on behalf of participating or contributing Member States, has the necessary legal capacity to hold a bank account, acquire, hold or dispose of property, enter into contracts and administrative arrangements and be a party to legal proceedings. The decision provides for the Athena administrator, with the support of the Union military staff and, if he/she is in post, the operation commander, to evaluate the amount judged necessary to cover the common costs of the operation for the planned period. The administrator will then propose this amount through the Presidency to the Council bodies responsible for examining the draft joint action or decision (European Commission, 2004).

Planning Challenges

Prior to the actual military operation, the EU has to face planning challenges which are critical for any successful operation. Successful planning implies the abatement of existing difficulties in procurement, media relations and collaboration with third countries or with international institutions. The secondment of sufficient procurement experts poses a necessity for the future tackling of EU missions and, therefore, a lack of equipment or infrastructure would not occur. Military missions take place in a high-intensity area; thus, they require well-trained media experts who ensure adequate media flow for Brussels and the public of each individual country. So far, EU military operations have always involved the collaboration of either third countries or international organisations, in particular the UN. EU integration in defence is based on an intergovernmental level making planning a mission in collaboration with third parties an even more difficult task. Since the ESDP is young and standards for financial, administrative and media-related planning are not perfected, issues of incoherence and lack of guidance emerge when more parties are involved in a military operation (Lindstrom, 2004: 122-129).

Although the EU military operations have been modest in scope, they have been a success. With small, but steady steps, the EU is learning from its various challenges in each successful operation enabling it to continuously acquire increased operationality on a broader scope. However, the Iraqi crisis in 2003 opened up profound differences of political views in the ESDP. The political unity, gained over the years, broke apart into smaller bits of nationalisms. Iraq represents a rupture in the military operations of the ESDP which can be traced back to the intergovernmental institutional framework of the ESDP promoting national egoisms.

4.4 Intergovernmental Framework of the ESDP

Since the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU as the 'roof' of the three pillars was implemented establishing the EU as a divided polity of Community and intergovernmental dynamics. The EU is a hybrid form of co-operation, where the Commission and European Parliament are the most influential EU organs on a supranational level. However, they are relegated to a subordinate role in the ESDP, while the European Council is the executive and legislative power possessing the right of initiative in the second (CFSP/ESDP) and third pillar (judicial and police co-operation). This re-organisation clearly segregates the supranational from the intergovernmental policies. The ESDP/CFSP is located on an intergovernmental level, where nation-states play the major role in policy-making. EU member states do not want to see possible ESDP matters of life or death of their soldiers put in supranational hands and, therefore, strictly decline to cede core elements of sovereignty to the Commission or EP. The only direct instrument of influence for the first pillar would be through budgetary power. However, the budgetary power of below three percent is insignificant for the ESDP. Moreover, the EU budget does not finance the hard power dimension of the second pillar which is the central approach of this thesis. This means that military expenditure of the ESDP is main responsibility of each individual nation-state.

In the sensitive field of EU security and defence policy, intergovernmental co-operation of policy-making invigorates the position of each individual country. While the intergovernmental method sustains state sovereignty, it complicates the coherence and consistency of the ESDP. In order to facilitate the decision-making process based on the lowest common denominator in the ESDP, the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam have introduced instruments of joint action, common position and common strategy. The Treaty of Amsterdam also introduced the possibility of a qualitative abstention during the voting procedure in the Council. In this case, undetermined or even reluctant countries have the possibility to remain neutral and uninvolved with the outcome of the decision-making process. Furthermore, they do not detain decision-making and are not allowed to impair the realisation of the decisions. In sum, this instrument alleviates the rigid intergovernmental method.

General decision-making relies on unanimity unless a Common Strategy by the European Council is underlying; then, then Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is applied. In reality, since the beginning of the enforcement of the Common Strategy instrument on 1 May 1999, it has only been executed three times. By 1 January 2007, when Bulgaria and Romania accede the decision-making process will be further complicated. Unanimity in an enlarged EU of 27 members, illustrates a difficult decision-making scenario. In this regard, QMV would significantly facilitate and accelerate the decision-making process and hence ESDP

deployment. The large European countries, such as Germany, favour QMV because it transfers the demographic power of Germany. Despite procedural advantages, the highly populated countries have encountered vehement opposition by the smaller countries who see their sovereignty in jeopardy because QMV favours the voting power of the great European nations. However, the intergovernmental method is restrictive and poses the threat of a complete paralysis. Indeed, one can argue that since the summit at Nice it seems as if the element of intergovernmentalism has strengthened.

Conclusion

Despite the fast pace of development of the ESDP the Iraq crisis and the failure of the Constitutional Treaty have shown the darkside of intergovernmental integration, where individual nationalisms are counterproductive to the common good. Instruments and procedures have been introduced to make this rigid order more flexible towards ESDP crisis responses, but have not yet resulted in the wished for coherency and consistency improvement. Nevertheless, one has to realise that the ESDP is a very young institution which needs time and patience to grow into possibly a Defence Union one day if the ESDP member states are willing to transfer the high politics to the EU.

The Americans are great realists and their academics talk all the time about the balance of powers. And they wonder all the time whether Europe is going to be a balance to the US (Hill, 2004: 33).

Since the end of the Soviet Empire, the USA remains unchallenged in its status as the world's sole superpower. International politics today are seemingly dominated by international interests of American security matters, clearly expressed in Afghanistan and Iraq. In particular, after 9/11, the War on Terrorism policy launched by the administration of George W. Bush appears on top of the international security agenda. There does not seem to be any other great power or "cohesive coalition of the other consequential powers", namely the big three Europeans, to mitigate America's capricious behaviour in IR (Barry R. Posen, 2004: 8). US primacy sixteen years after the Cold War is seemingly uncontested in international politics. This does not mean that the bipolar structure of the Cold War period has been replaced by a unipolarity of the USA. Instead, according to Joseph S. Nye Jr. one has to view power distribution in a more refined three-dimensional pattern now. American hegemony is complex and contestable in economic and other transnational issues. In fact, the USA holds unipolar predominance only in the distribution of power on military issues. On other issues the USA does not enjoy unprecedented power and relies on multilateralism.⁹ Thus, this chapter will focus on the empirical and analytical concerns surrounding the military nature of America's predominance within the new security environment in order to provide the reference point for the security and defence analysis of the big three Europeans in ESDP.

5.1 Understanding America's Power

Power is difficult to measure and therefore a security dilemma will always be present for states, compelling them to strive for power superiority. Usually a state owns various power assets:

population—the size, education level, and skills of its citizenry; geography—the size, location, and natural resource endowment of the state; governance—the effectiveness of its political system; values—the norms a state lives by and stands for, the nature of its ideology, and the extent of its appeal to foreigners; wealth—the level, sources and nature of its productive economy; leadership—the political skill of its leaders and the number of skilful leaders it has; and military power—the nature, size, and composition of its military forces (Art & Waltz, 1999: 6).

⁹ For example, in world economy the USA is joined in a quadripolarity by the EU, China and Japan.

With a population of 295,734,134, a territory of 9,631,420 sq km and a stable-growing economy with a GDP (real growth rate) of 3.5 per cent or a GDP (per capita) of \$41,800 the USA represents a superpower (CIA, 2006). This superpower has the world's leading GNP of US\$ 11,351bn, which is supported by its vast resource endowment (coal, copper, lead, molybdenum, phosphates, uranium, bauxite, gold, iron, mercury, nickel, potash, silver, tungsten, zinc, petroleum, natural gas, timber) (CIA, 2006). In the future the USA can seemingly only be matched by the emerging powers of China and India in these aspects of Waltzian capabilities. In regard to the other Waltzian power criteria, the USA is also among the leading nations in the world.

Of all power assets Art determines wealth, political skill and military power to be the most fungible assets. He argues that military power is integral to international politics and the higher the amount of military power of a state the greater its fungibility. He regards militarily powerful states as more influential in international politics and simultaneously more secure than states with weak military assets. They are less subject to the will of others and they are in a stronger position to offer protection or to threaten harm similar to the current position of the USA. The following paragraphs will closely examine and clarify the substance of America's military power.

5.1.1 America's Defence Budget

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 stimulated the USA to refuel the armament race worldwide which had been at a decline after the end of the Cold War. The military expenditure of 2005 has reached a new high since the end of the Cold War and is even expected to rise another 21bn in 2006. Largely, it is the USA which contributes to this development covering 48 per cent of the total world military expenditure in 2005, mainly induced by its War on Terrorism policy.




Figure 5

Data Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, p. 39

With a military expenditure of around 3.35 per cent of GDP the USA invests two times more than the five next leading military powers all together ¹⁰ in its military force. Its arsenal ranges from new bayonets for the American Army of a couple of dollars to the expensive order of a 97000t Aircraft Carrier Nimitz Class (CVN) worth US\$ 4.5bn per ship for the American Navy.

Table 3: National Defence Budget

	2004	2005	2006	2007
BA	US\$490bn	US\$505bn	US\$561bn	
Outlay	US\$455bn	US\$495bn	US\$535bn	
Request: BA/Outlay				US\$513bn US\$527bn

Data Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, p. 29

5.1.2 America's Military Potential

The military power is one of the most important pillars reaffirming America's dominance in IR. According to Barry R. Posen, it is especially the *command of the commons*, which he refers to as common areas or physical domains, such as sea, space and air, shared by all nations. These commons constitute military supremacy. The American dominance of these commons makes any challenge to America's military hegemony in the near or medium future implausible (Barry R. Posen, 2004: 3-44). In general, one can state that the USA gets more military use of the commons than other countries. This is due to its strong economy facilitating an excessively high investment in new military capabilities and technological warfare development. In comparison to other economically strong nations, the USA uses a higher percentage of its national budget for the development of the American military. The advanced American military technology and the size of its manpower of 1,546,372 active, 10,126 civilian and 956,202 reserve men and women willing to serve and die for the USA, raises its military power beyond any other nation's reach. Therefore, it seems as if the USA commands the commons. Only the People's Republic of China possesses a higher amount of manpower (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006: 29). Nevertheless, the following tables will reaffirm the American unipolarity in terms of military power.

¹⁰ View Appendix 4.

Table 4: Equipment by Type of the Army

Army 595,946 (manpower incl. reservists, but not of the Army National Guard)

Tanks	7,620+
Reconnaissance	96
Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AIFV)	6,719
Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC)	1,608
Artillery	6,530
Tugs	21,955+
Amphibious Crafts	124+
Aircrafts	307
Helicopters	3,821
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles	42+
Air Defence	1,281+
Radar	251

Data Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, pp. 30-32

America's Army plays a minor role in dominating the commons. It is in particular, the American Navy and Air Force which contribute to this hegemonic position. Though the commons are accessible to any other country, the USA manages to keep the commons under their control via their inexhaustible military potential. Posen argues that the USA "can credibly deny their use to others; and that others would lose a military contest for the commons if they attempted to deny them to the United States" (Barry R. Posen, 2004: 19). Posen sees the command of the commons as the "key military enabler of the US global power position" allowing it to exploit other sources of power more fully than any other nation (Barry R. Posen, 2004: 19).

Command of the Sea

Table 5: Equipment by Type of the Navy (incl. US Coast Guard, Marine Corps and reserve organisations)

Navy 376,750 (manpower total incl. Marine Corps, US Coast Guard and reserve organisations would be around 1 million)

Submarines	72
Principal Surface Combatants	135
Patrol and Coastal Combatants	152
Mine Warfare	41
Command Ships	2

Amphibious Ships and Crafts	380
Inshore Undersea Warfare	45
Aircrafts	2,782
Helicopters	1,583
Missiles	available (amount not given)
Tanks	403
Reconnaissance	252
Artillery	1,511
Tugs	5,063
Air Defence	Available (amount not given)
Radar	23
Amphibious Assault Vehicles	1,311
Logistics and Support	354
Bases/ Airbases	6/2

Data Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, pp. 32-37

Nowadays, the American Navy enjoys the supreme status once occupied by the navy of the British Empire in the nineteenth century. Assets of America's supremacy above and beneath the ocean are seven different types of submarines, of which the nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) are the key assets for America's command of the sea as France is the only other country possessing nuclear powered attack submarines, 28 different types of fixed wing and ten rotary wing aircraft and 25 types of surface ships assuring command of the surface of the ocean as well as seven types of special missions ships, 15 types of missiles, nine different types of weapon systems, seven different Naval Fleet Auxiliary Forces and three types of underwater search and recovery equipment (US Navy). Each type consists of numerous and expensive capabilities.¹¹ Some capabilities such as the SSN and CVN are worth billions making them an exclusive investment affordable only for a few rich countries of which only the USA, a few Western countries and China are able to build them.

Beyond the technological military capabilities, the Navy has possesses 376,750 active and 152,850 reserve manpower subdivided into the Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron, Navy Seabees, Navy Seals, Navy Rank Structure and Navy Task Force Simulation and Modelling.¹²

¹¹ The approximate amount of individual naval, aerial and army capabilities can be viewed in the Military Balance. This thesis seeks to give an idea of America's power, which is one of many subtopics building up to the argumentation of the main topic. Therefore, to avoid any distraction from the main issue the chapter on the USA is not meant to go into too much detail -by using figures which do not always present a precise figure and vary from publication to publication -, but to give a compact outline of America's military supremacy.

¹² These figures do not include the civilian US Coast Guard and Military Sealift Command crew as well as the Marine Corps Reserve.

Command of the Air

Table 6: Equipment by Type of the Air Force (includes the Civil Reserve Air Fleet)

Air Force 347,400 (manpower does not include reservists)

Aircrafts	6,825
Helicopters	167
Missiles	41,120
Bombs	130+
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles	65

Data Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, pp. 37-39

US air power is a significant factor of successful military operations. Air power allows attacks at a great range with the least loss of forces and casualties while simultaneously causing great damage to the adversary. For instance, the Kosovo conflict could have not been put under control by NATO if America's air power did not intervene on 24 March 1999 (Seller, 2001: 122). The American air operation in Kosovo was an essential factor contributing to the victory of the Alliance. It also painfully revealed the military gap, particularly in the aerial field between the Europeans and the USA.

Today, America's Air Force has a manpower of 347,400 active personnel. Its extraordinary range of cargo, combat, evacuation and sanitation aircrafts make up a supreme air fleet. The American Air Force also consists of a division concerned with the command of space, which is the third common of American supremacy, according to Posen.

Command of Space

Table 7: Equipment by Type of the Air Force Space Command and North American Aerospace Defence Command

Missiles	550
Space Based Systems-Satellites	34+
Space Based Systems-Sensors	24
Strategic Defence Systems	Approximately 85

Data Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, pp. 30, 38

The USA spends a large amount of its military expenditure on surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and communication satellites in space, which are important for worldwide co-ordination of America's military land, sea and air operations. For the fiscal years 2002-2007 the USA plans to spend \$165 billion on extraterrestrial research activities according to the Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld. Outer space combat is an aspect of the future, in

which the American government invests now in order to guarantee its hegemony in the long-run. The command of space is a field where the USA is contemporarily the leading nation. The EU and Russia have emerged as competitors in space research, but in comparison to the USA they lack the finance to fully utilise their knowledge and skills. So far, space is mainly used for satellites supporting terrestrial combat. America's conventional military power is strongly dependent on its satellite technology, which can make it an attractive target for adversaries. Space is a young common, which has yet to be fully explored in order for the USA to have its supreme command as in the other commons.

In addition to the traditional commons that Posen has described, globalisation has also brought about the internet as a new common or political space, which is not dominated by national actors or the USA yet. This new common poses mainly technological challenges for America's military and is definitely an important field to be closely watched in the future, but will not be observed in this context as this thesis concentrates on the structural neorealist and traditional concept of hard power in ESDP and the nations to be analysed.

Nuclear Deterrence

The overload of America's military assets for the dominance of the commons is backed by the best equipped army in the world and by America's military bases throughout the world, which provide the fundamental infrastructure for commanding the commons (US Army, 2006). The demise of the former Soviet Union and the expansion of NATO to eastern and southern Europe have enhanced America's military access to current geopolitical key regions.

Last but not least, the USA is the world's number one nuclear power with an arsenal of 5735 active, 5235 strategic, 500 non-strategic and 4225 reserve warheads. The USA is closely followed by Russia with a stockpile of approximately 16000 warheads, of which 5830 are active (Kristensen & Norris, 2006b). Well behind these super powers are the nuclear powers of France, the UK and China¹³. The world's five official nuclear powers have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Consequently, nuclear warheads are to be decreased step by step. Despite the treaty, Donald Rumsfeld stated at his first speech as American Secretary of Defence to the North Atlantic Council (NAC-D) on 7 June 2001 that the USA does "not intend to abandon nuclear deterrence. Rather we see it as one layer of a broader deterrence strategy that includes several mutually reinforcing layers of deterrence" (Rumsfeld, 2001). Nuclear weapons are the core of America's security concept nourishing America's inviolability and strength to pursue its national interests on a global scale.

¹³ Approximate figures:
Great Britain 200 (Kristensen & Norris, 2005a)
France 350 (Wikipedia, 2006)
China 200 (Kristensen & Norris, 2006a)

Summary of America's Military Power Potential

In short, America's military hegemony seems to be uncontested and omnipresent. America's military is engaged in 48 countries around the globe to secure freedom and stability (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006: 40-44). Notwithstanding, the failure of American troops in Somalia in 1993 has scratched the flawless image of military hegemony. America's military is not invincible, but far from being outrun by any other nation in the near future. The USA is the only nation in a position to actually execute global policies according to its national interests due to the military means of power projection and coercion, but also because of its attractive soft power and its willingness or rather self-proclaimed global responsibility (Seller, 2001: 138).

The international dominance of America's national interests in global politics will appear less threatening and less provocative to other nations if America's military power is politically embodied in a multilateral framework of co-operation, in which the other countries can benefit from American protection. If America's national interests are defined in broad terms and other nation-states can be convinced that this hegemony brings net benefits, the American pursuit of national interests in the global arena will sustain more international support. The international perception and the use of America's military potential depends to a large extent on the political leaders of the country. This will be examined in the following paragraphs.

5.2 Security Policy from the Clinton to the Bush Administration

Military power has been the basis of American security policy whether under Clinton or Bush. America's global power position as well as inner-state and structural premises, particularly the politically strong Congress, influence foreign policy and maintain the continuum of unilateral strategies (Rudolf, 2004: 7). Undeniably, inner-state factors have an impact on the unilateral course of the USA, but it is significantly America's hard power, which gives the USA the self-assurance to take the liberty of rejecting treaties and agreements of the international community, which do not serve American interests. Specifically, the transatlantic relations with the EU on security policy have been afflicted by American nationalism. In which direction the ESDP will develop will also largely depend on the influence of American hegemony in ESDP and the transatlantic relations of the big three.

5.2.1 Transatlantic Security Relations under the Clinton Administration

The administration of President William J. Clinton pursued a strategy of engagement and enlargement which built upon the Bush strategy of engagement and leadership (Seller, 2001: 120-123). Clinton's strategy aimed to fulfil four main policies: firstly, a new burden sharing and re-establishment of division of labour within NATO is to be organised; secondly, the USA should be granted a leadership role within any Euro-Atlantic security order; thirdly, the CFSP is to be supported as long as America's security prerogatives are not encroached upon; finally, the promotion of a successful transition of the Eastern European countries into democracies and their integration into the market economy would create greater security as it is believed that democracies do not fight democracies. In contrast to the preceding Bush Senior administration the Clinton administration designed its strategies on a more pro-European basis and more in favour of employing means of diplomacy. USA-EU external relations flourished and by 1995 a New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and a National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement were presented. They served as a legitimate security framework for the new American role in Europe and its involvement in the evolution of the European security order where NATO enlargement became of vital interest for both the Clinton and Bush administration.

At the end of the Cold War the USA continued investing in military and military-related technologies, whereas the EU members did not engage themselves and by the conflict outbreak in the Balkans the EU members had to realise that they had fallen behind and had become dependent on America's military force. Since then the USA has permanently called for more improvement of European capabilities. In its view, it does not want to take the entire burden for securing global peace and stability. The succeeding Clinton administration continued Bush Senior's security strategies of maintaining American presence and control in Europe to avoid any hegemonic aspirations of European countries. However, it also promoted the strengthening of the European pillar through ESDI. Hence, the White House was not pleased to hear about EU efforts to replace the ESDI by an autonomous ESDP in the late 90s. Symptomatically, the Clinton administration reacted by formulating the 3 Ds to "avoid pre-empting Alliance decision making by de-linking ESDI from NATO[,] duplicating existing efforts[,] discriminating against non-EU members" (Albright, 1998).

3 Ds

De-linking

The development of the ESDP raised concerns in Washington about the future influence of NATO if the ESDP served as an autonomous EU security institution. The USA strictly emphasised that it would only tolerate the ESDP when NATO remains priority and the ESDP is to be considered as complementary to NATO and part of ESDI. On one hand, America's policies encourage more EU burden-sharing while on the other hand, ESDP development in building a political entity within NATO is feared because it could destabilise NATO.

Duplicating

As a consequence of America's demand for no de-linking between NATO and the ESDP, the second American warning to the EU of no duplication arises. By request of the USA, the ESDP is permitted to access NATO capacities for its military operations at any time. This will hinder the ESDP to become an entirely autonomous institution. On the one hand, the American request seems a paradox, since over the last years the USA has put their European partner under pressure to invest more into their military capabilities and aggrandise their burden-sharing. On the other hand, the USA promotes the use of the existing military assets of NATO, the fortification of the European pillar in NATO and the rejection of European military autonomy tendencies. European military capability improvement is absolutely necessary as the comparison of military expenditure and actual capabilities show in this thesis. Otherwise, transatlantic co-operation could degenerate with, on the one side, a mighty USA and on the other side, a weak European military component which was not able to solve Kosovo by itself. At the moment the military budgets of France, the UK and Germany are unlikely to rise. In fact, a rise in the European military expenditure will never be able to compensate the military technological gap between both sides of the Atlantic in the near future. Therefore, the EU will have to accept American supremacy and unilateralism as it is neither an equal partner nor can it counterbalance.

Discriminating

The third warning addressed by Madeleine Albright concerns the non-discrimination of non-EU NATO members, specifically speaking of Iceland, Norway and Turkey. The USA fears that these nation-states could be neglected and treated as second-class partners to the EU. These countries only have consultative and co-operative rights according to the resolutions of Feira. This could have as a consequence that ESDP members in NATO form a unified political bloc eroding NATO. Especially in view of Turkey's strategic importance in the Middle-East for the USA, Washington is keen to see renegotiations of Turkey's EU membership after negotiations were put on ice by the EU. The Turkish side would also

welcome a membership (Erdogan, 2006). However, since the EU is determined to hold on to its membership criteria Turkey has become frustrated and threatens to block the EU's access to NATO capacities. The last thing the USA desires is an inefficient NATO as its unilateral toolbox. Though the USA is not directly affected by EU discrimination of non-EU members, eventually this could result in de-linking from NATO.

From a neorealist point of view, America's scepticism results from a fear of being challenged by, or to lose its hegemonic position to a rising military alliance of individually weaker states. Strikingly, the Clinton administration's use of jargon sympathetic to multilateralism appears to be a façade for its unilateral course scotching power aspirations of other nations. By 2000, America's criticism lessened after the EU declared ESDP complementary to NATO and inautonomous, and so a co-operative dialogue between NATO and ESDP was translated into action. On the one hand, the USA considered the ESDP as a possibility of military as well as financial burden-sharing with the EU but, on the other hand, the USA feared EU power aspirations. This ambivalence still exists within the Bush administration and continues to strain the transatlantic relations.

5.3 Security Policy under the Bush Administration

Unilateralists don't come around the table to listen to others and to share opinion.
Unilateralists don't ask opinions of world leaders (The Whitehouse, 2001a).

5.3.1 Before 9/11

During his trip to Europe on 13 June 2001 when asked whether Washington's policy can be described as a unilateralist approach or leadership George W. Bush's reply at NATO Headquarters in Brussels cannot whitewash the highly unilateral tendency in American policy. When he came into power at the end of 2000, Bush perpetuated Clinton's unilateral course, but with an aversion to binding the USA to international institutions. The American rejection of major international agreements and treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (all in 2001 before 9/11) reflect the scepticism of the new Republican Government towards international institutions. This has aggravated the transatlantic situation, and the international community as a whole was disgruntled. Increasingly, the new administration seemed to blatantly exploit the international community as a means of carrying through national interests.

In security policy, Clinton and Bush strategies before 9/11 are not as different as perceived. It is their different approaches, and to a strong degree the rhetoric, which distinguishes the

intensity of unilateralism. The Clinton administration did not exploit American primacy. Under his administration the USA fostered international institutions and remained a European power by driving NATO enlargement to Eastern Europe and being engaged in the Kosovo conflict. Since other countries benefited from America's hegemony which served the security interests of the world community, and seemingly not solely those of the USA, balancing American hegemony was not obviously desirable at the time of Clinton.

5.3.2 The new Administration's ESDP and NATO Policies

This is what still makes the transatlantic relationship distinctive: when we agree, we are core of any effective global coalition; when we disagree, we are the global brake (Hamilton, 2006: 47).

In the field of transatlantic security the USA cherishes multilateral as well as bilateral relations with EU member states. On the multilateral level of the ESDP the new Bush administration opines similarly to the previous government. The ESDP is to be complementary to NATO and that "[t]hose pursuing a European Security and Defense Policy will need to be vigilant to ensure that this project...adds capabilities to NATO...and that activities are arranged so that NATO has the right of first refusal" (Rumsfeld, 2001). America's insistence on the primacy of NATO and its scepticism towards ESDP remain and add to the delicate transatlantic situation.

Under Bush the Clinton paradigm of NATO engagement and enlargement continues, but America's security concerns have entirely shifted from Europe to the region of the Middle East (Rühle, 2003: 9). The Clinton presidency failed to reconfigure the international system. Bush's attempt to stabilise a post-cold war structure involved defining new geopolitics with the Middle East as the key region and weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as the main threats of the new security structure when in the wrong hands (The Whitehouse, 2001a). Terrorism was then ranked among the threats posed by cyberattack, high-tech weapons and rogue states until 9/11 raised terrorism to be the central threat to America's security (Rumsfeld, 2001). Before 11 September 2001, Bush came into office "to pursue a 'humble' foreign policy that would avoid the entanglements of the Bill Clinton years....After Sept. 11, however, the Bush administration embarked on a different path, outlining a muscular, idealistic and unilateralist vision of American power and how to use it" (M. Allen & Ratnesar, 2006: 20).

5.3.3 Post-9/11

After the 9/11 attacks in the first year of the Bush administration the international security policy became strongly homeland-oriented and dominated by national security interests, which were first anchored and reflected in the National Security Strategy (NSS) in September 2002. This document is a response to the dawn of the new global threats and to the events of 9/11. The Bush administration has formulated the NSS, also known as the Bush doctrine, to serve as a guideline for future action to protect American values: freedom, democracy and free enterprise and to promote the security of the USA and the rest of the world (George W. Bush, 2002: 1). After 9/11, the NSS has become the core of America's security and policy.

National Security Strategy 2002

The NSS identifies America's vital security interests and comprises core strategies and policies to be pursued by the American government in order to organise a clear structure in IR with the USA as the leading nation. The NSS registers the same new global threats as the ESS and shares their ranking of threat. Nevertheless, the NSS, which appeared 15 months before the ESS, mostly expresses purely American security concerns. Since the early 30s of the past century, Europe had been the central component of America's security strategy. Now as new security interests have emerged, the Europeans who are the oldest and most powerful allies are hardly mentioned in this security document.

Stabilising regions is an issue shared by both sides of the Atlantic. Whereas the EU emphasises bringing stability to the EU periphery, the USA is more concerned about non-European regional conflicts in Israel – because of the “region's importance to other global priorities” to the USA – and between Pakistan and India, and to a lesser extent Middle and South America as well as Africa (George W. Bush, 2002: 9-12).

The American strategy displays strong nationalist and realist traits and emphasises its supreme military potential, which remains its prime national security mechanism by deterring and pre-empting emerging threats and fighting them when all other paths fail (George W. Bush, 2002: 1-2, 26-29). Furthermore, the realist undertone becomes evident on bilateral issues between the USA and the great powers of India, China and Russia in order to stabilise its hegemonic position.

In this context, America's self-perception and language crystallise a realist American view of the world where the USA “enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence” (George W. Bush, 2002: i). Thus, leadership as the ultimate superpower becomes self-evident and unilateral action is legitimate, though multilateral action in accordance with the UN charter has alleged priority.

The difference in the language of power politics between the ESS and NSS elicits the political

view mainly represented by Kagan that the USA seems to have returned to a more traditional geopolitical understanding of territorial defence. The EU, by contrast, shares a broad consensus that security threats are diffuse and mutually reinforcing and that only a comprehensive strategy of civil-military tools make sense in response to them (Kagan, 2003).

Allen points out that, “[however], in the span of four years, the [US] Administration has been forced to rethink the doctrine with which it hoped to remake the world as the strategy’s ineffectiveness is exposed by the very policies it prescribed” (M. Allen & Ratnesar, 2006: 20). On 16 March 2006 the Bush administration released a new National Security Strategy for the coming years, striking a different tone in favour of multilateralism than the document in 2002. The NSS 2006 mainly ties in with the issues of NSS 2002 regarding the threat catalogue ranging from terrorism to proliferation of WMD, to human trafficking, to new threats of pandemic diseases and natural disasters. It draws a balance of the security developments against these global threats. In contrast to the earlier strategy, which adheres to a unilateral connotation, the NSS 2006 highlights multinational co-operation as the quintessence of the successful developments in the international security environment.

Bush states that, “[t]he challenges America faces are great....The times require an ambitious national security strategy, yet one recognizing the limits to what even a nation as powerful as the United States can achieve by itself” (George W. Bush, 2002: 49). The NSS 2006 is a signal to the world community that the USA realises the boundaries of unilateral action. This document accentuates future international co-operation with American leadership embodied in a multilateral framework (George W. Bush, 2002: 1-2). The NSS 2006 is a shift from the nationalist to a multinational position. However, to what extent the USA is willing to lead and subordinate its national priorities to international goals is arguable. It seems merely like a shift in rhetoric in regard to the current developments in Iran. The political influence of the EU on American politics towards Iran is crucial for the stability of this region.

The EU is the most important partner to the USA. The transatlantic relations are the foundation of global security. America’s strategies affect European security policy to a large degree and vice versa. The NSS 2002 is shaped by the conviction that national security is mainly assured by military strength, which is therefore not to be diluted by multilateral commitments. This position differs from the EU, which contrarily sees military force as the last remedy and focuses on problem-solving within a multilateral framework. This difference in ideology results in a divergence in strategies putting strain on the transatlantic relations. Therefore, the slightly moderate unilateral approach in the NSS 2006 is not only a signal to the world community, but particularly a chance for a transatlantic rapprochement under Bush.

5.4 Transatlantic Relations and NSS 2002 implications to the oldest Friend

The transatlantic partnership goes back to the end of World War II, when the USA was deeply involved in European reconstruction. The Marshall Plan launched in June 1947 promoting European economic co-operation was the cornerstone of America's political initiatives in Europe. Under the security umbrella of NATO with the USA as the leading nation, Western Europe revived like the phoenix out of the ashes and has become a peaceful and blossoming part of the world resembling the Kantian notion of a post-historical paradise of wealth and peace based on international co-operation. Whereas the USA, to put it in the words of Kagan, remains attached to history and exerts power in an anarchic Hobbesian world. In this world, military power resides as the only means to protect national sovereignty. Kagan claims that because of these different views the post-Cold War EU and American strategies will drift further apart (Kagan, 2003: 1).

Kagan's metaphor is a dramatised picture of transatlantic reality. The EU-US partnership under Bush is undergoing difficulties despite the initial solidarity after the events of 9/11. The attacks were a shock to the world and united the Allies. With the invocation of Article 5 on 12 September 2002 the international community declared its solidarity and military support to the USA. In spite of Article 5 the Europeanist countries did not follow to unconditional military support. The harmony after 9/11 was fallacious and fell apart after the NSS affirmed a stronger American unilateral course and that the USA postulated an intervention in Iraq. The major powers in the EU could not agree on Iraq. This divided the EU into two politically opposing camps of Atlanticists led by the UK and Europeanists with France at the head. This internal schism within the ESDP had a negative effect on the transatlantic relations. Iraq has shown that not all Europeans are willing to follow Washington when European interests are not at stake. The Europeanists refused American military action, which neglected multinational consultation in accordance with international institutions (Rudolf, 2004: 19).

On Iraq, the USA acted unilaterally with Atlanticist support and also focussed on NATO transformation after 9/11 for eventual American operations in the Middle East. The USA initiated the multinational NATO Response Force (NRF) of 21 000 troops of high readiness and out of area deployability within 5-30 days at the Prague summit. The aftermath of 9/11, the strategic change of regional interest and the situation with Iraq had profound implications for the transatlantic relationship and prompted the countries of France, Germany, Luxemburg and Belgium to review the creation of a European planning centre for the ESDP at the beginning of 2003. This alleged provocation of NATO primacy marked a low in the history of the transatlantic relations. The USA considered the meeting in Tervuren as the attempt to counterbalance America's military supremacy.

The EU and the USA have shared a long interconnected history consolidated by common

values and a similar Western culture. The analysis of the NSS 2002 has shown that in fact within the realm of security the American strategy bears an astounding resemblance to the EU strategy. Despite the similarities in strategies and values it has become manifest that the execution of the security strategies results in diverging political views dividing both sides of the Atlantic. In particular, after 9/11, America's unipolarity showed stronger unilateral contours. At present, Bush's unilateral course disrespects the world opinion. Since the 1950s the proportion of UN General Assembly roll call votes, in which the USA has chosen with the majority has declined (Karns & Mingst, 2004: 270). The USA runs the risk that other nation-states, which are inferior due to their lack of capacities or of the will to counterbalance the USA in traditional military terms, may complicate American foreign policy through active unwillingness to co-operate with unilateral applications of American power. An important example has been the reluctance of some major allies to aid American and British occupation in Iraq. The Bush administration has provoked discomfort among the world community. The war in Iraq has alarmed many countries, which do not share American values. The benign hegemonic state¹⁴ appears to have become more of a threat to be counterbalanced than a provider of international security. Iran is the latest example of a country developing nuclear warfare to prevent America's pre-emption strategies.

At this, after 16 years of post-bipolarism many observers succumb to the temptation to say that the unilateral course and transatlantic troubles show that the USA has lost interest in its most important partner and will act alone with the Transatlantic Alliance merely serving as its toolbox. Heinz Gärtner and Ian Cuthbertson frankly describe this intensified unilateral policy as "a willingness, indeed an eagerness to act alone, regardless whether or not major allies agree and support an action..." (Gärtner & Cuthbertson, 2005: 7).

Despite all temptations to declare an end to the transatlantic relations, 2003 characterised the low-point as well as the turning point of the transatlantic depression. At the end of 2003 a EU planning cell incorporated in NATO headquarters was agreed upon and the EU clarified its political position on security policy with the presentation of the ESS (Rudolf, 2004: 16). Furthermore, after ESDP was declared operational the EU took over NATO missions in the Balkan region and physically showed their will to contribute to America's demand of burden-sharing. The growing responsibility in the security field by the EU extenuates the ESDP controversy on the American side. Still, the USA stays attentive and ensures that the ESDP does not develop a life of its own parallel to NATO. The years of 2004 until now have been a phase of cautious re-approximation between both sides of the Atlantic. For the USA the

¹⁴ Peter Rudolf used the term „wohlwollender Hegemon“ meaning benign hegemonic state in English in his essay (Rudolf, 2004: 13)

prerogative of these years was to take control over the political situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are the “front lines in the war on terror” (George W. Bush, 2006: 17). The NSS 2006 states the importance of multilateralism and the transatlantic partnership in order to win the war on terror. For the time being, the end of the US-EU partnership does not appear to lurk around the corner. Future developments will depend on a greater convergence of American and EU strategies, but also on the rapprochement of the USA and the major EU powers on a binational level.

Conclusion

This chapter reveals that the combination of excessive military power in all the commons and a nationalist, *Realpolitik* oriented ideology expressed in the NSS 2002 does not favour multilateral co-operation. The USA can and will act unilaterally to protect its vital interests in the international realm. Whatever happens, American leadership will generally be more legitimate in the eyes of other countries when its policies are embedded in multilateral frameworks. The re-election of George W. Bush in 2004 signalise a trend that the USA is very likely not to alter its current position and continue, and even intensify, its unilateral course as the ‘world’s policeman’. This continuum of unilateralism after the Cold War continues to put the transatlantic relations to the test. It will also continue to be the main external factor which has profound implications for the development of the ESDP.

Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind that no single instrument of statecraft is ever sufficient to achieve any international policy objective of a country. *Pax Americana* is therefore a generalisation for today’s era, which has to be closely observed under a magnifying glass, since it only indicates the hard power of the USA, which in fact is dependent on multilateral aspects of both hard and soft power.

Furthermore, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are the prototype of American hegemony, dramatically relying upon multilateralism, especially upon the support of European countries, in order to introduce stability and peace to the regions. Hence, American unilateralism in international affairs cannot truly exist. This is where the ESDP comes into play. If the Europeans manage to set up a fully functional ESDP with the entire scope of the potential established by the Headline Goal 2010, the ESDP will definitely contribute to a strengthening of the European pillar in NATO, which will consequently result in a stronger political voice of the EU and of its individual member countries as well as an increase in their power position in world affairs.

The UK: a special European in a NATO-EU balancing Act

Previous examination of the USA has revealed the important role played by transatlantic relations for international security. The American hegemony has a tremendous impact on European security and defence policy. The EU-US partnership on the one hand and binational relations between the USA and major European powers on the other are essential influences in the development of the ESDP. How will the European actors behave in the face of an omnipotent hegemonic state? Will they bandwagon, balance or buckpass? The creation of ESDP in this context appears to be a weak form of balance of power (Barry R. Posen, 2004: 17). One can question whether this young institution will really evolve into a counter-pole to the USA in the future. The decisive factor for the development of a relevant prospect of the ESDP will be the examination of the big European nations of France, Germany and the UK. The latter is a military heavyweight in the EU and the closest partner to the USA. The UK has always taken a special pro-American and distant position towards European integration. In the field of ESDP this 'special' European country displays astounding engagement and enthusiasm while exerting an Atlanticist influence to direct ESDP towards NATO and the USA.

6.1 From the End of British Imperialism to European Schizophrenia

We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not compromised. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed...We belong to no continent, but to all (Churchill in Barber, 1998: 7).

Winston Churchill's comments on the Briand Plan for a united Europe in 1930 illustrate the semi-detached foreign policy towards the European continent. This stance in foreign policy has been maintained by all succeeding Labour and Conservative governments in the history of Britain. The semi-detachment stems from the isolated geography and historical role of the UK. Being an island made influence or even domination of the UK from the continent impossible. Furthermore, as a former empire conquering other nations for raw materials and land, invading nations became implicit in British politics. This implicitness of power maximisation was intensified by its victorious past, its vast military strength and by the fact of being the only invincible European nation in World War II. These collective factors served to foster the British perception of itself as a global player beyond an average middle-range

power, while at the same time its perception of the European continent as a source of political incompetence and ill has been strengthened.

Thus, in the early stages of European integration the UK supported the idea of a supranationally organised European co-operation, which began with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). However, the UK never considered such an organisation as an option for itself. The British are Europeans, who wish not to be classified as European and therefore avoid any Europeanisation. The British have a very strong sense of national sovereignty, largely rooted in the traditional identification with the political system of parliamentary democracy, where the power lies in the House of Commons. Its geographical, political and historical perspectives indicate the UK's global aspirations and its general detachment from Europe.

In 1950, at the dawn of the European integration when the UK declined the Schumann Plan, the integration locomotive started moving without the UK on board. In the field of security and defence the UK maintained its strict sceptical and intergovernmental course towards Europe and rejected any defence plans, from the Pleven Plan in 1950 to the Fouchet Plans a decade later. The British were not *per se* against a defence organisation, as they wanted to embank any possible German reinvigoration. To this end, the UK was willing to negotiate regarding an EDC in 1952 and even drafted the Eden Plan. Presumably, this co-operation was intended to be located on an intergovernmental level (Chuter, 1997: 106). The British proposal did not evoke any reaction from the six EU founding countries, so that by the time of the Fouchet Plans, Britain had distanced itself from any further continental European EDC attempts. Conversely, the UK largely initiated the intergovernmental WEU within NATO in order to create a defence dimension for Western Europe linked with NATO, which guaranteed British and American influence on the continent. The UK still saw itself as a potential global power, and like most global powers it wanted to continue pursuing its global interests and did not want to be restricted to a region (Morgan, 1999: 126). Above all, the UK wanted to avoid national subordination to a supranational construct by an alliance of six weaker nations. The UK was willing to participate in European integration only when the principle of intergovernmentalism was implemented. Since this was not the case, the British preferred to continue cherishing the lucrative relationship to the strong and victorious USA. This 'special' relationship with the USA "provided them with status and prestige (not to mention nuclear capability) unrivalled in Western Europe at the time" (Buller, 2004: 194). US/NATO primacy guaranteed the British easy military access to NATO capabilities and political advantages over the continental Europeans, which had appeared militarily unconvincing in the past. The cohesion within NATO also kept British international power aspirations alight as the junior

partner of the USA. In return the USA could depend on the UK's unconditional military and political support in the fight against communism. The focal point of this fight was the Korean peninsula in the early Cold War years and then later on the Middle East region, which has always been of great geopolitical interest to the USA. From Suez to Oman to Lebanon to Kuwait, the entire Cold War period displayed a realist American foreign policy militarily supported by Britain. As a junior partner, Britain increasingly managed to bridge the capability gap to the USA and rise to a competent and virtually equivalent partner (Coker, 2001: 77-79). British military deficiencies were uncovered during the Korean operation in the early 50s, but gradually settled.

6.1.1 Orientation towards the European Community

Overall, during the Cold War the UK never had in mind to subordinate its special relations to the USA or its bond with the Commonwealth to the European Community. In particular, the main sectors of foreign policy to that time, agrarian and trade policy, were influenced by the Commonwealth. The UK wanted to remain a power with global pretensions, but had to realise that the reality of the situation was somewhat different. The decomposition of the Commonwealth and the diminishing of the Anglo-American relations at the end of the 50s, forced the UK to move closer to the European continent, which had experienced an astounding economic boom and could possibly substitute the economic vacuum the Commonwealth had left behind. The Anglo-American partnership was still prioritised in defence and security political terms, but approximation to the European Community was an economic necessity and can be characterised as a purely pragmatic approach to European integration. This early pragmatism within British foreign policy regarding Europe would be as a thread throughout the coming years of Britain's incentive in foreign policy towards European integration.

During early European integration, the British government had on the one hand praised European supranational initiatives in the field of defence and trade but on the other, rejected the inclusion into such European Community projects (D. Allen, 2005: 120-121). A decade later, the UK realised that it could not isolate itself from European integration any longer without economically falling behind the other European countries. Thus, Britain declared its intention to join the European Community in 1963, but had to reapply in 1967 as de Gaulle vehemently negated any British membership. The second attempt also failed due to France's refusal. Britain's late entry in 1973 was enabled by de Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, who believed Europe would be stronger if the UK were involved. British membership was a pragmatic and economic move for the UK, as it realised that with the European Community at

its back, benefits from trade and commercial negotiations with the USA, Japan, and later China, could be multiplied. Today, three decades after joining, British politicians still view the EU as more of an economic union than a visionary union based on political values. This greatly angers the Franco-German tandem. The UK only supports integration if it brings added value to its economic position. It is also Britain's strong defence of its national sovereignty, however, which plays a role in the British position. Thus, participation in the European Community demanded a huge sacrifice for the British who have been, by all means possible, actively engaged in Europe on an intergovernmental level. In the following years, the UK became an important player in the young EPC which was created merely three years before the UK membership and was located on an intergovernmental level as the preferred policy level of British IR. Beyond the EPC, the United Kingdom played a leading role in the creation of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), which was later transformed into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Moreover, in the field of human rights and democracy, the UK was a main player when creating the Council of Europe in 1949 and the European Commission on Human Rights and the International Court of Justice for Human Rights. Despite an orientation towards Europe, the Thatcher era in the 80s made clear that the UK's interest in Europe was based on its national interests being enforced by the European Community.

6.1.2 Thatcherism

When the 'Iron Lady' came to power in 1979, the European Community played a subordinate role to the British-American or British-Russian relations. In fact, Thatcher's friendship with Reagan gave new impulse to the waning Anglo-American relationship. Until 1982, British foreign policy beyond the great powers was the complete responsibility of Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. Margaret Thatcher was more concerned with miming a great nation on the same stage as the two Cold War antagonists and preferred to selectively engage herself in IR only in context with the USA or the Soviet Union. After Carrington's resignation, the Prime Minister became more involved in foreign policy towards Europe, which was a step down from her usual arena of foreign policy. From 1982-1990 Thatcherite foreign politics dominated the EPC ranging from the British budget rebate to the opposition of the Single Market initiative and the Monetary Union project. Hill describes this period as the "dramatic interruption of a longer trend towards the Europeanization of British foreign policy" (Hill, 1996: 71). While her predecessors saw the future economic and political importance of the European Community, and therefore sought a rapprochement to the continent, Thatcher seemed to emphasise the independence of the UK from the European Community. Her

assertive, disintegrative foreign policy made waves and stopped any communalisation attempts by the European Community. On the one hand, Thatcher used the European Community instrumentally for economic and political benefits while on the other hand, she hindered communalisation in order to preserve national sovereignty. Thatcher chose EPC involvement or simply bypassed the EPC on a case-to-case basis depending on the benefits to be gained by the EPC, disgruntling other members. Paradoxically, an increased communalisation would boost EPC utility and at the same time elevate national benefits for the UK. Nevertheless, Thatcher – as most British prime ministers – wanted to preserve the intergovernmental *status quo* within foreign policy. This task had become increasingly difficult to manage as Thatcher gained experience.

During the Falklands War, British troops received support from nine other EPC members. This act of solidarity among EPC members was utilised by Britain. Since Thatcherite foreign policy was only concerned about the national freedom of manoeuvre, and because reciprocal benefits are no guarantee, many fellow members ignored future co-operation with the UK and even opted out of joint actions (Hill, 1996: 72). The ‘Iron Lady’ persevered in furthering the special relations with the USA, but realised that the diplomatic and collective advantages of the EPC as during the conflict in the Falklands or the better reputation of the European Community than the USA in the Islamic countries regarding the delicate Rushdie affair, proved to be equally useful. Thatcherite foreign policy behaviour in the EPC appears to be twofold. That is, aspiring to an influential leadership role in the EPC, while instrumentalising EPC and not committing to its integrative progress.

The positive support of Britain under Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington was displaced by an unco-operative solo of Thatcher or as Hill says, “a downgrading of EPC from the days of Carrington” (Hill, 1996: 73). Of course, this view is slightly exaggerated and, in fact, the succeeding Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe as well as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) being in direct correspondence with Brussels, were able to influence and moderate the stern course of Thatcherite European policy.

The FCO is the main governmental organisation concerned with the British external relations to the EU. The FCO provides essential advice on security and defence issues to the Ministry of Defence, which then deals with matters on European defence and security on an intergovernmental level. Since the FCO is to be seen more as an advisor, identifying negotiability and success than the actual policy-maker, its assessment and advice can be misinterpreted as pro-European and diverging from the pragmatic British discourse (Forster, 2000: 49-51).

Generally speaking, pragmatism prevailed and continues to prevail in the UK. In particular, the realisation of the common market was, and remains, the main objective for Thatcher and her successors. Absolute commitment to the political finality of the European Community is not part of the British mentality. The UK tends to act, or rather react, in the short-term. This varies from case to case depending on cost/benefit calculations. Sometimes this political rationality can create loneliness in the European Community, as Thatcher had to realise. The isolated geographical position of the UK seems an allegory of the Thatcherite years: detached and disintegrative.

6.1.3 From Major to Blair

The end of the East-West antagonism was the end of the Thatcher era. Simultaneously, it also revived the idea of an autonomous European defence. However, the British maintained their Cold War stance of NATO primacy, hindering any new prospects for defence integration with the WEU in the Treaty of Maastricht. Maastricht was also the affirmation of British anti-communalisation continuity now under John Major, who put pressure on a pillarisation of the EU.

In 1994 the USA believed that European defence co-operation was not generally deprecated and might even settle the burden-sharing problem between Europe and the USA. This green light from the Clinton administration was motivation enough for the UK to play an important role in shaping the ESDI and make a link between the USA and the EU. At the NATO summit in Berlin in 1996 the ESDI was given the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) as a military instrument. These successful developments were an achievement of the British government mediating between both sides of the Atlantic. Unfortunately, the Berlin meeting also marked the peak of the British defence engagement for the EU. After that, Major's Europhobic Cabinet subdued any pro-European attempts within the Cabinet and, as a result, the ESDI faded and was penetrated by NATO interests of enlargement and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) (Howorth, 2000: 383-382).

The Major administration was replaced by the new Tony Blair administration in 1997. Until then, Britain's engagement in the CFSP had never moved beyond institutional piecemeal and short-term objectives. In short, it was relatively meagre which can be interpreted in a negative sense as well as in a positive sense, since the UK only had a handful of diverging interests throughout the first half of the 90s and thus only marginally disturbed the unanimity principle in the CFSP (Forster, 2000: 55). The intergovernmental nature of the CFSP explains this remarkable convergence between British and continental European foreign and security

interests. That is, the UK has a great interest in maintaining the intergovernmental principle, which is documented by the vehement resistance of the communalisation reforms in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000). However, after the Thatcher and Major years having sharpened the contradictions in British foreign policy, this position becomes harder and harder to sustain. The incoming Blair government initially persisted in the Eurosceptic viewpoint of its predecessor at Amsterdam in 1997. Consequently, the WEU could not be immediately incorporated into the EU. Blair's administration, like earlier administrations, feared that autonomous military developments of the EU would prompt America's retraction out of Europe and into isolationism.

Beyond the anti-European tendencies in CFSP, Blair's rejection of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the generally passive and merely economically oriented British attitude towards the EU caused disapproval from other EU members. The New Labour Party seems to have a more positive stance towards Europe, which is largely due to the fact that Blair's Cabinet consists of EU-experienced personnel such as former EU commissioners Lord Richard and Lord Clinton-Davies as well as former EU parliamentarians. However, British foreign policy towards the EU, and in particular in the context of security policy, was still defined in pragmatic terms. This was summed up by Blair's former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook in an article in *The Times* 23 June 1997:

We have protected British interests in areas where some of our partners originally wanted to go further than we thought wise, notably on defence where the treaty confirms that our defence policy rests firmly on Nato. And we have preserved Britain's veto in all key areas....What you saw in Amsterdam was the federalists and integrationists...in retreat. The old European obsession with institutional mechanics is giving way to a new agenda which reconnects with our citizens' lives (Cook, 1997).

It seems that policy-makers in the UK still use the EU merely instrumentally and do not feel committed to it as a common integration project. Utilising the EU as a policy instrument selectively, only when required, became much more difficult for Blair since firstly, the UK did not want to be excluded from the Franco-German leadership and secondly, the enlargement of the EU and the deepening of CFSP would eventually necessitate a qualitative leap of intergovernmental decision-making in the second pillar.

6.2 Blair and the ESDP

In 1998, Blair saw an exigency to improve Britain's status in the EU equivalent to an international gain in influence by initiating the ESDP through rapprochement to the position of France at the Pörschach informal meeting of the European heads of state. The UK was, for the first time in British history, in favour of a European defence.

For fifty years (1947/48-1997/98), the UK – arguably Europe's foremost military power – systematically refused to agree to the European Community (in its various different manifestations – EEC, EC, EU) discussing matters connected with defence or international security....Although there were brief moments when British leaders appeared to stray from this code (1956, 1971-71), so long as the Cold War lasted, and even after it ended, Atlanticism remained, for London, the primary reference. There were four basic reasons for this: confidence in (and closeness to) the American hegemon; lack of confidence in (and relative distance from) the European pretender; concern over what would later be called 'discrimination' against European NATO members who were not also members of the European Community. Above all, the UK feared that any serious move towards European autonomy – or even caucusing – in defence matters would jeopardize the Alliance by pushing the USA towards isolationism (Howorth, 2000: 377-378).

Despite European pressure on the UK to integrate in the past decades, no British prime minister before Blair had ever moved away from the British position. Blair's shift towards Europe in defence matters was a "substantial change of mind" (Chuter, 1997: 105). This change of mind initially appears paradoxical but is, in fact, a logical action in the attempt to maintain American involvement in Europe and the cohesion of NATO, which have always been the primary goals of British security and defence policy. To continue achieving these goals, America's interest in Europe as a reliable partner must be assured. For this reason, Blair has changed tactics. Instead of delaying European integration in the field of defence he paradoxically initiated integration to eliminate the European lack of capabilities and lack of effective defence policy which posed a threat to NATO existence. Once the EU develops a common defence and security capacity, the European pillar as well as the Atlantic Alliance itself would also be strengthened. This new tactic also implies a win-win situation for the UK. That is, it profits from the ESDP in the EU context and also cultivates its relations to the USA and increases its influence with NATO (Donfried, 2002: 191). Blair did not want to put the special relationship with the USA in jeopardy, and therefore agreed to a European defence integration on the condition that this would focus on capability enforcement rather than institution-building. Furthermore, this project should revolve around NATO centrality as well as preserving intergovernmentalism. At the dawn of the ESDP it was, in particular, the UK, that mitigated America's scepticism and mediated between France as the other ESDP driving force and the USA on the topic of the 3 Ds (Howorth, 2000: 392-393).

Of course, internal financial pressures confirmed Blair's decision and newly embraced role. This surprised the world community, since France and the UK had extremely opposing positions on European defence. Blair's rapprochement to France was a signal to other EU members that the integrative momentum was launched in the field of defence. Blair's tactical change was the most important impetus or, as Charles Grant likes to say, "if Tony Blair were to fall under a bus, the entire CESDP project could go back into reverse" (Grant in Howorth, 2000: 383). This is now very unlikely to occur due to the advanced institutionalisation of the ESDP, but it is true that Blair was an important actor in the creation of it. Without Blair as the contemporary British prime minister, UK engagement in the ESDP would, with regard to the preceding prime ministers, quite possibly be null and void. In contrast to Thatcher and Major, whose defence of sovereignty and opposition to European integration closely resembled a European paranoia, Blair considers the British position strengthened through international co-operation and EU partnership.

The ESDP is the only part of the CFSP where Britain's engagement is not detached and half-hearted. Since Britain's reputation in the CFSP was rather poor, Blair has shown great initiative and engagement in the ESDP in order to distinguish Britain within the EU. Attempts of the Blair administration to penetrate the Franco-German motor have failed, leaving defence as the only field within which the UK can gain major influence in the EU.

Conversely to 1997, when Blair still rejected the inclusion of the WEU into EU structures, 1998 marked a change in the British security policy paradigm. This vicissitude is no reorientation to the EU, but should perhaps be perceived as a willingness to co-operate in certain forms of security and defence policy which neither question intergovernmentalism nor NATO primacy. Until St. Malo, Britain had vigorously dismissed any military developments parallel to NATO. They were considered as lavish duplications which could impair the transatlantic relations and provoke American neo-isolationism (Kirchner, 2002: 43). Furthermore, the British parliament as well as the British government argue that every individual nation is responsible for the deployment of their military personnel and material, which implies that the lives of the individual nation's citizens are at stake. Consequently, responsibilities in the ESDP must be kept on an intergovernmental level. At the Cologne and succeeding summits, the UK ensured the centrality of intergovernmentalism and NATO for the ESDP. In the Treaty of Nice the UK even enforced the denomination of the ERRF as not being a European army. Notwithstanding new British enthusiasm in the ESDP, the UK still prefers bilateral policies with the US¹⁵ than the European option, as the bombing of Iraq in 1999 and the Iraq crisis of 2003 display.

¹⁵Tony Blair was the first European head of state to visit and congratulate Bush in February 2001 as the "strongest friend and closest ally" of the USA (The Whitehouse, 2001b).

6.2.1 The Iraq War

After 9/11 the UK proved to be the closest, and due to its military strength, the strongest American ally. The terrorist attacks were catalysts of a new era of the special Anglo-American relationship. More than any other ally Blair supported the USA unconditionally and helped push for a solution to the Iraq problem, which strongly displeased the other EU members. As America's stalwart he also attracted unwanted terrorist attention, distinguishing the UK as a target country alongside the USA. With the Iraq issue, the UK has once again proved its willingness to act alone and outside the EU context, preferring its partnership with the USA over a multilateral approach with the CFSP/ESDP. The UK queued in a coalition with the USA in propagating a change of the Iraqi regime. This is to be achieved with the use of force, which demonstrates British *real politik* in foreign policy rather than the Franco-German position adhering to interdependency and international law. The UK conducted an early logistical preparation in case of a military intervention in Iraq (Heimrich, 2002). It agreed with the USA in that the Iraq problem had to be solved immediately and pressured the UN Security Council to ratify a resolution which legitimised the use of force. Resolution 1441 was ratified but did not meet the urgency of Anglo-American criteria. Thus, the Anglo-American tandem and Spain pressed for a more compelling resolution of the Security Council and Blair was actively involved in persuading indecisive Council members (Heimrich, 2003). The pro-war activism of Blair at the dawn of the war disgruntled his fellow EU partners. In particular, in the UN Security Council the two opposing major powers of France and Germany clearly rejected any war. The UK could not do justice to its self-proclaimed role as a bridge-builder between the USA and the EU. Blair's flying solo in such an important foreign policy matter as Iraq resulted in the biggest CFSP/ESDP coherence crisis yet. Albeit there were other EU members supporting an intervention in Iraq¹⁶, it was the solo action of the most militarily powerful ESDP actor which jeopardised the existence of a CFSP/ESDP. The actual military intervention of the Anglo-American duo where a third of the British army was deployed, was merely the cherry on the cake of the Iraq crisis. During and shortly after, this fragmentation of the EU's foreign policy the institutionalisation of the ESDP was largely carried out by the supranational engine in Brussels. The Iraq deployment also moved British focus away "from pursuing the Helsinki Goals as a priority, preferring to work with the French and Germans to drive workable force capabilities forward" (Giegerich & Wallace, 2004: 129). Despite national rapprochement of the big three the wounds of this coherency crisis are not healed and have been newly torn open by another core issue concerning the

¹⁶ The UK received a lot of support, in particular, from the young Eastern European ESDP member countries who are pro-NATO oriented.

constitutional treaty of the EU. The UK, under, Blair is facing the same transatlantic dilemma as all prime ministers before him. The British remain in between the EU and the USA, and cannot, or will not, position themselves with one side. The Blair government has come closer to the EU but it will not endanger its special relations to the USA and, as a consequence, British foreign policy continues to exist as a bilateral case-by-case decision-making process, so that the end of the British dilemma in ESDP is postponed indefinitely.

6.3 The British Dilemma

In essence, the British dilemma is bridging the gap between its NATO-oriented politics and its commitments as part of the ESDP leadership trio. On the one hand, the UK has to justify being the most important ally of the USA, on the other it cannot afford to disgruntle the EU members, because of its economic dependency to the EU. Hence, the ESDP can be considered as a domain, in which this tension can be relieved by playing the valuable role of a mediator between both sides of the Atlantic. Simultaneously, Britain's engagement in this field will be beneficial and possibly lead to spill-overs for further European integration of CFSP. In comparison to other policy fields, British engagement in the ESDP is very strong. This is best indicated by its increased military expenditures for the first time in 15 years, which have risen by approximately £2bn (Kirchner, 2002: 46). Nevertheless, attempting to satisfy and to bring two opposing political views together is a difficult task to manage and will eventually backfire.

This assumed dilemmatic position in between the two sides can also be viewed as a privilege which is displayed, for instance, by the Echelon system of English speaking countries (Kirchner, 2002: 47). Intelligence sharing amongst the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand is advantageous for the UK but, of course, this has created the resentment of other EU members on various occasions regarding industrial espionage and preference of the Echelon countries in regard to the ordering of arms. In general, the UK holds the advantage of easy access to those already existing structures of NATO, so that it will try to avoid any unnecessary duplication such as investing in European satellite facilities.

Currently, Britain can still benefit from its position in between both sides of the Atlantic. This position will alter with increased European integration reinforcing the British dilemma. Although the ESDP is located on an intergovernmental level where national restraints are very weak, the process of integration cannot be reversed and existing structures in Brussels will continue to grow, cause spill-over effects and result in a creeping Europeanisation of national

defence and security. Britain's extensive fight for pillarisation and intergovernmentalism seems to be in vain. One day, the UK's role as a mediator will perish. This will be the moment when it will have to make a decision between the European Union and the USA, unless it can successfully consolidate and interweave the two, separately developing defence institutions.

6.4 The United Kingdom and the ESDP

There has been British participation in the integration process for more than three decades. However, there is little evidence that, from Wilson to Blair, either a transformation of national objectives in British collaboration with Europe or a new European identification has eventuated. The ESDP is no exception. The UK will adhere to the principle of intergovernmentalism and seek to pursue its national interests in ESDP. Nevertheless, the growing British dilemma will make it increasingly complicated for the UK to continue along this course.

British perspective on the ESDP is predominantly influenced by the transatlantic dilemma. That is, Britain is generally in favour of a close link between the ESDP and NATO, of which the latter is the organising and planning umbrella for both defence institutions. NATO has the right of first refusal so that, in case NATO chooses not to participate in a conflict which is more of European concern, the ESDP can act in its place. Initially, the UK envisaged the ESDP taking command only of the political functions of the WEU, and NATO taking over its military dimension (Howorth, 2000: 390). Nevertheless the UK compromised, understanding the necessity of autonomous European military action if NATO did not wish to engage. In the British opinion, autonomous ESDP action is tolerable but to be restricted. The UK sees the ESDP as more of a regional player, limited to Europe and Africa (Howorth, 2000: 394). It believes that ESDP should only be concerned with the limited interpretation of the Petersberg tasks on a small scale of low intensity. Since the UK is keen to preserve American participation and NATO primacy in large scale operations of high intensity, it will therefore oppose any strongly autonomous and supranational developments of the ESDP. These autonomous and supranational developments are promoted by the French Europeanist pole in the ESDP. Europeanist countries like France are contrarily more in favour of seeing the ESDP develop autonomously and taking full responsibility for the entire range of the Petersberg tasks. How long the UK will be able to preserve the close link to NATO and intergovernmentalism in ESDP is a question of the ESDP integration dynamic, the influence of smaller pro-NATO EU members to cement the Atlanticist influence in ESDP and time, which is ticking against the UK position. Unintentionally, the UK has become the initiator

and contributor to an increasing self-autonomous ESDP process. Preserving the NATO orientation in ESDP seems now to be an easier task than preventing the ‘creeping Europeanisation’.

Though supranational integration seems to pose a threat to national sovereignty, the ESDP has out the prospect of multiplying the UK’s power position, possibly catapulting the power position of the big three in the EU closer to the USA. Nevertheless, as the strongest military power in the ESDP the UK acts quite non-typically with regard to the structural realist mould. The structural realist assumption is that weaker big nations than the hegemonic state will tend to counterbalance the hegemonic state in any possible way. However, the UK has always unconditionally supported the USA and cherished its transatlantic relations. The UK displays the state behaviour of a very weak state, which is in need of bandwagoning and not that of a powerful nation which embraces alliances with other powerful nations to build a balance in IR. It strongly adheres to NATO and vehemently justifies and safeguards America’s influence in the European defence and security fields. In short, the British position in ESDP is mainly based on an old habit as well as cost-benefit calculations and not solely on its power position within the global context or the ESDP context.

6.5 Capabilities of the United Kingdom

As an island group apart from the European continent and distant from any invasive nations, the UK was able to develop its culture and Waltzian capabilities without restraints. The UK prospered and by the nineteenth century it had become an empire with various colonies overseas enhancing its national resource capability (coal, petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, lead, zinc, gold, tin, limestone, salt, clay, chalk, gypsum, potash, silica sand, slate, arable land) (CIA, 2006). At that time, the UK was an indisputable world power, if not the greatest power *par excellence*. This was particularly due to its military potential, specifically its Royal Navy. Nowadays, the splendour of the colonial Empire has faded. British territory is downsized to 244,820 sq km, which is smaller than the other two big nations in the ESDP (CIA, 2006). In terms of the economic development, the UK has managed to keep its GNP of US\$ 1,647bn (Heilig, 2006). This GNP and the GDP (real growth rate) of 1.8 per cent in 2005 signifying a GDP (per capita) of US\$30,300 which indicate that the UK is economically slightly better positioned than France. It is also stagnating less rapidly than the GNP-stronger Germany (CIA, 2006). Hence, the UK could become the strongest European economy in the future.

Its population size of 60,441,457 people is comparable with the population size of France (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006: 107).

6.5.1 British Military Capabilities

Since the Gulf War in the early 90s, the British military has seen a 25 per cent reduction of manpower. Active military personnel consist of 216,890 (not including reserve) people, which are at their lowest since the end of the Second World War (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006: 107). The largest contingent is provided by the British army, which a few years earlier, Coker had described as “small enough to fit into a first-class soccer stadium and still leave room for the fans of the opposing side” (Coker, 2001: 82). In fact, being an island, territorial defence by its army against a conventional attack by another army will never occur. Unlike on the European continent, the UK’s Royal Navy takes primary responsibility for territorial defence. Furthermore, the historical distrust in the army, traced back to the times of Cromwell, has contributed to a weak position for the army within the military and society at large. This position has altered significantly in the post-Cold War era, since territorial defence against the new global threats starts beyond national borders. The high deployment rate of UK soldiers abroad demands increased army personnel.

Table 8: Equipment by Type of the Army

Army 247,080 (manpower incl. reservists and Gurkhas)

Tanks	543
Reconnaissance	475
AIFV	575
APC	2,503
AIFV/APC additionally	1,675
Artillery	877
Tugs	800+
Helicopters	115
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle	8
Air Defence	339+
Radar	4+
Patrol and Coastal Combatants	4
Amphibious Crafts	4
Logistics and Support	6

Table 9: Equipment by Type of the Navy

Royal Navy 62,600 (manpower incl. reservists)

Submarines	15
Principal Surface Combatants	34
Patrol and Coastal Combatants	26
Amphibious Ships and Crafts	52
Logistics and Support	28
Strategic Missiles	58
Naval Aircrafts	86
Naval Helicopters	71
Air-to-Surface Missiles	available (amount not given)

Bases	4
Naval Airbases	3
Royal Marines Command	7,000
APC	24+
Artillery	available (amount not given)
Amphibious Crafts	28
Helicopters	6
Radar	available (amount not given)
Air Defence	available (amount not given)

Table 10: Equipment by Type of the Air Force (and of all related sub-organisations)
Air Force 90,670 (manpower incl. reservists)

Helicopters	171
Aircrafts	813+
Unmanned aerial vehicles	available (amount not given)
Tactical Missiles	Available (amount not given)
Bombs	Available (amount not given)
Air Defence	24+

Data Source (for Tables 8-10): International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, pp. 107-112

Regarding manpower, the Royal Navy has experienced extreme cutbacks and is, in the post-Cold War era, only marginally bigger than America's Coast Guard (Coker, 2001: 82). In terms of equipment, the government intends to add several more aircraft carriers in order to place the UK back into the league of naval powers. By 2010, the new carriers and other procured equipment to modernise the Navy should be ready for deployment (Coker, 2001: 83). Modernising the military implies closing the technology gap between American and British forces. Information warfare will become a crucial field in which further British investment is necessary. Beyond doubt, the UK possesses skilled people for information warfare but does not see the necessity of operating in this field on a large scale. Whereas the USA has thousands of people working specifically on information warfare, the UK only employs a handful of part-time experts (Coker, 2001: 83). The Royal Air Force has also experienced a downsizing in manpower and equipment but this has been comparably less dramatic than the Royal Navy. The Air Force is not as chronically understaffed as the information warfare sector. In fact, in comparison to the British Navy and Army the Air Force enjoys greater governmental investment. The army has been the most revamped military section in order to serve new European and NATO goals and adapt to its new global-oriented functionality. However, the Territorial Army has been reduced in size. The decline of manpower in the Army puts the UK back on the level of other European powers. Coker argues that manpower is the only real utility the UK can provide for the USA (Coker, 2001: 90). Despite the UK's current moderate power position it is back on track, due to the rising

defence budget in recent years in order to mitigate America's scepticism and to fulfil the requirements of the Headline Goal 2010. In the words of Jolyon Howorth, British military trend within the ESDP can be summed up as:

a rather complex situation...as far as military capacity is concerned, the British tend to concentrate on the realistically attainable, short- to medium-term 'headline goal' targets and to avoid any longer-term vision or aspiration towards programmatic commitments going beyond plans for troop levels, deployability, sustainability etc. (Howorth, 2000: 389).

6.5.2 British Defence Budget

Table 11: National Defence Budget

		2004	2005	2006
Defence expenditure	£	27.0bn	27.9bn	
	US\$	50.1bn	51.7bn	
Defence budget	£	26.4bn	27.6bn	28.6bn
	US\$	49bn	51.1bn	50.2bn

Data Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, p. 107

Nowadays, the UK is spending merely half the proportion of its GDP on the military in comparison to approximately 30 years ago. In particular, the Major and the early Blair administrations have induced defence expenditure cuts in real terms by 23 per cent (Coker, 2001: 83). At the end of the century, British military expenditure was the lowest in peacetime. The creation of the ESDP gave a reason for a defence budget rise under the Blair administration over the last few years. This trend has created hope for the UK to maintain its military credibility to the USA through the ESDP framework. As one of the strongest military powers in the ESDP and with the best connections to NATO, the UK is an important player in the ESDP. Vice versa the UK profits from the EU's 'multiplier-of-power-capability effect', so that it will be able to remain important to America's strategy. Vis-à-vis the exceptional contingent of America's capabilities, the post-Cold War cuts in the British defence budget, personnel and equipment have humbled the former Empire's global aspirations and lowered it to a moderate power of similar military strength to France.

In the late 90s, the Defence Operations Analysis Centre at West Byfleet constructed eight main war scenarios of different intensities. In all eight scenarios, the study concluded that the UK would require American assistance (Coker, 2001: 82). Despite its current power position, the British have always been attracted to the notion of global power which can be gained through different paths. Therefore, it is indispensable for the non-hegemonic UK to cherish the relations to the USA politically in order to keep global influence. The USA as the

hegemonic nation is not likely to consider these relations as ‘special’, but rather diplomatically useful from time to time. However, it is also in the British interest to cultivate these relations in a non-political way by actually delivering the capability requests of the USA.

Conclusion

Since World War II, the USA has dominated world affairs. The UK wants to return to its greatness of the nineteenth century, but its capabilities are far behind those of the USA. The UK’s comeback in worldwide influence will largely depend on the strength of its various alliances, of which the Anglo-American partnership is the most powerful and profitable.

Facing new global threats, the UK prefers co-operation on an intergovernmental level over supranational institutions. If the supranational institutions add value to a policy field, the UK will trade in a small part of its national sovereignty for added value. Regarding security and defence policy, national sovereignty will remain highly guarded by the British. Thus, intergovernmentalism will be strengthened rather than making allowances for supranationalism. Therefore, the UK will endeavour to secure intergovernmentalism and Atlanticist influence in the ESDP and attempt to direct ESDP’s future development toward NATO.

In terms of the UK’s defence and security policy, Britain will continue to favour bilateral co-operation and action with other nations over CFSP/ESDP when facing issues beyond the European region. Communalisation of the CFSP/ESDP in the near future is an idea vehemently rejected by the UK as it is not beneficial to Anglo-American interests. This contemporary stance may even be pushed further by Blair’s successor in 2007.

The UK envisions a European Union of Nations, in which the term union is understood as the intergovernmental co-operation between national entities on the basis of a loose structure. The UK does not aspire to a supranational unity which destroys the notion of the sovereign nation-state.

France: la Grande Nation and the Vision of a Europe Puissance

Over the past 50 years, France managed to transform itself from an agrarian and colonial state into a modern industrial and service state with leadership qualities within the EU. Since the rapid economic development of the 70s, economic growth has been relatively stagnant and unemployment has increased. Nevertheless, the French economy is ranked amongst the top ten in the world and its grandeur as the *grande nation* has not vanished in the midst of globalisation.

Despite its grandeur, the last fifty years have also been cumbersome, and politically an ambivalent path for a nation which has always aspired to superpower status. It was forced to give up part of its sovereignty in order to attain more international power through a supranational European institution. The French nation-state is strongly interconnected with the EU, especially in economic terms. More than half of the French imports are from the EU and more than half of its exports go to the EU. The *grande nation* is probably one of the biggest beneficiaries of European integration and also has always been the elementary driving force behind the integration process in co-operation with Germany. In future, this Franco-German axis will remain crucial for the development of the EU. In the field of defence, however, it appears that France has been a lonely fighter for many years. Howorth states that

France tends to treat defence and security policy as if she were acting for the whole of Europe....Despite the rhetoric France's defence thinking on certain key issues (nuclear policy, alliance policy, resourcing, industrial policy and conscription) has often been visibly out of step with the majority of its European partners (Howorth, 1997b: 23).

Over the last decade, France has unexpectedly gained a new defence partner in the UK. This new partnership between two strategically different countries as well as the new post-Cold War security environment as a whole will influence French behaviour in ESDP. How, if at all, France will be able to assert itself against the strong US-supported position of the UK as presented above and still remain able to mould ESDP according to its Europeanist vision is a question to be analysed in this chapter on France and its defence and security policy in the European context.

7.1 France and the European Integration

As it comes to defining European defence, each country expressed ideas and defined concepts with individual peculiarities deriving from its own culture, history, and role wars played in the collective experience of the nation. Thus, in France the components of a defence policy are influenced by the memory of an illustrious past, the experience of the past century, and the weight of a strong military industrial complex associated with the pre-eminence of the state....However complex the institutional arrangements that are required by the EU, France cannot accept a mediocre vision of Europe without political aspirations. A merely trade-oriented organisation, comparable to a 'super Switzerland' cannot be the end of the result of all the effort (Boyer, 2002: 55-56).

In 1948 at the European Congress in The Hague, France already supported the idea of a politically organised federal Western Europe, which encountered resistance by the British who preferred intergovernmental co-operation. Unlike the UK, France did not have any special relations to the USA and therefore saw a European unification as its only possibility to stand up to the two Cold War blocs. With the Schumann Plan of 9 May 1950, France seized the chance to establish its power position in Western Europe. Concurrently, with the inclusion of West Germany, France was able to strengthen the European continent as an aspiring third power centre facing the USA and Soviet Union. Later, France was also able to control the rearmament and political development of West Germany after it was accepted into NATO. The treaty conceived by French foreign minister Robert Schumann rests upon the co-operation of the Western European nations. Out of this initiative, the first European Community of the Montan Union between France and Germany was founded and then regionally expanded. In the course of time, the European integration gained a dynamic which spilled over to other policy fields. By 25 March 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome the two Communities of EURATOM and EEC were added. At the same time, René Pleven's vision of a European Defence Community failed due to French sovereignty issues. According to Pleven, national military power was to be pooled under a European political authority like the existing Communities (Balme & Woll, 2005: 100). During this period, France itself was experiencing a difficult time of decolonisation and needed its forces for its own vital national interests (Stahl, 2003: 105). Despite the spill-over into other policy fields, European integration never managed to expand into the political dimension, which was lamented by France. Like France, other European nations were not yet ready to give up their national sovereignty in such a sensitive area. At this stage, European integration initially encompassed merely an economic dimension.

French ministers, Robert Schumann and Jean Monnet, personified this early European integration stage. According to Monnet, France envisioned a supranational European co-operation. Under the pro-European government of Guy Mollet this project prospered but came to an abrupt halt with the end of the Fourth Republic and the first presidency of the Fifth French Republic by Charles de Gaulle, who aspired to a European Community with indisputable French leadership. The transition from Republic IV to V marks a turning point in French history. Since then and to the present day, presidential power has been an important innovation of the new constitution, allowing the president an authoritarian and influential position within the French governmental apparatus and, in particular, within foreign affairs. The centralised and unitary state structure has promoted a strong sense of national autonomy and national sovereignty respectively, due to the power accumulation of the president and his government.

De Gaulle's presidency was characterised by a realist and instrumental view of the European Community. French ambiguity toward the strong initiative of Europeanisation and the preservation of national sovereignty was clearly identifiable within his European power politics. On the one hand, de Gaulle attempted to push forward policies favouring the French power position in Europe. In terms of defence policy, de Gaulle initiated the Fouchet Plans designed to create a defence union of nation-states. This was rejected by the other EC members since the Fouchet Plans aimed to distance NATO and assign France the leading role. On the other hand, de Gaulle hindered integration via an empty chair policy as a boycott to the introduction of QMV in 1965/66, which would signify a loss of national sovereignty. General de Gaulle's foreign and defence policy has been characterised by an absolute aversion to supranational decision-making and American influence in Europe (Balme & Woll, 2005: 100). Radically, de Gaulle wanted to guarantee French hegemonic aspirations and steer clear of American and British influence within continental Europe. In compliance with this extreme position was his double rejection of the British membership in the European Community and his withdrawal from NATO in 1966. After the European nations could not agree on any intra-European defence co-operation NATO became the sole security guarantor by the mid-60s. De Gaulle refused to acknowledge American leadership and supremacy through NATO. By the time of the withdrawal, the French had already obtained nuclear capabilities and therefore aspired to a more prominent role which was never granted to them within NATO. After France turned its back on NATO, the European Community was the only remaining supranational option to multiply its power position.

The European Community and its institutions are ideal instruments with which to continue the promotion of French objectives in Europe and in the world. As de Gaulle stated,

what is the purpose of Europe? It should be to allow us to escape the domination of the Americans and the Russians. The six of us ought to be able to do just as well as either of the superpowers...Europe is a means for France to regain the stature she has lacked since Waterloo, as the first among the world's nations (Peyrefitte, 1994: 159).

Concentrating solely on the defence dimension, it had become very clear with the Fouchet Plans that France also saw the chance of multiplying its military power by an intergovernmentally organised Defence Community. The years of the de Gaulle presidency were the most formative of French foreign policy and are still reflected in various modifications throughout contemporary French foreign and defence policy conception.

7.1.1 The Gaullist Paradigm

Generally, one can sum up General de Gaulle's foreign and defence policy paradigm in seven principles. In de Gaulle's opinion the paramount function of a nation's foreign and defence policy is to guarantee the national sovereignty of a national entity (Fabisch, 1999: 43). This principle implies national independence, which is premised by military independence of which de Gaulle specifies nuclear power as the main premise (Fabisch, 1999: 43). The national sovereignty and military independence are secured by "a high degree of self-sufficiency in armament" (Fabisch, 1999: 43). De Gaulle envisions a French military purely equipped by the French armament industry (Fabisch, 1999: 163). West Germany is given a special status and is included in the Gaullist concept of self-supply, since this inclusion also enables French control of West Germany's development. De Gaulle wanted to avoid annoying France's most important European partner, highlighting the special relationship with Germany as one which strengthened the European and French position against the USA (Fabisch, 1999: 43). Although British-French co-operation has now replaced the Franco-German leadership in defence, Germany continues to be the most important partner for the French armament industry even half a century after de Gaulle.

De Gaulle's political view of the international realm is strongly characterised by realist power politics. He aims to elevate the Western European region, implying the rising power position of France, onto the same level as the two opposing superpowers in order to loosen the bipolar structure. Nevertheless, he emphasises maintaining American presence in Europe to guarantee the European Community's security (Fabisch, 1999: 43). Though the USA is seen as the most important ally, Europe must develop a common political dimension in order to play an

influential role in world politics and like any political entity, must be able to defend itself and not permanently rely on the USA. The concept of the development of an autonomous political and defence dimension is a constant quest of all presidents of the Fifth Republic. This aspiration toward autonomy is also manifested in multinational forums of NATO and the UN. Within these international institutions, France aspires to a leadership role. France has not been granted this position in NATO and has, ostentatiously, left this defence alliance. For the record, de Gaulle has shown very little interest in international institutions. His main interest, which is the central principle of his leadership, is the preservation of national sovereignty constituted by a realist foreign and defence policy. This principle poses a dilemma for France, since preserving a high degree of national sovereignty involves the risk of making itself more vulnerable with regard to the Cold War security issue. Leaving NATO equates with putting French national security, and thus its autonomy in jeopardy. The only possible escape from this dilemma is the creation of an alternative European defence structure.

De Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO was a momentous decision complicating French defence policy in the following presidencies. Furthermore, the Gaullist paradigm continues to permeate policy under all following presidents. Under his successor, Georges Pompidou, the first steps towards a political and possibly a Defence Community were established with the creation of the EPC based on the Luxembourg Report in 1970. From the late 70s until the early 80s it was Giscard d'Estaing who tried to find a balance for this dilemma. However, it was not until François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 that decisive political progress on this issue was made.

7.1.2 Mitterrand and a Europe Puissance

From then on Mitterrand led France toward a *Europe puissance*. During the early and mid-80s the UK was concerned about American unilateralism due to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) crisis. Thus, Mitterrand had the unique opportunity, in the early days of his presidency, to initiate a revival of the WEU and “a concerted drive in favour of a greater co-operation among the EC nations on matters of defence and security policy” (Howorth, 2000: 378-379). He and his German counterpart Helmut Kohl unremittingly fostered European integration. Unfortunately, in the field of defence and security it has become clear that the WEU will only have a bit part in international politics next to NATO.

From de Gaulle to Mitterrand the European Community had become strategically indispensable to France as a political actor, but always with the preference of sovereignty over integration as the paradigm. Conversely to de Gaulle's policy in the early stages of Europeanisation, France, under the Mitterrand presidency, embraced European penetration. It

perceived the integration process as an opportunity from which France would be best served after having served the European Community/EU by transferring its national sovereignty. Mitterrand voluntarily and consistently approved supranationalism in view of national advantages. During a time when the USA and Japan were economically and politically on the up, Europeanisation seemed the only solution to France as it did not want its people having “to watch bad American television programmes on Japanese television sets” in the future (Blunden, 2000: 21).

However, Mitterrand always only went so far so as not to cede French decision-making power. Hence, in Maastricht, France militated a similar stance to the UK in favour of the pillarisation of the EU, although in the run-up he and his German counterpart were actively involved in initiating the CFSP. As a result of Mitterrand’s intergovernmental effort, foreign and defence policy concerning vital French interests was placed in a separate second pillar from the Community fields. Although Maastricht symbolised a qualitative leap towards supranationalism, France under Mitterrand was cautious not to have the Community principle infiltrate the foreign and defence policy like the policy fields of the first pillar, where Europeanisation dominates domestic policies.

After the Cold War, the defence issue was again raised by Mitterrand who actively promoted an intergovernmental European Confederation. This was rejected by the former countries of the Soviet Union. These newly created Eastern European countries favoured a defence solution under the NATO umbrella. Dating from the French withdrawal from NATO in 1966, France was relatively isolated in defence and security policy and relied heavily on bilateral arrangements. Due to the intensive Franco-German friendship, which was not only vital for the economic situation of France but also for its defence, a Franco-German brigade was created in 1986 which was later joined by other European nations to become EUROCORPS in 1995. At the same time EUROFOR and EUROMAFOR were launched as a military collaboration of France with the Mediterranean countries. These collaborations were within the European pillar of NATO and provided France with the necessary influence in WEU and thus NATO in order to indirectly affect political action. Mitterrand and later Chirac built a new defence and security framework for France outside of NATO without losing essential ties to the Atlantic Alliance. They managed to mitigate the French security dilemma the tension between Europeanisation and national sovereignty still persisted.

7.2 Post-Cold War and Chirac

The end of the bipolar structure compelled Mitterrand to redefine French defence and security policy in the *livre blanc* of 1994, which was the second defence White Book after 1972. Herein, vital, strategic and international post-Cold War interests of France were named to serve the restructuring of French defence and a clear separation between the function of nuclear and conventional forces in a new multipolar context, where French interests have to be newly identified and defended. In this document former Defence Minister Léotard speaks of a “*mutualisation of power (mutualisation de la puissance)* in the service of the defence of Europe and of a common security....This ambition lies at the heart of the new *livre blanc*” and makes clear that the Europeanisation of the French defence ambitions will continue to exist even four decades after de Gaulle (Léotard in Howorth, 1997a: 27). In contrast to the earlier *livre blanc*, the one of 1994 is linked to a new, different and more fluid environment, where the security concept goes beyond bipolarism. France has recognised this and redefined its defence and security concept which reaches far beyond its borders. Howorth states that “[t]he new feature of this approach to security is that...interests are also shared by the EU with the regions on its periphery such as Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean seaboard [sic]” (Howorth, 1997b: 28). France has immediately adapted to the new interdependencies and defence understanding of the changed global security context. In 1996, under Mitterrand’s successor, the *Loi de programmation militaire 1997-2002*, which is based on the White Book, was ratified and implemented in the following years. These two defence guidelines make clear that Mitterrand as well as his successor, Jacques Chirac, are interested in establishing a *Europe puissance* in order to regain French superpower status within a globally acting EU which possesses the necessary political and military foundation. Hence, France has quickly responded to the new security environment and reformed its armament policy as well as its military to a professional military of smaller quantity. These reforms of military equipment and personnel are to be completed by 2015 and aim to increase interoperability and the capability of power projection of the new military in a blurrier and more complex environment of asymmetrical threats (Manfrass-Sirjacques, 1999: 28-30). The early implementation of the reforms is derived from French national interests and only marginally includes a European perspective, which became problematic for the later developed ESDP. Notably, the French military goals were an ambitious and unrealistic national venture, doomed to fail. Nevertheless, France projected its goals onto a European level at the Helsinki summit in 2000 and therefore did realise its national interest on a regional level (Giegerich & Wallace, 2004: 125).

7.2.1 French Rapprochement to Britain...

The assumption of office by Chirac in 1995 not only implied a new orientation in terms of military potential but also a change to a more pragmatic political line in terms of security and defence policy in general. This new pragmatism combined with Gaullist principles strained the continuity of the Franco-German friendship cherished under Mitterrand, and even slowed down the European integration dynamic with Chirac's rapprochement to the security and defence concept of the UK. Paradoxically however, this new position has also facilitated the co-operation of other countries with France in terms of defence. Collaboration between the military powers of France and the UK concerning the Yugoslavia conflict and certain armament projects have calmed Chirac's approach to NATO (Howorth, 1997a: 31-38). Coevally, though unintentionally, this has also paved the way for future British-French defence projects such as the ESDP.

This new political course symbolised a re-orientation towards Atlanticism after an autonomous European defence was rejected by the UK and other EU members. Chirac's attempt to develop WEU as a European defence in Amsterdam was narrowed down by the British demand for NATO patronage. Even before Amsterdam, an autonomous European military capacity seemed impossible due to the heavy weighting of pro-NATO EU member states. In view of this majority and the ambivalent French position which was blatantly displayed in Amsterdam, a revival of WEU appeared to be a French farce (Deloche-Gaudez, 2002: 125-126). The project of a *Europe puissance* seeks to counterbalance America's domination in NATO and is the guiding aim of all presidencies of the past fifty years (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2004: 204). However, Paris appears to continue cultivating a rhetorical discrepancy between its co-operative demands of a *Europe puissance* and its actual willingness to restrict its national sovereignty for the good of communalisation, which has proven to be the more successful approach in other policy fields.

7.2.2 ...and NATO

Alternatively, Chirac tried to converge with NATO and promote WEU as a hinge between EU and NATO in the early days in power. In the framework of ESDI under the Berlin Plus Agreement, Paris was actively involved in improving the CJTF as well as enhancing PfP and even taking part in the NATO operation in Kosovo in order strengthen the WEU as the European pillar in NATO.(Stahl, 2003: 108-112). In fact, the French air campaign in former Yugoslavia was the second largest military contribution after the USA. Despite French efforts to act as an equivalent partner to the Americans, the USA was unwilling to grant a bigger share of political responsibility to the European pillar in the Alliance, disappointing France

(Blunden, 2000: 21-22). The turn in Chirac's political course was pragmatic and a rational consequence of the inability to create an alternative European or even French security structure outside of NATO (Deloche-Gaudez, 2002: 131). Since this rapprochement did not serve French national interests this was reversed. The French convergence and even their contemplation of returning to NATO was put aside after the USA did not concede to a stronger European command in NATO. Once again, France dedicated itself to intergovernmental security arrangements. The necessity of constructing its own security network depleted the French budget, which was already suffering. Just six years previously, armament projects with European partners made up one third of the intergovernmental projects. These circumstances were not financially ideal and another cogent reason for the French to convince its EU partners to establish an autonomous security and defence capacity going beyond ESDI.

7.2.3 The ESDP Initiative

Not until the British rapprochement in 1998 was France able to put its vision of an autonomous European military capacity into action. From Pleven to de Gaulle to Mitterrand, all had failed to bring about this vision. It was finally realised in 1998 at St. Malo and profited from American pressure and the pressure of the Balkan conflicts, which legitimised and catalysed the implementation of ESDP. The motivation to launch ESDP is rooted in the Waltzian security concept. The UK and France have recognised that their military potentials are not sufficient to act independently from the USA in conflicts which endanger the EU. Until ESDP, Western Europe relied on the principle of bandwagoning in the framework of NATO. In view of the hesitant behaviour of the USA in the Balkan conflicts, the Waltzian assumption that such coalitions are unreliable and undesirable for individual nations, is because they can lead to security dependency from the USA. The creation of ESDP is an opportunity for greater autonomy, political influence and emancipation of the EU member states from the USA. This development definitely plays to the French quest for autonomy. France was pleased with the extraordinary developmental speed of ESDP. Due to Franco-British similarities concerning military potential, the nuclear arsenal, global power aspirations and the intergovernmental approach of CFSP, France considered the UK increasingly as its partner leading the ESDP. France had also to reluctantly accept the complementary role of NATO to ESDP as a compromise to the British position within this new leadership.

“Au premier rang des difficultés résiduelles, figurant les relations entre l'Union européenne et l'OTAN et le degré d'indépendance de la force européenne d'intervention par rapport aux

moyens de l'OTAN¹⁷“, remains an unsolved issue in regard to the French ESDP autonomy ambitions (Barrau, 2001). This declaration, which emphasises the French repudiation of NATO/US influence in ESDP, was published in an official report of the French National Assembly on 31 January 2001. This statement also served to clarify that France would continue the pursuit of an autonomous European military structure despite a current compromise with the Atlanticist position. The creation of ESDP implies power maximisation for France but also the possibility to counterbalance the American *hyperpuissance* on international defence and security matters.

At one end of the spectrum is the United States, standing apart from the mechanics of the process, yet with a vital interest in how it develops. It remains suspicious of a process that it cannot influence directly and that risks diminishing America's primacy in European defence matters. Towards the middle of the spectrum stands the UK, with a desire to enhance European military capabilities but prevent any actions that could undermine the NATO alliance. At the far end of the spectrum are countries such as France which possess a more ambitious goal for the ESDP. The reconciling of these different attitudes will determine the path and the extent of the success of the EU's defence initiative. (Rees in Smith/Timmins 2001: 109)

Despite fundamental and seemingly irreconcilable differences between France and the USA, 9/11 has proven French solidarity with the USA and the importance of NATO. Generally, France does not question NATO and the American engagement in Europe, although it does question American leadership and instrumentalisation of NATO. It is not in France's interest in view of the young and sparsely equipped ESDP to wish for America's isolation from Europe (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2004: 204). In the French opinion, it is the European pillar in NATO that should be strengthened and NATO military intervention should only take place in connection with a mandate of the UN Security Council. France prefers the fortification of the European pillar in NATO by ESDP, but on the other hand does not want ESDP development to end in an ESDP autonomy loss and, finally, in an integration into NATO structures. The French insistence on avoiding Americanisation of the ESDP structures through NATO capability and facility recourse, has provoked criticism from many EU members. Beyond doubt, the other EU members could perceive the French anti-NATO defence policy as an intransigent policy serving merely French national interests. Nevertheless, by the end of the Nice summit for the implementation of ESDP, France accepted the principle of consultation between NATO and the EU. This would imply that the EU will increasingly concentrate on operational capacities and that ESDP-NATO policies would be largely regulated from Brussels (Deloche-Gaudez, 2002: 130).

¹⁷ “First of all, concerning the residual difficulties, which constitute the relations between the European Union and NATO and the degree of independence of the European intervention force from NATO means”

The events of 9/11 also made an impact on the French concept of *Europe puissance*. Taking into account the new security environment and the new ESDP, it was exactly one year later when France ratified its new *Loi de programmation militaire 2003-2008*. This document represents the second stage of military transformation up to 2015 and emphasises the necessity of strengthening the ESDP independency from NATO developments.

7.3 The Franco-German Duo against the Iraq Intervention

The Iraq issue in 2003 revived the Franco-German tandem in security policy, which had been put aside after the irritations of Nice. The Franco-German consonance on this topic stems from rather vague causalities of different national approaches that only share the commonality of criticising a violation of international law (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2004: 253). In contrast to France, this veto against American and NATO action was a novelty in German foreign policy which, until then, has been bridging the gap between Paris and Washington as will be described in the next chapter. Simultaneously, this issue demonstrated the difficulties of the French ESDP leadership with an ideologically opposing partner as observed in the previous UK chapter. The Iraq issue disunited ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe and put a wedge between the Europeanists led by France and Germany and the Atlanticists led by the UK, Spain and Poland. The Atlanticist countries also had the support of most of the younger Eastern EU members. Disunity regarding Iraq was problematic for the continuity of CFSP/ESDP, but at the same time it reignited a new dynamic and symbolised a catharsis, according to Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2004: 264).

At present, harmony is not entirely re-established, although the ESDP has recovered. Beyond the coherency cracks in CFSP/ESDP, the Iraq conflict also manifested typical French power politics against America’s hegemony. France aspires to a multipolar system in which American *hyperpuissance* is to be controlled and set in a balance of power. To this end, France highlighted the importance of the UN Security Council and condemned any pre-emptive American intervention without a UN resolution of the Security Council during this crisis (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2004: 255). Out of this anti-hegemonic position, the conclusion can be drawn that power relations maintain the essence of French security and international policy thinking (Brenner & Parmentier, 2002: 18-24). France wants to play a central role with the EU in international politics. The USA, as the contemporary hegemonic nation must, according to French power politics, be counterbalanced, since it poses a power positional threat to France, and restricts France in its freedom of manoeuvre in the international arena.

To sum up the French positional development over the course of time, it has become clear that France was originally bent on unilateralism, then intergovernmentalism, and now the *grande nation* has gained a fondness for limited supranationalism and multilateral action. In particular, concerning defence and security issues Paris has become more in favour of multilateralism and has unintentionally come closer to NATO via the UK influence in the ESDP.

7.4 France in ESDP

Security is the business of all of us, defence is the business of each of us (Dumas in Lemaître, 1990)

Former French foreign minister Roland Dumas' statement made a decade before ESDP and in a different post-Cold War context, captures France's current perception of an autonomous European defence policy. It implies the everlasting tension between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. After St. Malo the following summits of Cologne, Helsinki, Feira and Nice confirmed the implementation of ESDP. During this process France, which initiated this project, adamantly defended an autonomous development of ESDP from NATO. Edwards says, "[t]he French position is that the EU itself should decide on its own military requirements and come up with a new and innovative Euro-centered military plan" (Edwards, 2000: 6). Moreover, France insisted on the merger with WEU as well as a transfer of the entire scope of Petersberg tasks from WEU. These demands raised hackles on the side of its British partner, who rejected any ESDP-WEU amalgamation and who preferred a minimum takeover of the Petersberg tasks in favour of NATO. At the summit of Feira, decisions regarding the Petersberg tasks were made in support of the French position. Nevertheless, the problematic nature of the WEU as well as the access to NATO capacities were not entirely clarified.

France was actively engaged in the ESDP implementation process and, under its presidency, the Nice summit marked the final stage of ESDP structural implementation. In Nice, France managed to enforce its national interests and preserve intergovernmentalism conceding the main decision-making power to the nations while the ESDP bodies remained relatively dependent on the nation-states. This tactic assured the French that Brusselisation would not dominate French power aspirations within ESDP. France defended its national sovereignty but lost favour with the other ESDP members (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2004: 216-217). On the one hand, France generally supports the creation of institutional ESDP structures. These structures are capable of contributing to a more coherent picture of the ESDP in the

international realm. On the other hand, France is unwilling to endow these ESDP bodies with the essential competences to warrant an efficient exercise of their functions.

This then is the expression of the fifteen sovereignties that have decided to act together; in other words, this is the second pillar, the intergovernmental logic that can fully express this willingness with the flexibility needed with respect for each sovereignty (Richard, 1999a).

In ESDP, as former Defence Minister Richard expressed in his speech to the 50th Anniversary of NATO, France emphasises the intergovernmental nature and designates the PSC, EUMS, EUMC and even the position of the High Representative as non-autonomous EU bodies. These bodies should serve, primarily, the enforcement of national interest. With the ratifications on ESDP in Nice, an intergovernmental path has been taken which is unlikely to result in a communalisation of ESDP in the near future but in a strengthening of France's national foreign and defence policy. Richard states that “[à] la fin ce sont les nations qui décident et qu'il ne faut rien faire qui les prive de leur pouvoir¹⁸” (Richard, 1999b). This statement further emphasises the centrality of national sovereignty and the term ‘power’ in French defence policy, which can be regularly observed in the French defence and security rhetoric from de Gaulle to Chirac and is even manifested in the *livre blanc* of 1994.

Under Chirac, France has adopted a pragmatic attitude to security and defence policy. It realised that there was a discrepancy between its claim to leadership in the world and its actual power position. Hence, France was initially more open to NATO and increasingly flexible concerning multilateral defence solutions (Stahl, 2003: 108). Similar to the UK however, France prefers selective use of the CFSP/ESDP. Depending on the region of conflict, France will prefer bilateralism over multilateralism in its former colonies, especially in Africa, where “France comes closer to being a world power ... than anywhere else” (Blunden, 2000: 35). Then again, it will mainly utilise the CFSP/ESDP in areas where French prestige and authority are weak. In these situations, the ESDP serves to increase French influence and power or, as Gnesotto claims, “Europe is to France what the United States is to Britain, the optimum multiplier of national power” (Gnesotto in Blunden, 2000: 22). France must strike a clever balance between its national interests in certain conflicts and the use of ESDP to avoid being the odd one out, similar to Thatcher's position after the Falklands' conflict, as outlined in the previous UK chapter.

Concerning the modalities and the institution-building process of ESDP, France has also displayed a closer position to the UK than to federally organised and very supranationally

¹⁸ “In the end it is the nation-states, which have the power, and nothing should be done to prevent them from exercising this power”

oriented Germany. France strongly defends the intergovernmental level of ESDP and does not deem it necessary to abandon national sovereignty in order to reassure French as well as European independence from the USA and NATO. The ESDP amplifies French military potential and should not result in a loss of sovereignty. Within ESDP, the French priority is to develop an autonomous European command structure and to modernise military technologies among member countries in order to increase interoperability of the European militaries. In short, the French do aim for an autonomous ESDP, but such a vision as *l'Europe puissance* is only accepted when France makes a profit from the restriction of its national sovereignty. Introducing supranationalism to ESDP does not signify a profitable trade-off for France in the near future. Both France and the UK hold a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, which symbolises national world power status and should not be traded in for a EU seat involving a loss of national power and influence. France will continue to place emphasis on the intergovernmental conception of the ESDP. Nevertheless, a French integrative dynamic and gradual fondness of Brusselisation can be felt, such as was unimaginable a decade ago. As Jolyon Howorth stated in an analysis of the French defence and security position: “if the Europeans cannot even agree among themselves on the institutional framework within CFSP, there is little chance of ESDI becoming reality” (Howorth, 1997a: 18). Reality has now proven otherwise.

7.5 Capabilities of France

The *grande nation* persistently ranges among the top three nations according to the Waltzian view of capabilities. The territorial relicts of its colonial past result in the biggest territory of 547,030 sq km of all three major European nations (CIA, 2006). This land and water territory is endowed with natural resources greater than the other two big nations (coal, iron ore, bauxite, zinc, uranium, antimony, arsenic, potash, feldspar, fluorospar, gypsum, timber, fish) (CIA, 2006). Its population of 60,656,178 also ranges among the top EU countries (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006: 68). In terms of economy, France's heyday is over. Its present GDP (real growth rate) of 1.45 per cent and GDP (per capita) of US\$29,900 signifies stagnation and relatively slow economic growth in 2005 (CIA, 2006). However, similar to Germany, it remains one of the wealthiest economies with a GNP of US\$1,455bn (Heilig, 2006). In order to substantiate its political power aspirations within ESDP, it is essential for France to support its claim with necessary military and financial capabilities. In 2005, France had the highest defence expenditure among the EU members. With the stagnating economic situation and the major defence budget cuts for 2007, it is very likely that the transformation of the military will slow drastically. As a result, the weight of

France's military potential in determining the power position within this context will then decrease. In political terms, this would imply that French power claims will be more dependent on the development of the EDA to promote intergovernmental armament co-operation according to Article 17 paragraph 1 sub-paragraph 4 of TEU.

Table 12: National Defence Budget

		2004	2005	2006
Defence expenditure	€	42.7bn	42.5bn	
	US\$	52.7bn	53.8bn	
Defence budget	€	32.4bn	32.9bn	
	US\$	40bn	41.6bn	

Data Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, p. 68

7.5.1 Military Potential

The French professional military of today was achieved by the Chirac administration, which quickly transformed and adapted the out-dated French military to the new post-Cold War security environment. From 1996 until 2002, the reforms have led to a dramatic reduction of 500,653 military staff to 150,000. These are to be subdivided into so-called projection forces of 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers. As a consequence, France saved 14bn francs a year. Today, France has an active military staff of 254,895 with an additional 44,465 civilian and 21,650 reserve soldiers (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006: 68). The breakdown of the defence budget into various inter-service modules went hand in hand with the transformation of the divisions into smaller inter-service commands of three main operational functions: prevention, projection and protection (Howorth, 1997b: 36).

Regarding the modernisation of the equipment, a declining budget has become a major issue leading to a slowing down of this process. Initially, France launched the transformation independent of the European context. It was more concerned about removing its national military deficiencies, so that there have been costly procurements which could have been avoided by better arrangements with other EU partners. A typical case was the Air Force's *Rafale* case which clarifies and re-illustrates the main dilemma of French defence and security policy. *Rafale* is a fighter aircraft which has been preferred over a five-nation co-operative European fighter aircraft, since France insisted on its national autonomy. Arising from this inflexibility of superpower aspirations was a catastrophic mis-investment in the mid-90s that

strained the French budget and disgruntled other European partners. France's unilateral move did not lead to a *Europe puissance*. Instead France worked against this aim, which is to be achieved by increased interoperability and synergy of military resources (Howorth, 1997a: 39). Today, with the new *loi de programmation militaire* the Chirac administration has learnt its lesson and is more supportive of multilateral armament approaches.

The transformation of the French military has resulted in the problem of a declining defence budget. As a consequence, the reforms which aim to modernise the French equipment and consolidate the professional army concept in order to guarantee the French leadership and Europeanist influence in ESDP, have lost their initial development speed. The UK, which represents a strong and competent military partner in leadership, is dealing with similar budgetary issues but is in the fortunate position of being the most important ally and partner to the USA. Similar military potential and compatible notions of national sovereignty have brought the UK and France closer together. However, because of the proximity of the UK to the USA and its slightly better equipped military, the UK is also a competitor in leadership. France has, therefore, cultivated this ESDP partnership with caution in order to remain at the helm of ESDP and not lose ESDP leadership to NATO.

Table 13: Equipment by Type of the Army

Army 162,000 (manpower incl. civilian)

Tanks	926
Reconnaissance	1,809
AIFV	601
APC	4413
Artillery	787
Tugs	1,195
Aircrafts	15
Helicopters	393
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles	68
Air Defence (Surface-to-air Missiles)	455+
Radar	75

Table 14: Equipment by Type of the Navy (incl. equipment of the Public Service Force)
Navy 56,460 (manpower incl. civilian)

Submarines	10
Principal Surface Combatants	35
Patrol and Coastal Combatants	41
Mine Warfare	21
Amphibious Ships and Crafts	29
Logistics and Support	23
Naval Aircrafts	156
Helicopters	84
Tactical Missiles	available (amount not given)
Bases	10
Naval airbases	4

Table 15: Equipment by Type of the Air Force
Air Force 71,100 (manpower incl. civilians)

Aircrafts	796+
Helicopters	117
Air Defence Systems	available (amount not given)
Tactical Missiles	available (amount not given)
Radar Stations	5

Paramilitary (mainly Gendarmerie) own equipment 28 tanks, 153 APCs, 157+ Artillery and 49 helicopters

Data Source (for Tables 13-15): International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, pp. 68-74

In addition to its traditional forces, France possesses nuclear capacities which are the core of French defence. France is ranked third of the official nuclear powers and, in the EU, it disposes of the biggest nuclear arsenal. The UK is the only other nation in possession of nuclear power within the EU. At present it is very unlikely that either France or the UK will put their nuclear capabilities at ESDP's disposal.

France's supreme position regarding nuclear power is a symbol of national sovereignty and impregnability. During the Cold War period nuclear deterrence was essential to the French strategic doctrine (Howorth, 1997a: 32-33). Conventional weapons were considered as tactical support. The roles have now been inverted and as mentioned earlier in this chapter the White Book of 1994 explicitly argues that conventional weapons have become strategic to France whereas nuclear forces play a tactical supporting role. Nuclear weapons are on the decline worldwide. In contrast to other nuclear powers, France is very hesitant in reducing its nuclear arsenal. Though it is signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, under Chirac, France even continued to announce the procurement and development of nuclear weapons. This announcement was put into action when Quai d'Orsay adopted a new military plan on 27

January 2003 authorising US\$4bn to nuclear weapon programmes. France currently possesses two nuclear weapon systems. Firstly, nuclear-powered ballistic submarines carrying submarine-launched ballistic missiles and, secondly, aircrafts carrying medium-range air-to-surface missiles. Sixteen years ago, at the peak of its nuclear power, France had a total of six different nuclear weapon systems (Kristensen & Norris, 2005b). In spite of the French government's pro-nuclear attitude it has become clear that, overall, France has reduced the proportion of its defence budget directed toward nuclear programmes by over 20.5 per cent since the 80s (Howorth, 1997b: 37). Nuclear weapons are *a priori*, a means of deterrence and securing the French power position. Despite nuclear tests in the Pacific in 1995/1996 which generated immense protest from the international community, post-Cold War France does not intend to use nuclear forces against a specific target. However, the international community feared a shift towards an increased operational nuclear approach under Chirac in the mid-90s (Howorth, 1997b: 29). French governmental mentality is that the possession of nuclear weapons in a new global security environment is the ultimate national interest guarantor and, to a lesser extent, a matter of operability. Though France is always developing new key capacities to maintain its strategic autonomy, its nuclear weapon arsenal will remain an essential military power attribute. Without this, France would nowadays find it increasingly difficult to cement its superpower aspirations.

Conclusion

France is the second-best equipped military power in Europe. It possesses the third biggest European economy and has a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and therefore the right of veto. France definitely justifies its reputation as a *grande nation* in terms of Waltzian power capabilities. Arising from this power position is a strong European nation, actively involved in world politics and promoting multilateralism from G8 to EU to OSCE to UN. Within these institutions, France attempts to hold onto its important and influential positions in order to support French interests on an international level. France has adapted to the new security environment and realised that holding on to the traditional Gaullist paradigm will not actively promote its quest for maximisation of autonomy. Today, unilateral action and strict adherence to national sovereignty is no longer an option. The new tendency in French defence and security policy recognises that in order to accomplish goals, the French cannot act alone. In regions of the world, beyond francophone Africa or the Pacific Islands, where American influence dominates, the French rely on multilateralism to increase influence. In this context it is, in particular, the EU framework which is most profitable and efficient for France. Whereas under de Gaulle the French seemed still reluctant to embrace European integration, it has now

become evident that France's power position is inseparable from this process. Despite the eternal French priority of superpower aspirations, the EU has become the most important (f)actor, or rather, supranational alliance to perpetuate French grandeur worldwide and realistically keep these aspirations high.

In the realm of security and defence, it is the ESDP which secures the French global power aspirations. The *grande nation* and the UK, two very different, even contradicting, European military powers, have come together to lead this intergovernmental institution. It was, in particular, due to the heads of state, Chirac and Blair, that ESDP developed at this speed and intensity. By 2007, these important political figures will very likely have left the political stage. Whether the new political leaders can continue development at this pace in ESDP is to be seen.

Today the French position within ESDP experiences multiple tensions between its Gaullist paradigm of national sovereignty, ESDP commitments on a European level and the Atlanticist compromise. At present, Chirac walks a tightrope, attempting to harmonise all these influences affecting the French ESDP position, which is in favour of deeper integration with minimum loss of national sovereignty. Coinciding with the analysed UK positional prospect of ESDP, France will prefer a development towards an intergovernmentally based Community. This is the preferred form of ESDP integration on the one hand and on the other, France will enhance an autonomous European capacity from NATO. However, this position distinguishes the French from the British concept of the ESDP development.

In the shadow of the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has evolved from a country laid in ruins after World War II to the most powerful economic actor in Europe. It was embedded in European integration and NATO's security framework. Its current strength is founded on soft power which refers to the scientific and technological knowledge of its people. Germany possesses few natural resources and declined military power since World War II ended. The FRG is the weakest of the big European nations in regard to military power. Irrespectively, Germany has played, and is still to play, an important political role among the nuclear powers of the United Kingdom and France in shaping European security structures. This role is based on its civilian capabilities and its supranational integrity.

8.1 Historical Development of the German Security Concept

The FRG represents the heart of Europe in geographical terms. Similarly, in historical terms Germany has been the pivotal point in world affairs throughout the twentieth century. At the end of World War II Germany was demilitarised and divided into two countries. The war experience and the austerities imposed on West Germany by the Allies have created Germany's current pacifist stance in IR. The defeat also signified a recommencement of the West German military in 1955. This new start was within the scope of NATO and the European Community framework. West Germany was yoked to the strategies of others and constrained in its armament. Though Germany itself was never allowed to possess ABC weapons, it became a leading supplier of nuclear, chemical and biological substances for ABC weapons to Libya, Iraq and Pakistan during the late Cold War (Müller, 2006: 50).

The early Cold War period symbolised an era of constraints and paternalism of Germany's security policy. West German security policy was embedded in international structures and articulated through these. However, the inclusion into institutional structures, such as the European Community, allowed Germany greater room of political manoeuvring. Paradoxically, Germany gained more sovereignty through increased European economic and political integration. As a consequence the initial loss of sovereignty of the individual *Länder* and the FRG itself through integration was willingly embraced.

¹⁹ The German term *Friedensmacht* was used by German politicians such as Gerhard Schröder of the SPD during the election campaign August and September 2005 referring to Germany as a strong civilian actor in world politics.

It was, in particular, the USA and France that fostered Germany's embodiment in foreign, institutional geostrategies hindering simultaneously a new German hegemonic aspiration and an outreach of communist influence to Western Europe from the Soviet Union.

The integration into European structures provided security for the other European countries from Germany. At the same time, it created a new German-European identity of reconciliation and co-operation. Within Atlantic structures the role of Germany implied being the central front of America's strategy towards the Eastern bloc. At times, when both structures were contrary to each other, Germany was caught in between. For example, after the French withdrawal from the Atlantic security design, Germany had to balance European interests and Atlantic commitments. It made an effort to reconcile both positions, while ensuring that NATO and the USA remained the main guarantors of German security until the fall of the Berlin wall. This event marked a turning point in America's strategy. Until then, German security policy was characterised by multilateralism and incorporated in the American grand strategy of bipolar stability. Since West Germany's security aims were identical with those of the Alliance, it failed to develop its own distinctive national security interests and instead focussed on its economic development.

After having overcome the bipolar system, Germany's geostrategical importance for the USA during the Cold War faded. By virtue of Germany's lack of military and financial capacities for its new security policy, the USA lost interest in Germany as an earnest partner in a unipolar system of new global threats. At the same time, the altered polarity decreased Germany's dependency on America's power.

Thus, the fall of the Iron Curtain also terminated formal external restraints caused by the American strategic dependency. The bipolar strategy of NATO became obsolete, so that West and East Germany could be reunified. The unification of East and West Germany changed Germany's power position enormously with regard to population and territorial substance. Germany was now no longer simply an economic heavyweight: its population has become the biggest in Europe. This new demographic and territorial strength of a reunited Germany, as well as the new structure of the international system, raises the question as to whether this new freedom and power position of Germany will entice the country to "replace its post-war political modesty and restraint with old patterns of over-assertiveness" (Kamp, 2001: 93). Kamp draws the conclusion that Germany has managed these new strategic realities and has preserved its "Western orientation and its strong preference for integration in European and Atlantic structures" (Kamp, 2001: 93). For the post-Cold War period, Germany must preserve its integrity but, nonetheless, it must now also live up to its power position and the international responsibility attached to this position.

8.1.1 Post-Cold War Era of Developing Responsibility

The German military (*Bundeswehr*) was created for territorial defence during the Cold War. As a result of the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, Germany became an army without a *Feindbild*²⁰ (Longhurst, 2004: 55). Finding a new role for itself was a difficult task for a military created and legitimised by the Cold War. The old FRG had abstained from military power deployment for more than four decades and has developed the pacifist mentality of a civilian power. During the Cold War it was not permitted to act beyond the NATO area based on the German constitution. The new international structure and new threats required a new German security concept that went beyond its territorial defence and compelled Germany to abandon its military abstinence in international affairs. The Gulf War was the first international crisis, in which Germany had to find and discern its new role. Germany contributed financially to the sum of 17.2bn Deutsche Mark (DM) (Inacker, 1991: 104-106). However, it did not participate in the Gulf War militarily. This provoked harsh international criticism²¹ regarding Germany's self-imposed restriction of being only allowed to act in defence of NATO areas. The Alliance condemned Germany's free-rider position. It no longer tolerated and postulated a greater responsibility for Germany as a central European power. Since then the German government has gradually modernised and upgraded the role of the German military forces acting beyond their traditional role during the Cold War period including extraterritorial operations in Cambodia, Yugoslavia and Somalia, even before the out-of-area debate in Germany was resolved (Kamp, 2001: 95, 107). The German government and opposition could not find common ground in this controversial debate until mid-1994. By 12 June 1994 the Federal Constitutional Court declared that *Bundeswehr* out-of-area missions were compliant with the constitution. According to Article 24 of the German constitution the out-of area missions are legitimate if the *Bundeswehr* acts within the scope of WEU, NATO or the UN. Since then, Germany has obtained the legal status to bear its share of the international security burden both financially and militarily.

This new German concept of responsibility was created out of Germany's desire to fulfil international expectations and to be a reliable partner in foreign and security policy (Brunstetter, 2005: 21). Despite a greater gain in international responsibility, Germany strictly adheres to its peaceful position and affirms its abdication of ABC weapons even 50 years later, even though it has now regained complete national sovereignty.

²⁰ concept of enemy

²¹ So called „chequebook diplomacy“ or “German attempt to bail out from common responsibilities” see Kamp in Rubin 2001: 95.

8.2 The *Bundeswehr* in the 21st Century

The new orientation of Russia and the enlargement of the EU and NATO towards the East have changed Germany's security environment dramatically. Today, Germany does not feel threatened by conventional attack by other nations. The new global security environment has brought about new threats which Germany shares with the other EU members and the USA. In order to protect the German citizens from these threats, the *Bundeswehr* works within a multinational framework of which NATO is the most important guarantor for German security. The EU also provides a multinational security framework which the EU hopes to develop into a European Security and Defence Union. These multinational alliances enable Germany to defend itself according to the German constitution, which states that Germany must act wherever risks and threats emerge for itself and its allies. That is, Germany's defence can be utilised outside its territory or, as Struck declares in his government statement on 11 March 2004, that Germany's security is also defended at the Hindukush.

8.2.1 Reforms

Germany's new and greater responsibility in world affairs as expressed by Struck, also assumes the transformation of the Cold War relict, *Bundeswehr*, into a modern military. Already under the Kohl administration, attempts to restructure the *Bundeswehr* were being made. In 1994, Defence Minister Volker R  he introduced a new personnel restructuring model reducing the *Bundeswehr* personnel from 670,000 after reunification in 1990 to 340,000. However, it was not until the Schr  der administration that the reforms were introduced on a grand scale. The decision of the federal Cabinet on the reorientation of the *Bundeswehr* on 14 June 2000 represented the foundation of a rough draft of the *Bundeswehr* reforms which were enforced from mid-2000 and intensified following the events of 11 September 2001. The reform of the *Bundeswehr* took place at a very slow pace until the terrorist attacks of 9/11 sparked the need for Germany to wake up, re-orient and reform profoundly. At this, the transformation is primarily a natural post-Cold War procedure, long overdue given the new post-Cold War security context.

The introduction of new organisational elements, the amalgamation various fields of responsibility and streamlining of different structures should allow: a higher interoperability with other nations, mobility, command and control, effective engagement, combat support and sustainability, intelligence collection and reconnaissance as well as survivability and protection by a modern *Bundeswehr* (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2004: 16-21).


A new element of the reform was to ameliorate the link between the *Bundeswehr* and the private industry in order to receive the latest technology and most recent research data at low

prices. A most important innovation, therefore, was the creation of the Society for Development, Procurement and Enterprise (*Gesellschaft für Entwicklung, Beschaffung und Betrieb* (GEBB)), which should play a key role in assisting the management of the Ministry of Defence by the selection and design of the procurement, enterprise, financing and payment modalities. The GEBB is a structural innovation of the *Bundeswehr* reform but is, at the same time, commercialised in order to utilise elements of the private industry in order to increase the efficiency of the ministry's management. Unfortunately, the wish for efficient investments and savings was not brought in by GEBB and could not help relieve the burden of the financial constraints (Agüera, 2004: 121).

Adjacent to the integration of private industrial elements into these reforms, the lion's share of those reforms concerns the improvement of the efficiency of the armed forces as well as their control and command. Thus, the organisational structure of the Army, Air Force and Navy command has been tightened and the functions within the individual commands have merged. The structure of the Army troops has been reduced to five, not including the three special divisions. Similar compression methods have been introduced to the Air Force and Navy divisions.

Various Air Force command squads have been reduced to one Air Force command squad managing three divisions as well as the Air Force transport squad, the Air Force operation leading squad and the National Centre for Air Defence. Within the Navy, the five flotillas have merged into two flotillas (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2004: 32). The Ministry of Defence consists of further detachments, which can be viewed in the following graph. These are of a civilian nature and consequently regarded as non-determining factors for the measurement of Germany's hard power.

Figure 6: Organisational Structure of the German Defence



Source: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2004, p. 29

The reorientation of the *Bundeswehr* envisions that the total number of soldiers will be reduced to 282,000 and, in the final reformation, to 252,500 by 2010. Simultaneously, the strength of the action force will be tripled. The reduction and relocation of personnel in the military basis leads to this triplication of the action force. The action force must meet the demands of the ERRF of the EU and of the NRF of NATO. At this, the traditional separation of the crisis reaction force and the main defence force was repealed.

In general, the new envisioned number of personnel implies a retrenchment of the staff in the Army down to 138,500, in the Air Force down to 51,850 and in the Navy down to 20,650 (Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 2000: 13). It is, in particular, the abatement of the Army which contributes to the additional Medical Service and Armed Forces Base of 3500 and 7000 respectively (Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 2000: 13). The abatement will eventually generate a lack of personnel in crisis situations. Therefore, the guidelines envisage maintaining conscription (Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 2003: 5). When these reforms began, active military staff was counted at 314, 813 and, currently, this number has been dramatically reduced to 284, 500 – not including reservists of 354, 650 women and men – which indicates that the criteria of the reforms have been more than satisfied by 2006 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006: 74).

An important characteristic of the reformed *Bundeswehr* forces is the reclassification in Response Forces (35,000 soldiers, who are the main component of the forces for the EU Battle Groups), Support Forces (70,000) and Stabilisation Forces (147,000). Response Forces are deployed in operations of high intensity abroad as well as on national territory in order to protect the population and the vital infrastructure. Support Forces are deployed by multinational military operations within a peace stabilising framework of low or medium intensity and long duration. These Support Forces are, as the name implies, forces that support the Response and Stabilisation Forces before and during the operations on national and international soil (this paragraph is entirely based on Staack, 2005: 35-36). The new differentiation postulates a task-oriented and deployment-oriented training, from which the multinational forces will benefit during conflict prevention and crisis regulation.

Transformation measures in material and armament are geared to the aforementioned capability profile of the *Bundeswehr*. In view of scarce resources, it is a necessity for the *Bundeswehr* to seek multinational co-operation and orient its procurement policy directly to potential operations of ESDP and NATO in order to increase efficient spending. The impact of the limited *Bundeswehr* resources was felt during the UN mandated mission of the EU in the DRC, within which Germany was given a leading role. Lack of resources and poor preparation for the DRC mission caused Berlin considerable embarrassment and showed the

international community quite plainly that Germany was not equipped to take military responsibility in extraterritorial missions (Mauß, 2006: 8). Germany is slowly transforming its military to face new global challenges. Nevertheless, in Berlin as well as in German society military power is still not viewed as a strategic asset for Germany (Mauß, 2006: 9).

Table 16: Major Capability Focus of the new Armament Policy

Management ability	Reconnaissance	Strategic Mobility	Efficiency of Deployment	Resilience/Survivability
Improvement of the interoperability	Satellite supported reconnaissance	Future Transport Aircraft	EUROFIGHTER with air-air armament	Near-range anti-aircraft system for ships
Modernisation of skirmish capabilities	Unmanned carrier platforms/ drones	Airtanking equipment for AIRBUS	Frigates 124/ Corvettes 130	Armoured transport vehicle
Increase in efficiency of radio data transmission systems and identification systems	Spying vehicle	Helicopter NH 90	Support Helicopter TIGER	Mine-hunting equipment
Upgrading of the management systems	Opto- and radarsensors for TORNADO		Armoured tracked vehicle 3	Lightly armoured transport vehicle
	Great range oceanic reconnaissance plane and U-fighter MPA successor		Submarine 212 A	
			Increase of efficiency of the anti-aircraft PATRIOT missile system	
			Marine Helicopter MH 90	
			To sea missile of medium and great range	

Data Source: Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 2000, p. 39

Table 16 displays the major capability investments of the new Armament Policy. In regard to reorientation, procurement and armament planning the Armament Council plays the main decision-making role. The General Inspector of the Armament Council develops a consensus on the basis of the advice from the other inspectors as well as on existing resources. The reforms have also aimed to increase the power of the General Inspector (Longhurst, 2004: 109).

In the future it will be indispensable for the *Bundeswehr*, due to its small defence budget and the increasing multinational nature of operations, to better arrange its procurement and armament policy with its partners in order to achieve the aims of NATO's Defence Capability initiative in 1999, of the PCC and the EU Headline Goal 2010, to which Germany has committed itself to contribute to a force-pool of 32,000 soldiers, 130 aircraft and 18 ships (Stützle, 2002: 159). In order to achieve these goals in time the ECAP²² was established. Unsurprisingly, France and the UK are actively involved in the panels and have each taken leadership over four out of 19 panels. Germany is engaged in 13 and takes the leading role in two panels. The same strong German commitment to improve the capability gap and pool capabilities can be observed in the Atlantic structure (Agüera, 2004: 127-129). At the time of writing, there have been pooling regulations designating Germany to withdraw from strategic, oceanic transport and to focus solely on certain military fields and projects in co-ordination with its EU and Atlantic partners (Staack, 2005: 37). In general, since the transformation began, Germany has strived for more international responsibility and worked hard to master those capability commitments which correspond with its new post-Cold War role.

Eventually, the reforms aim at restructuring the organisation, its policy guidelines and procurement policy. However, the reforms also seek to make the *Bundeswehr* more appealing to young people by investing retrenchment-induced finance into new trainee concepts and higher financial incentives. Despite the creation of a more attractive image of the *Bundeswehr* as an employer, the issue of the *Bundeswehr* as a training army is unlikely to be solved by the reform. Germany is still unable to reorient itself and restructure towards the model of a deployment army, *Armee im Einsatz*, such as the armed forces of Germany's most important European ally, France (Meiers, 2006: 50, 56).

Since the introduction of these reforms of the twenty-first century, there have been important innovations implemented. On 21 May 2003, these innovations were officially outlined by the

²² View Chapter 2 and Appendix 1

Minister of Defence in the Defence Policy Guidelines succeeding those guidelines of R  he in 1992. This new document provided a new framework of contents for the transformation and also gave an ultimate end to Germany's territorial defence role. The transformation of the *Bundeswehr* aims at effective crisis management implying a comprehensive concept of security policy to challenge the new global threats under a multilateral umbrella. The German military has adapted to the new security context and is on the appropriate course toward mastery of these new security aims.

The Defence Policy Guidelines of 2003 also made clear that Germany views the ESDP as a "decisive step towards Europe's deeper integration and enhanced capacity for action in security matters. The goal is the creation of a European Security and Defence Union as part of a fully developed Political Union" (Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 2003: 11). That is, Germany's new guidelines explicitly outline Germany's interest in the supranational finality of the ESDP. This should be in the form of a possible security and defence union, incorporated into a political union. This long-term goal lies in the distant future. The reforms introduced by the Schr  der government and continued by the Merkel administration are an important step in this direction.

8.3 Capabilities of Germany

From a neorealist perspective, Germany's unification has increased its power position both territorially and demographically, enabling Germany to pursue a higher degree of power politics. The unification catapulted Germany's population to a total of 82,431,390 by 2006 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2006: 74). Similar dramatic growth applies to Germany's land and water territory, now encompassing an area of 357,021 sq km (CIA, 2006). Despite the territorial increment, Germany could not significantly gain in resource endowment and lacks natural resources in comparison to the other major European powers (German resources: coal, lignite, natural gas, iron ore, copper, nickel, uranium, potash, salt, construction materials, timber, arable land). However, Germany has established one of the world's strongest economies with a GNP of US\$ 1,966bn (Heilig, 2006). Germany's economy is solid, but lacks innovative impulses in order to reflate the market. The GDP (real growth rate) of 0.95 per cent and a GDP (per capita) of \$30,400 in 2005 indicate that Germany's economy is experiencing stagnation similar to minimal growth rates in France (CIA, 2006). These factors imply that Germany is a politically stable, democratic country with moderate power capability figures, no hegemonic aspirations and is considered a moderate power. To assess the development of Germany's power position, it is crucial to include the German defence budget and military capabilities within the assessment.

8.3.1 German Defence Budget

For the fiscal year 2006, the German government planned a budget of 262bn Euro, 23.88bn of which makes up the defence budget. This amount is slightly less than the defence budget of 2005. From 2007, the Single Plan 14 is to become effective and will ensure a constant inclination of the defence budget until 2009 (Bötel, 2006).

Table 17: National Defence Budget

Year	1990	1991	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Defence Budget	57.36bn (DM)	52.6bn (DM)	€24bn	€23.9bn	€23.88bn	€24.28bn	€24.58bn	€24.88bn
	US\$	US\$	US\$29.7bn	US\$30.2bn				
Defence Expenditure			€30.6bn	€30.4bn				
	US\$	US\$	US\$37.7bn	US\$38.5bn				

Data Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991-1992, 2005-2006, 2006

The economic stagnation in Germany has had negative effects on the defence budget. Under Schröder the defence budget has suffered significant cuts, decelerating the Bundeswehr transformation. Schröder's successor will face the same financial problems. Whether or not the foreseen budgets for the following years will be realised depends to a great degree on the fiscal development under Merkel in 2006. The gap in military expenditure will nevertheless remain in the first instance, leading to the perpetual gap between German forces and those of the other leading armies in the Alliance. Germany is financially not in the position to follow the transformation and procurement demands it has committed itself to within the NATO and EU framework. There is an evident mismatch between ends and means. Meiers even speaks of German forces as "the least deployable, mobile and sustainable of NATO's and the EU's leading armies" (Meiers, 2006: 54). Out of its financial constraints arise the relatively meagre capabilities, in comparison to France and the UK.

8.3.2 German Military Capabilities

Table 18: Equipment by Type of the Army

Army 488, 650 (manpower incl. conscripts and reservists)

Tanks	2,200
Reconnaissance	523
AIFV	2,241
APC	3,123
Artillery	1,551
Tugs	1,915
Amphibious Crafts	13
Helicopters	525
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles	available (amount not given)
Air Defence	Around 2000
Radar	154+

Table 19: Equipment by Type of the Navy

Navy 33,150 (manpower incl. conscripts and reservists)

Submarines	14
Principal Surface Combatants	14
Patrol and Coastal Combatants	14
Mine Warfare	23
Amphibious Ships and Crafts	6
Naval Aircrafts	20
Naval Helicopters	43
Missiles	available (amount not given)
Logistics and Support	38
Bases	6

Table 20: Equipment by Type of the Air Force

Air Force 117,350 (manpower incl. conscripts and reservists)

Aircrafts	587
Air Defence	available (amount not given)
Missiles	available (amount not given)
Helicopters	89

Data Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, pp. 74-79

Additionally, or rather, due to the financial problems, Germany also faces capability and deployment problems. The financial restraints as well as the continuation of conscription have slowed down the transformation of the *Bundeswehr*, decelerating the restructuring process of the staff which is to be achieved by 2010. This means that, in the near future, German deployments will remain rudimentary and military staff will be overstrained (Meiers, 2005: 20).

The financial issue also accounts for the poor modernisation and procurement of military material leading to non-compliance or delayed compliance with the commitments to NATO and the Headline Goal 2010 (Meiers, 2005: 20).

These problems add to the slow development of the *Bundeswehr* and prolong the transformation process, which was already embarked upon a decade too late. Thus far, Germany has attempted to become an attractive military partner for France and the UK, or the USA by 2010. Until then, Germany must accept reprimands from these nations and the fact that even France prefers an Anglo-Franco leadership in the ESDP.

8.4 Germany and the ESDP

The FRG is an essential part of the motor of the European integration. The deep interconnectedness of Germany and the EU is reflected even in the preamble, Article 23 and Article 24 of the German constitution in which the transferral of national sovereignty towards a supranational foreign policy are manifest. Germany's economic and demographic weight extols it as a political heavyweight in the EU and in particular in the CFSP/ESDP. Besides the enlargement of the EU, Germany puts the ESDP as the main focus of its foreign policy. In comparison with the two other leading European nations in the ESDP, Germany is militarily inferior and appears to be in the wrong place among the European military powers when speaking of ESDP leadership. This ostensibly wrong position is paradoxically justified, since the smaller EU members give Germany high credibility as a political and diplomatic heavyweight among the two nuclear and former colonial powers.

In spite of this respected medial position, the new security structure has compelled Germany to reform and militarily accommodate to the expectations of the other big ESDP members in order to maintain its influence in the ESDP. The development of the German position after the Cold War is a balance between a culture of constraint and the necessity of taking increasing responsibility in the new security environment. At this, it is in particular the governments of Schröder and Merkel which will be relevant for the post-war power positioning of a modern and unified Germany in the face of the new security environment.

8.4.1 ESDP and the Schröder Administration

In September 1998, the sixteen year Kohl era of Christian Democratic governance came to an end. The new red/green coalition with Gerhard Schröder as the new chancellor came into power during the pressure of the Kosovo War. At this time it became clear that, even under a new pacifist coalition, Germany must act in regard to the genocide in Kosovo. When the Schröder administration came to power, this conflict posed a highly sensitive issue due to the administration's pacifist Green coalition partner and a public hesitant regarding the use of military force. Although Germany was reluctant to participate in active combat, humanitarian obligation to prevent genocide such as the Germans had themselves experienced, prevailed (Brunstetter, 2005: 22-23). As a result, German soldiers actively took part in combat for the first time since World War II.

The deployment of German troops to Kosovo initiated a security policy regarding the normalisation of frequent German participation and international deployment of German troops in conflicts outside of the German territory. Although the late 90s had proved that Germany was attempting the development of a natural handling of the use of force such as the increased international deployments display, the Cold War period marked Germany's emancipation from force to a civilian power (Longhurst, 2004). Today Germany will not jeopardise this status, but will strike a balance between international responsibility and the use of military power.

Kosovo was not only an eye-opening experience for Germany in terms of military force, but also for the EU as an entity. It highlighted the fact that European integration needed to be comprised of a security and defence component in order to synergise hard power. This would solve escalated conflicts on European soil more efficiently. Soon after the Franco-British initiative of St. Malo, Germany became an important actor in this project. In the first half of 1999 Germany, as the chairholder of the EU presidency, was actively involved in creating the ESDP at the EC summit in Cologne and promoting the immediate exertion of the new CFSP instruments created in the Treaty of Amsterdam for the European security policy (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 171-173, 191-195). The German presidency also attempted to introduce QMV into the CFSP, which would have strengthened the supranational approach in the EU's foreign and security policy. Furthermore, Germany committed itself to allocating the biggest contingent of soldiers for the newly created ERF. The German presidency also promoted the ratification of the first common strategy regarding Russia and a deeper integration of the CFSP with regard to the imminent EU enlargement.

Under Schröder the German security policy was the main focus of pro-European Kohl security policy and emphasised the centrality of European policy in the new government's

programme (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 191). This intensive orientation towards the EU is best reflected by Schröder's insistence on an EU seat in the UN Security Council over a German seat.

On 20 November 2000, Germany again proved its strong interest in European integration of defence structures at the Capabilities Commitment Conference by committing to increase its defence budget and capabilities. Even outside of the EU framework, Germany was seemingly shedding its image as a 'culture of restraint'. While Berlin was greatly involved in the fast development of the ESDP, the government emphasised its constancy to NATO like all other precedent governments. The German view of the ESDP is regarded as a complementary security structure to strengthen the European pillar in NATO, as former Foreign Minister Fischer emphasised during his government policy statement to the *Bundestag* on 11 September 2003. That is, that ESDP is characterised by "Komplementarität, nicht Konkurrenz"²³.

Aus deutscher Sicht sind die Stärkung des europäischen Pfeilers in der Allianz und die Herausbildung eines sicherheitspolitischen Arms in der EU komplementäre, miteinander eng verknüpfte Prozesse, die darauf ausgerichtet sind, die transatlantische Partnerschaft und die europäische Handlungsfähigkeit im Bereich der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik gegenseitig zu stärken (Meiers, 2002: 36).

Within this statement, Meiers affirmed Fischer's declaration and his belief that Germany's security policy adhered to the NATO First principle. He classified the ESDP as merely a supplement to NATO and stated that Germany would endorse the preservation of NATO primacy in the EU in order to maintain America's involvement on the European continent.

The *transatlantic partnership* remains the bedrock of our security. Now, and in the future, there can be no security in and for Europe without the United States of America. Germany will continue to make a substantial contribution to the transatlantic partnership (Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 2003: 9).

Under Schröder, Germany saw the USA as the longstanding and continued guarantor of peace and stability in the EU. So that this peace and stability could remain intact, the European pillar in NATO required fortification in order to cherish the transatlantic partnership. However, the further the Atlantic and European security options drift apart, the more difficult it will be for Germany to act as a bridge between both sides of the Atlantic. Especially, with regard to Germany's most important partners, the USA and France, which pursue

²³ "complementarity, not competition"

contradicting strategies, Germany increasingly displays an ambivalent security policy strategy.

The Schröder administration particularly emphasised the Franco-German relations. These were relatively cold at the outset of Schröder's term but were re-activated and becoming increasingly warm from late 2002. Due to the constitutional process and the enlargement of the EU, the Franco-German motor was revived. These internal co-operation motivations on the one hand, and a common stance on Iraq on the other, contributed to a strong Chirac-Schröder friendship reflected in the intense bilateral relationship of these countries. Unfortunately, regarding such matters as Iraq, the adjacency and political weight of this relationship did not leave much room for the UK, or smaller countries in favour of a transatlantic co-operation, to articulate their opinions properly. Thus, the strong Franco-German relationship hindered the European motor of integration. Although Paris-Berlin relations will always depend on the Berlin-Washington/NATO commitments, the Franco-German tandem in the ESDP has managed to initiate important co-operations. One of these, the merger of Aérospatiale-Matra and DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG (DASA) with European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), was a crucial step for the European armament market (Overhaus, 2004: 42).

The first year of the Schröder administration saw Germany as a strong proponent for a European security and defence policy. Germany continued its course of growing international security responsibility, introduced by Schröder's predecessor. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 Germany's domestic security policy had new impetus. The Security Package I was adopted in September by the Cabinet, then passed by the Bundestag. Since Germany had been, and remains home to al-Qaeda supporters and militants "German government initiatives to tighten up domestic security have been accompanied by strenuous efforts to deepen European integration combating terrorism" (Hyde-Price, 2003: 106).

The events of 9/11 unleashed new German zest for action in the European and global security environment. Schröder comments that the terrorist attacks were a "declaration of war on the entire civilized world" (Brunstetter, 2005: 26). Schröder agreed to send German troops to support the USA in Afghanistan. This was the first active combat mission of German soldiers since World War II. It has become evident that German defence and security policy under Schröder starts beyond the German borders and continues to be oriented to a larger institutional framework of the EU or NATO.

German troops were also deployed to assist in Macedonia, resulting in intragovernmental tensions with the Green party in late 2001. These tensions were mitigated only after weeks of debate (Brunstetter, 2005: 27). Under the Schröder administration, a broader and

comprehensive concept of security was achieved, overcoming geographic boundaries and leading to an increase in the out-of-area deployment of German troops. Schröder's administration also accelerated the reforms of the *Bundeswehr*.

Ultimately, Germany under Schröder has overcome the shadows of the past and is willing to take responsibility in military operations beyond its territory and its traditional non-combat guideline. Germany has embraced its power position and accepted the use of military force under certain circumstances. This does not mean that Germany has generally adopted the notion of military force as a viable measure. Rather, Germany has gained the confidence to act at its own discretion concerning international security.

During the Iraq crisis leading to the American intervention in March 2003, German leaders, as well as the public, did not view Iraq as an immediate threat unlike the USA. Germany absolutely rejected any unilateral invasion of Iraq – especially during the election campaign, daring to leave its traditional and safe path of multilateralism *per se*. Instead, it supported UN inspections and diplomatic negotiations, hesitating over America's preference for the use of force. This discordance on Iraq only added to already difficult US-German relations and should remain the only vehement anomaly of the traditional diplomatic and multilateral German foreign policy.

The transatlantic irritations between the Schröder and Bush administrations coevally afflicted the Anglo-German relations. At the beginning of the Schröder leadership, Blair raised hope regarding the creation of a "joint social democratic agenda in European politics", also known as the "Third Way" (Miskimmon, 2006: 33). This initial euphoria of a European social democratic harmony was quickly clouded over due to discord on political issues in the following years. Those different views on Iraq in 2003 acted as explicit evidence of diverging Anglo-German interests. In general terms, the UK and Germany hold different perceptions and military power potential, which exacerbates the co-operation on hard power issues. The ESDP provides an opportunity for Germany to improve the hard power quality and quantity of its national security and defence policy through integration. Late in 2005, Schröder passed on his transatlantic burden to his successor Angela Merkel.

8.4.2 Germany under Merkel and the big Nations

Under the Grand Coalition led by the new chancellor, Merkel, Germany continues to transform and modernise the *Bundeswehr* according to international standards, emphasising the centrality of NATO and the ESDP. German Minister of Defence, Dr. Franz Josef Jung, stressing the importance of the transatlantic partnership, said that “*die NATO ist der stärkste Anker unserer Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik....Die Stärkung der freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zu unserem wichtigsten Verbündeten USA*”²⁴ is an important focus of the German foreign policy (Jung, 2005).

The German government’s change-over in September 2005 presumably equals a shift in German foreign policy towards “*ein intensiveres transatlantisches Verhältnis. Das ist aber keine Botschaft gegen andere*”²⁵ (WEB.DE, 2006). Early in 2006, at the Conference on Security Policy in Munich, Merkel stated clearly that NATO comes first, and only if NATO fails is the EU to be considered as a major player. Merkel’s transatlantic orientation was already hinted at her first journey abroad as Chancellor, when she included a trip to the European NATO Headquarters during her routine trip to Paris (Kamp, 2006: 2).

Germany’s new pro-Atlanticist policy should not be seen as a rejection of the ESDP, but rather as an attempt to synergise the hard power of both sides of the Atlantic.

Merkel aims to ameliorate transatlantic relations without neglecting close partners of the former red/green government under Schröder. The reinforcement of the transatlantic relationship is not a renunciation of the other allies. In fact, Merkel wants to deflect the importance of the Paris-Moscow-Berlin triangle in relation to the transatlantic relationship (Hamilton, 2006: 42). This triangle was cultivated by Schröder, but since the USA still represents “our most important ally”, as Helmut Schmidt once declared, Merkel highlights the transatlantic relations in Germany’s security policy (Jung, 2005). Although Merkel and her team publicly state their sympathy for the USA as an ally, Merkel aspires for Germany to be on par with the USA. Merkel expresses Germany’s interest in a strong transatlantic relationship but also dares to criticise the USA on international matters such as Guantánamo or the abduction of a German citizen to Afghanistan by the CIA (Spiegel Online, 2006)/ (Crossland & Jones, 2006). After only six months in power, whether or not Merkel’s initial approach will be beneficial for both sides cannot yet be assessed. However, maybe in several years a balance can be struck regarding the transatlantic relationship.

²⁴ “NATO is the strongest anchor of our security and defence policy....The reinforcement of our friendly relations to our most important ally”

²⁵ “a more intensive transatlantic relationship. However, this is not a message against others.”

The same applies to the deep Franco-German relationship which dates back to the very beginning of European integration. The special relations between Germany and France have been the motor for the European unification process. This motor initiated the successful integration of the coal and steel industries of Western Europe into the ECSC in 1951. The Franco-German tandem also initiated the ratification of the Treaties of Rome in 1957 engendering the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) and the EEC. This Franco-German friendship and its European activity has lasted more than five decades. Various ups and downs have been overcome and have served to strengthen this partnership. During the last years of the red/green coalition, Schröder placed considerable importance on cultivating the Franco-German friendship. Contrarily, the first six months under Merkel's pro-Atlanticist course show that these special relations have relapsed. Germany still plays the mediator role between France and the USA. However, Merkels rapprochement to Bush has also generated a certain distance from Chirac. A highly productive friendship for the European integration, such as the one between Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing, or respectively Kohl and Mitterrand, is not expected to happen between Merkel and Chirac. Indeed, in her first government policy statement to the Bundestag on the 30 November 2005, the chancellor also placed emphasis on the important role of Franco-German relations in the EU (Merkel, 2005). In December she contributed significantly to solving the issue on EU finances from 2007 until 2013 and shared credit with Chirac by complimenting him on the Franco-German teamwork (Müller-Brandeck-Boquet, 2006: 22). Nevertheless, in early 2006, consultations between Berlin and Paris have evinced different security political guidelines, especially concerning the use of nuclear weapons, making common security achievements such as the creation of the EUROCORPS in 1992 a thing of the past and such co-operation improbable for the near future. The lines of conflict have to be reduced to a common denominator. Given the fact that the French elections in a year's time and the majority of European countries awaiting a new French president, Merkel will certainly not reignite the Franco-German motor of integration (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2006: 23-24). The European integration has been both the catalyst and fruit of the special relations between France and Germany. The future of the ESDP with an enlarged EU of 27 cannot politically rely on the weakened Franco-German motor. In the field of security policy the UK has complemented the Franco-German driving force and has become an important contributor to the ESDP. In fact, as Clarke detects:

an effective Franco-British axis in defence affairs will be sufficient to build an effective European security pillar. Only on the basis of such an axis can Germany play a full part in an ESDP: without it Germany is simply too far behind the curve in post-Cold War military adjustment and could not, for all its numbers, provide an effective pillar in a bilateral arrangement with either France or Britain alone (Clarke, 2000: 733).

Germany's lack of military capabilities implies that France and the UK are the leading nations in the ESDP. After the summit of St. Malo, the UK has become France's partner in the leadership of the ESDP, because "*die britischen und französischen Verteidigungsstrukturen mehr gemeinsame Elemente haben, was eine Zusammenarbeit erleichtert*"²⁶ (Wiegel, 2000). Germany is a military lightweight and cannot take over the degree of military responsibility as have the other two powers. Politically and financially, Germany remains an important ESDP member. Nevertheless, it is only in the field of defence policy that the UK has replaced Germany in the integration leadership.

As far as Germany is concerned, co-operation with France is crucial for European integration. Germany values the relationship with the UK to a lesser extent due to the UK's semi-detached position towards the EU. Furthermore, political divergence on Iraq, and Turkey's EU membership do not offer an ideal start for Merkel to cultivate British-German relations. She has also made clear that she shares the same opinion on Iran as Schröder and his violence-free course of defence and security policy. In her first government policy declaration, she emphasised Germany's role as a civilian power and its preference for the use of diplomatic means in IR. Merkel's new security strategy bears a resemblance to the strategy of her predecessor, with Germany as a civilian power relying on institutionalism and multilateralism. In spite of past discordance on the use of force in Iraq, Merkel's current pro-Atlanticist course has caused the UK to draw closer to Germany. This Anglo-German approximation had already emerged before Merkel had won the election. In the summer of 2005, Blair held talks with Schröder as well as Merkel, who was then in the opposition. To what extent this new bilateral relationship can gain momentum will depend on Germany's commitment to its leadership role in ESDP, without using it as a mechanism to outweigh the USA. It will also depend on whether Germany, under the Grand Coalition, will manage to keep the federal budget deficit under 35 per cent according to the Maastricht criterion and, simultaneously, fulfil its commitments to ESDP and NATO, or whether it will isolate itself from world affairs in order to concentrate on domestic problem-solving.

Whereas "Schröder wanted to put Germany back on map as a normalized, emancipated and self-assured medium-sized power" Merkel realises that "effective German foreign [as well as German security and defence] policy is best served by embedding it in European policy" and developing a so-called *selbstbewußte Bescheidenheit*²⁷ in Germany's external relations (Nijhuis, 2006: 29). "Influence in Europe cannot be imposed by means of bullish behaviour"

²⁶ "the British and French Defence structures have more common elements, which facilitate the co-operation."

²⁷ Foreign Minister Steinmeier speaks of *selbstbewusste Bescheidenheit* (self-assured modesty), that should be the new guideline for Germany's external relations.

and thus Germany should not be “harping on its national interests but being open to the desires and anxieties of the smaller member states” (Nijhuis, 2006: 29).

In short, it can be observed, that from Adenauer to Kohl to Schröder and then Merkel, there are four contradictory matters generally describing the dilemma of German security policy. That is, status versus commitment, integration versus national sovereignty, economic influence versus fiscal stringency and transatlantic versus European security (Schlör, 1993: 63). It has become clear that Germany’s security interests have always been projected into a bigger European or Atlantic context. This situation will remain since, over time, Germany has gained increased sovereignty and influence through its integration into supranational structures over time. This process will continue, with ESDP as an interesting area to be watched closely.

Conclusion

The unification of East and West Germany resulted in the slight improvement of Germany’s power position. In a system of unipolarity a structural realist expects that Germany, as a moderate power, will try to bandwagon with other powers to counterbalance the USA. However, Germany under Schröder and especially under Merkel, does not aim to jeopardise the transatlantic relations nor counterbalance the American position with the EU/ESDP despite a much stronger inclination toward an autonomous EU security project under Schröder. In fact, Germany’s foreign policy is better characterised as co-operation of power in order to establish a true partnership on both sides of the Atlantic. Co-operation under Schröder was expressed in the blossoming of Franco-Russian-German relations, and now, under Merkel, British-German and transatlantic relations have revived. Generally speaking, it can be said that German aspirations concerning an autonomous ESDP as a counterweight to NATO are very unlikely. At the moment, the prospect of a stronger German engagement within NATO might actually mean diminishing German interest and investment in an autonomous European military capacity. So far however, the Defence Policy Guidelines make clear that German military power will continue to prosper in the multinational context of the Atlantic as well as the European structure. Germany thrives on European structures without aspiring to a hegemonic position, since integration into European structures is the paradigm of German power politics, that is, greater power and influence through integration. Precisely speaking, further integration of the ESDP into supranational structures would mitigate Germany’s military problems concerning financing and military equipment. Therefore, it is expected that within the ESDP, Germany, in contrast to the UK and France, will continue to push an advanced ESDP integration into supranational structures and pursue politics in a

symbiosis of European and German interests. In contrast to the aforementioned positions of France and the UK, Germany considers security by integration, France security by sovereignty and UK security by Atlanticism. Whether Germany's pursuit of supranationalism will lead to an *avant-garde* of nations in the ESDP, such as Fischer adumbrated in his famous Humboldt speech in 2000, or whether an enlarged EU will be able to maintain the integrative dynamics of the ESDP is to follow in the final chapter.

In this résumé there will be a brief overview summarising the central perspectives of the major nations. This will then be followed by the discussion of the effects that the diverging positions have towards the question of whether, from a structural realist/neorealist perspective, the ESDP is on its way to become a Defence Union. Furthermore, the relevance of the structural realist prospect will be discussed, questioned and alternative approaches delineated. Finally, a general ESDP prospect will be given.

9.1 Positions of the Big Three in the ESDP

9.1.1 British Position

The UK holds one of the top power positions in terms of Waltzian capabilities within the EU as well as in a global context. Particularly in terms of military power, the UK ranks top within the ESDP context. This power pre-condition supports the UK in promoting British political views in the ESDP.

The British political position within international security policy has always been strongly influenced by its special relation to the USA which grants the UK a privileged position within NATO and determining its Atlanticist stance in favour of NATO primacy within ESDP. The UK will ensure that the ESDP will not develop apart from the Atlantic Alliance and duplicate NATO functionality in the global security environment. Nevertheless, the UK's interest is twofold: NATO primacy is to be cherished in combination with strengthening the European pillar in NATO in order to maintain this privileged position. Thus, Blair's ESDP policy is focussed on minimal autonomy concessions from NATO. Beyond the notion of Atlanticism, British ESDP policy is also moulded by the notion of intergovernmentalism. The UK guards its national sovereignty in high politics jealously and only allows Brusselisation in areas of low politics, notably in trade. However, British pragmatism and cherry-picking of Europeanisation benefits has also led the UK into an isolated position of minor influence within the EU. In order to re-establish its influence and power position in the EU, the UK has placed emphasis on ESDP development and leadership.

The two main political views of intergovernmentalism and Atlanticism also constitute the two major dilemmas the UK is experiencing in ESDP integration. The first dilemma results from the tensions between intergovernmentalism and increased ESDP integration, of which the latter is also linked to the transatlantic dilemma. The UK's EU interdependency and commitments to ESDP on the one hand and its status as the most important ally of the USA on the other, are posing an increasingly difficult gap to bridge. The UK must bridge this gap and mediate between both sides of the Atlantic, mainly in the framework of NATO and ESDP. From the British perspective, there is no conflict of interest being a main contributor in ESDP provided that NATO primacy is not diminished. Nevertheless, other EU members such as France view this sceptically. From the analysis of the British position, it has become evident that this role is dependent on the speed of ESDP integration and that this status quo will not remain. In the future, the UK will face greater difficulties in building a bridge across the Atlantic.

From a neorealist perspective, despite its vigorous power position, the assessment of the British role in the ESDP clearly identifies a British tendency to bandwagon with the hegemonic state. In Waltz's opinion this behaviour would be considered as an anomaly, because only weak states will bandwagon with the hegemonic nation and stronger nations are likely to build an alliance to counterbalance the hegemonic country. In Schweller's modified version of neorealism, bandwagoning is argued to be more likely to occur in IR than the balancing principle put forward by Waltz. In fact, one could find similarities between British behaviour and Schweller's principle of wave-of-the-future bandwagoning. Nevertheless, bandwagoning with the hegemonic state as well as with the perceived counter-alliance depending on the political issue does not fit Schweller's approach either. The British are executing a form of double bandwagoning to maximise their profits from both sides.

The rapprochement to the French position on defence policy does not question the NATO-First principle, but rather serves as an additional security safeguard, in case the British cannot rely on the transatlantic relations. The UK pursues a NATO-oriented and self-serving defence and security policy that minimises the chances of a possible European Defence Union in the near future.

9.1.2 French position

The Europeanist French position represents the opposite pole to the Atlanticist British position; however, France has a similar strong Waltzian power positional profile to the UK. In contrast to the UK, France perceives the *hyperpuissance* of the American military as a potential threat to its sovereignty and thus, pursues a security policy based on Walt's balance of threat principle. In order to abolish this unfavourable situation, France promotes an autonomous ESDP to counterbalance the USA. Nevertheless, one should not arbitrarily use the neorealist balance of power/threat schema to analyse the ESDP, since in the case of the ESDP the British influence assures ESDP complementarity and co-operation with NATO. This is anchored in Berlin Plus. ESDP-NATO co-operation can even be classified as a type of supranational bandwagoning without a counter-pole in a military coalition framework. It involves security benefits on both sides of the Atlantic in the broadest sense.

That is to say, nowadays, no one assumes that the EU could ever balance the potential threat of the USA such as perceived by France. The USA is, and will probably remain, militarily superior to the ESDP. With the ESDP, France can only aspire to a higher degree of military room of manoeuvre.

Contrarily, in terms of national sovereignty, both opposing nations of the UK and France are not so unsimilar as they appear at first glance. Throughout history France embraced the notion of a *grande nation* and vehemently defended its national sovereignty wherever possible. In this way, the Gaullist paradigm is like a thread that can be observed running from the first presidency of the Fifth Republic to the current presidency. Deriving from the analysis of France in Part II, it can be seen that from de Gaulle to Chirac, power, influence and autonomy from NATO have been central terms. They appear in varying intensity in the political rhetoric and in actual foreign and defence policy. With regard to ESDP, the French notion at present is not to create an antagonistic opposing power under ESDP to NATO/US, but rather a co-operative counterpole to antagonise American dominance in NATO and hence the unipolar structure. France conceives the international realm as a multipolar realm with Europe as a central pole.

In short, France favours integration in some areas, where the European framework results in multiplying power and not ceding national sovereignty. French defence and security policy is characterised by this notion of power maximisation. The existence of the ESDP allows France to project its national interests via the institutional structure onto a European level. An autonomous ESDP is designed to strengthen both the European and at the same time the French position and influence in international politics. Therefore, France supports the development of the ESDP. However, at the same time it also restricts ESDP development by

implementing ESDP on an intergovernmental level and constrains competencies of the ESDP institutions.

There is also a French ambiguity in European defence policy based on cost-benefit calculations by France. That is, on the one hand it tries to maintain defence and security policy constituting the core of high politics on an intergovernmental level and on the other hand *la grande nation* wants to maximise its power and influence which is at present chiefly realisable through the EU. The French position within the ESDP is ambiguous and counteracts the prospect of a Defence Union. It can even be considered as prejudicial to ESDP integration, since France seemingly only allows integration to a degree that is intergovernmental and useful for its national interests. The idea of a European Defence Union can be a reality only when France overcomes its national egoisms and is willing to trade-off national sovereignty in the ESDP.

9.1.3 German position

The German position in the ESDP can be described as a moderating or balancing act between the Atlanticist British and Gaullist French perspective. The German position argues slightly in favour of the Atlanticist position in which NATO primacy is to be maintained. However, Germany prefers supranational integration of the ESDP over intergovernmental integration distinguishing its position on ESDP integration from the aforementioned countries.

Although Germany now has a better power position than during the Cold War, it continues to orient and to embed its policies in supranational European structures which restrict its national autonomy and power politics. However, simultaneously, the EU multiplies Germany's influence in IR. Thus, Germany articulates and acts on behalf of an even greater collectivity of powers.

Germany's paradigm of integration signifies a greater gain of influence than of autonomy for Germany. The neorealist assumption that Germany will pursue a higher degree of power politics seeking autonomy and influence, thus neglecting its multilateral and co-operative orientation, has not been verified in the ESDP. Despite its stronger power position achieved through re-unification, there have not been any tangible German autonomy aspirations. German security and defence policy behaviour can be contrasted with the French behaviour. As noted already, France seeks to foster the EU alliance of ESDP as a counterbalance to NATO and America's hegemony, a tendency particularly evident under de Gaulle.

Germany represents a different position to the USA and NATO. It emphasises its status as a civilian power and the singularity of the ESDP disposing military as well as civilian crisis management capabilities. The civilian capabilities ideally complement the NATO

deficiencies. This emphasis can also be derived from the fact that out of the leading trio of EU powers Germany has the worst equipped and financed military. It is militarily inferior to the other two and compensates for its lack of hard power through its other Waltzian capabilities. In defiance of its moderate military power the altered polarity in IR implies less need of protection and bandwagoning with the USA, as in the Cold War period.

In short, Germany's position now can be described as co-operative balancing: Germany tries to restrain the unilateral American foreign and security policy course by strengthening the coherence of the European pillar in NATO through supranationalism, so that the EU will gain political weight in NATO. In the case of Germany the structural realist approach does not seem to entirely account for the intricacies of German defence and security policy of today.

9.2 Present Situation and Perspective of the ESDP

In the case of Germany and the UK, the structural realist approach has displayed a very modest usefulness. The high politics of nation-states is structural realism's home turf. The fact that structural realism appears to be very limited for the analysis of high politics implies the necessity to go beyond the systemic level in order to give an accurate perspective of the ESDP.


Nonetheless, up to now the systemic structural realist examination of the positions can be visualised in Figure 7, which illustrates the positioning of the big three within the ESDP. It depicts their level of integration and their balancing of power or their alliance preferences.

9.2.1 Present Situation of the ESDP

On the level of integration the analysis concludes that the British and French position prefer the ESDP remaining intergovernmental whereas Germany has a preference for projecting its interests onto a supranational level as well as an ardent vindication of an intensified European integration. France and the UK guard their national autonomy in high politics jealously. However, in contrast to the UK, France is more willing to concede partial national sovereignty to the ESDP in the hope that France will receive a power positional added value in return.

The second area of conflict presented by the graph is the dilemma between Atlanticism and Europeanism. Referring to the analysis, the UK is on the extreme pro-NATO spectrum of ESDP while France is located at the opposite extreme on the pro-European spectrum. This tension is fractionally abrogated by Germany's mediating position between the two poles. Nevertheless, Germany has made clear that NATO will always have priority over the ESDP.


Figure 7: The ESDP and the diverging Positions of the Big Three



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The diverging directions in which the big three try to pull the ESDP, shape a triangle of tension (the dashed lines representing the pull direction localise ESDP at their common intersection point). From a structural realist perspective, this implies that at present, ESDP is positioned in favour of NATO and on an intergovernmental level. The future development of ESDP will consequently depend on the pulling force of the individual nations. From this current pull-condition arise two opposing ESDP integration scenarios represented by the red and blue arrows (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: European Defence Integration



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9.2.2 Scenario 1: Structural Realist Scenario

The following predictive scenario will illustrate the structural realist perspective represented by the red arrow by referring to the theoretical assumptions of Table 2. Since the countries of France, the UK and Germany are similar in their power position, but individually not capable of counterbalancing the USA by themselves, they ally to multiply their power position and hence, their collective autonomy and influence. The aim of the ESDP as an alliance of powers is to counterbalance America's hegemony. From a structural realist view this signifies that the three European states will do their at most to multiply their national hard power to strengthen the ESDP politically in IR.

According to the structural realist development in terms of integration, a deepening of intergovernmental integration and an approximation of supranationalism will occur. However, supranationalism will never be embraced, merely approximated. Structural realism views the ESDP as a sensitive area of high politics. Thus, from a structural realist perspective, nation-states will never entirely sacrifice their national sovereignty for an added value of defence and security via supranationalism. Nation-states will always seek to maximise their national autonomy and sphere of influence. The communalisation of high politics is not in the nature of a nation-state. In this case, a common defence policy according to Article 17.1 is unlikely to become reality in the near future.

France and the UK strongly reflect this position. Both countries will primarily continue to invest in their own military capabilities in order to secure their national autonomy and leadership role in the ESDP. Germany's stance differs from the French and British position and seems to be pro-supranationalism. However, from a structural realist perspective, Germany as a sovereign nation-state will never entirely transfer its national sovereignty to the EU. It will only allow supranational integration as long as its national sovereignty is not in jeopardy.

This means that the big three European countries will, on the one hand, promote their own military capabilities to secure autonomy and on the other hand, promote supranational institutions of the ESDP to a lesser extent. This promotion of supranational institutions serves to multiply influence and reduce the financial burden of military investments. In this scenario, the EDA plays a key role for the ESDP member countries. It serves as a pooling framework for intergovernmental military capabilities. This will improve the political incoherency issue and the capabilities-expectation gap at the same time. However, the EDA and the other ESDP bodies will remain subordinate to the individual nation-states and their military policies. This implies that in spite of various ESDP bodies and affiliated institutions, the ESDP will remain intergovernmental and dominated by national interests in the future. This prediction assumes that nation-states will continue regarding their security and defence policy as an area of high

sensitivity, which will not allow a functional differentiation under a supranational institution, despite financial issues. The most a European country is willing to do is probably commit to the headline goals and marginally pool resources within the EDA framework.

Nation-states will predominantly continue to pursue their own national interests within ESDP. Consequently, this could result in unnecessary capability duplications and high financial costs (as examined in Chapter 7 on France). Furthermore, the continued focus on national interests will never resolve the ESDP political incoherency issue. The structural realist scenario predicts the continuation of the dominance of nation-state actors in the ESDP and IR. As a result, the aforementioned main issues of the ESDP can be weakened, but will remain, since these problems are in the nature of the intergovernmental integration. The question now is whether the political harmonisation among the member states of the ESDP on an intergovernmental level will be developed strongly enough to survive problematic international issues such as Iraq. Political coherency is the key of the alliance of the ESDP. If this cannot be achieved the ESDP development is doomed to stall or even degenerate and implode due to the strong nationalisms involved in the ESDP development.

9.2.2 Scenario 2: Alternative supranational Integration

The structural realist concept signifies a pessimistic perception of ESDP integration. In contrast to the red arrow is the blue arrow which poses an optimistic scenario for the ESDP development. The blue arrow represents an alternative future development to the structural realist prediction. It results in a Defence Community. In order for this future to become a reality, it would first imply a significant change of mind of the UK towards European integration. Blair has largely contributed to a European rapprochement, in particular in the ESDP. The future development will be mainly dependent on Blair's successor and his attitude towards ESDP. The eventuality of a stronger orientation towards the European continent in regard to the ESDP is relatively high at the moment.

However, it is not only the UK, but also France and Germany who have to be role models for other ESDP members and show a willingness to transfer their national sovereignty in the field of hard power in order to become a Defence Union. These countries have the biggest influence in the ESDP. If they harmonise politically, the ESDP could become a strong coherent military and civilian EU institution. So far, only Germany is tending towards supranational ESDP structures. However, these structures have to be complementary to NATO.

This will also depend on the degree of Brusselisation in the ESDP. The greater the degree of Brusselisation in the ESDP, the higher the chances that nation-states can be persuaded to give up their national sovereignty in the area of security and defence. The creeping Brusselisation enables nation-states to become familiar with the gradual transferral of certain aspects of a nation's functionality and responsibility in advance. At present the COREPER, the EDA, the planning cell and other non-nationalised ESDP organs are facilitating the intergovernmental co-operation in the ESDP. Over time this creeping Brusselisation may take over the main responsibilities in the ESDP.

This scenario is not a prediction for the immediate future, but for the distant future. Post-2007, when Chirac and Blair leave the political stage, there might be an opportunity for this long-term development in the form of their new EU-oriented successors.

9.3 Internal and External theoretical Deficiencies

To apply the structural realist approach in all its facets onto the empirical analysis of national positions within the ESDP is a difficult undertaking due to the simplification of any theory as mentioned in the introduction. The difficulty lies in a system-oriented approach that is only concerned with IR, expelling other factors on other levels which still interact with the IR level. In the various forms of structural realist modification, the IR explanatory power of neorealism is diluted by the commingling of various levels. Despite the general critique of the limited significance and relevance of structural realism in today's global politics, the analysis of the three nations has made the fundamental motivation of the states as actors in IR apparent and a valid prediction of the future of the ESDP has been presented in the first scenario.

Though one can give a convincing future prospect of ESDP through a systemic structural realist approach, the security and defence policy of a nation-state always presupposes the holistic analysis of internal and external factors. National security interests and thus, security and defence policy are not exclusively defined by the structural power arrangement in the international realm. The influences on a national security and defence policy in times of globalisation are as complex and manifold as the new global threats these policies respond to. Hence, it is important to emphasise that the future of European political and military security is also to be seen as dependent on its embodiment within international security architecture with the interplay of long-established international organisations, namely NATO, OSCE and the UN. The wider security approach of the ESDP involves diplomatic, economic, financial and police co-operation illustrating the necessity of including the non-state actors in IR as major factors in any analysis.

Since the end of the Cold War the three major European nations have experienced a more complex and fluid geopolitical environment. The structural impact on the security issue of a nation is complicated by non-state actors, by increased interdependency resulting in an automatic mutual defence within the EU and by division of labour through globalisation. To consider the systemic level as a mere realm of nation-state action simplifies and distorts the prediction. For example, the ESDP will not act militarily without a UN mandate.

Not only the abnegation of non-state actors, but also the relinquishment of other European perspectives of smaller powers slightly falsifies the ESDP positioning in Figure 7. Smaller powers such as Poland for instance, who vindicate a similar extreme position as France; or the Scandinavian countries, Austria and Denmark, which are neutral or of armed neutrality and pro-civilian behaviour.

Beyond the systemic level, structural realism also lacks the impact of sub-systemic factors such as national economies, environmental policies and the degree of any pacifist attitude in a society, which indeed have an enormous impact on the ESDP positioning in the graph. For instance, in the analysis of all three countries, it is mainly the domestic financial constraints and thus the limited military budget which compel the ESDP members to pool resources and consider a functional differentiation of defence, such as can be observed with the ECAP panels.

As a result of these significant sub-systemic interests, a nation-state will rather act in the sense of a balance of interests rather than a balance of power. This would imply that one can regard the ESDP as a balance of interests à la Schweller in the broadest neorealist sense.

9.4 Theoretical Alternatives

The numerous internal and external deficiencies of structural realism provide fertile grounds for other theories to germinate. The perspectives of other theories would contribute to an enhanced accuracy and credibility of the ESDP prediction. In this connection, the author believes that it is important to merge structural realism with constructivism in order to get a comprehensive explanation and prediction of the ESDP. Similar to structural realism, constructivism shares the centrality of nation-states as actors in IR and the existence of anarchy. However, anarchy is not superior to nation-states. Both elements in IR are correlated. This means that actors in IR have an impact on the structure of anarchy (from an unco-operative Hobbesian structure to a peaceful and co-operative Kantian structure). In contrast to structural realism, constructivism recognises that state actors in IR primarily co-operate with each other. Structural realism as a traditional theory of conflicts in IR appears to be explanatory insufficient in regard to the ESDP. Constructivist concepts go beyond the

materialistic and systemic approach of structural realism. They explain a state's behaviour in IR from a sub-systemic level. Communication and interaction create a social reality on a sub-systemic level which constitutes a state's identity and is reflected on an international level. Explaining a country's behaviour in IR also depends on its interaction and communication with other countries which affirms a certain identity and behaviour. The international realm is no longer a realm of war or peace between individual nation-states. The system has become more complex with a multiplicity of other non-state actors. Although the ESDP is based on intergovernmentalism, it represents a unique form of multilateral co-operation which is not only power-positionally oriented, but also influenced by values and norms. These normative standards are not included in structural realist theorising. Hence, multilateralism on an international level such as in the case of the ESDP can be more adequately explained by constructivist approaches.

Waltz's structural realist theory has become less credible nowadays. Nation-states today are more likely to solve issues in IR co-operatively than with military means. Since the new nature of the international system is more complex and multi-layered, structural realism as a general theory of high politics explaining war- and peace-time has become obsolete. Constructivism as a metatheory offers a more realistic view and more optimistic explanation than the traditional rationalist approaches of realism.

Furthermore, institutions have become an essential factor supporting the collective problem-solving in the EU. International institutions are vital umpires monitoring and sanctioning international co-operation, so that the gains and losses of nations are fair in IR. Despite the intergovernmental nature of the ESDP, ESDP bodies have been established and will develop an automatism and promote integration and supranationalism within the ESDP.

Resembling the neorealist and constructivist theoretical premises is the neoinstitutionalist approach, which is also based on anarchy in IR. However, neoinstitutionalism puts greater emphasis on institutions, which are to be viewed as any organising control system, guiding co-operation among nations in IR. Merging a tiny bit of neoinstitutionalism with the two aforementioned theoretical approaches would extend the explanatory power of the existing materialistic, rational-choice based approach of structural realism. The amalgamation of all three theories offers a more comprehensive and accurate explanation of British and particularly German behaviour in the ESDP. Germany's behaviour is in reality more optimistic and co-operative than a purely structural realist prospect would predict. Some academics even speak of Germany as a civilian power. This would imply that in the case of Germany it is imperative to use constructivism. The merger of these theories and this brief theoretical exploration brings out a new topic for further interesting research on the future of

the ESDP. For now, based on the analysis as well as the empirical and theoretical findings of this thesis, the author has constituted the following descriptive-realistic third scenario for ESDP.

9.4.1 Scenario 3

The failure of the constitutional treaty and the following breakdown of the crisis summit in mid-June 2005 revealed the difficulty of different national interests of the major EU member states across various fields. The crisis of the EU has dampened the optimism of a development of the ESDP in the speed of light as Javier Solana once proclaimed at the summit of Feira. The aim of the constitutional treaty to implement new CFSP/ESDP structures in order to achieve a higher degree of coherence in the EU foreign policy has been put aside after the negative referendums in France and Holland. After this, the communalisation of the ESDP appears to be out of reach more than ever. Some might have even succumbed to question ESDP's existence, since NATO already exists as an international security and defence framework.

However, the political crisis of the EU does not inevitably imply the stagnancy or more pessimistically, the setback of the dynamic of the ESDP, but it does emblematises the realist problems attached to the diverging national perspectives of the big three in the ESDP. For the future development of the ESDP these national perspectives will play an important role as analysed and concluded in the first scenario.

Nevertheless, the future development of the ESDP will also be influenced by a supranational force. Ever since the implementation of the ESDP by nation-states, this intergovernmental project has gained a dynamic momentum, which has now slipped out of the controlling hands of the individual nations and is, in fact, now largely driven by the bureaucratic apparatus in Brussels. Despite the UK's impedimental Atlanticist position and the reluctance of the ESDP member countries to transfer national sovereignty to the EU, it has become evident that supranational structures are at hand. Brusselisation is set to continue with or without the nation-states. However, the individual nation-states will remain a vital factor in the ESDP development. They will determine the nature and finality of this project. Predominantly the diverging national positions of the UK, France and Germany will have a big impact on the ESDP development. From a neorealist perspective, the supranational finality of the ESDP is a utopia. In the near future, the UK and, to a lesser degree, France will continue deepening intergovernmentalism in the ESDP. Contrarily, Germany will push towards supranationalism. Despite these diverging positions and in spite of this negative outlook for the ESDP with the new heads of state in France and the UK in 2007 a more EU-oriented approach to the ESDP

could be possible. A more pressing need for now is to fortify the decision-making structures and multiplex military resources as far as possible in the ESDP in order to attain political harmonisation. This would be an important accomplishment towards a globally stronger, political EU presence and action. It would also signify a strengthening of the European pillar in NATO. However, at the same time it would bring the ESDP a little step closer towards communalisation.

Furthermore, one has to consider that NATO will also continue to evolve and perhaps aspire to acquire civilian means of crisis management. This could result in a legitimacy problem for the ESDP, since NATO already provides a European pillar for international security and defence policy. Hence, the ESDP could be considered as an unnecessary duplication. Unfortunately, this international military framework has been neglected by the EU members – primarily France – which have placed emphasis on ESDP instead. However, it should be in the EU's interest to antagonise American unilateralism in the NATO framework. The EU should not leave NATO to the USA, since the USA will continue to utilise NATO as its personal security and defence policy toolbox.

In short, the third alternative scenario for the ESDP is a development primarily influenced, firstly, national and Brusselisation-related interests of the ESDP member countries, secondly, the transatlantic relations in conjunction with NATO development and thirdly, the international security context. According to the author, these three factors will direct the ESDP to become a politically influential actor in the framework of NATO due to its military and civilian means. Nevertheless, the tension between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism will persist. Consequently, the ESDP finality can be described as a never-ending journey similar to the quadrature of a circle where finality is approximated, but never accomplished.

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Appendix 1 ESDP Chronology: From Cologne to Nice (Key dates)

1999

German presidency

13-14 March

Informal EU foreign ministers' meeting. German proposal for ESDP.

24 March

Begin of war by NATO air operations in Kosovo.

23-25 April

New transatlantic strategic concept and Defence Capabilities Initiative at NATO summit in Washington.

29 May

Franco-German summit in Toulouse, where a proposal was made to put the EUROCORPS at EU disposal

3-4 June

At the Cologne European Council first steps are made to implement ESDP by limiting ESDP to the Petersberg tasks.

21 June

EU-US summit in Bonn to issue New Transatlantic Agenda.

Finnish presidency

July

Report of ad hoc working groups on the restructuring of the EU defence industry.

20 July

Launch of the European Defence Capabilities Initiative in Rome.

14 October

Merger of DASA and Matra-Aérospatiale to EADS.

18 October

Javier Solana was appointed first High Representative.

15 November

First joint meeting of EU foreign ministers and defence ministers in Brussels.

22-23 November

WEU Ministerial Council in Luxembourg concerning capabilities for EU-led crisis management missions.

25 November

Anglo-French Declaration in London on European Defence.

2 December

The Spanish Aerospace and Defence Company (CASA) joins EADS.

10-11 December

Agreement on Headline Goal and ESDP-NATO modalities as well as the further implementation of ESDP bodies.

2000

Portuguese presidency

28 February

Defence ministers' meeting in Sintra lays groundwork for Capabilities Commitment Conference.

March

Interim ESDP bodies start work.

23-24 March

Committee for Civilian Crisis Management is established.

19-20 June

At the European Council meeting in Santa Maria da Feira a proposal to establish a Committee for Civilian Crisis Management is made and the Headline Goal as well as the relations to NATO are further specified.

French presidency

27 July

Framework agreement on the European defence industry.

19 September

First joint meeting of the NAC and the interim Political and Security Committee.

13 November

Transfer of WEU crisis management functions to EU.

20 November

Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels.

6-12 December

European Council at Nice, where permanent political structures, the implementation of capabilities and consultation arrangements are redefined in favour of an intergovernmental framework.

Data Source: Gnesotto, 2004, pp. 262-267

Appendix 2 Helsinki Force Catalogue commitment 2002

Country	Land	Air	Navy
Austria	1 mechanised infantry battalion, 1 light infantry battalion, 1 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defence unit, 1 “humanitarian civilian assistance package”, 1 Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) element, 1 helicopter transport squadron, 1 transport company, 100 observers/ experts		
Belgium	1 mechanised brigade, Smaller units (as part of humanitarian operation for up to 6 months)	24 F-16 fighters, 8 C-130, 2 Airbus transports	2 frigates, Mine Countermeasures (MCM) vessels
Denmark	No contribution (opted out of ESDP at Maastricht in 1992)		
Finland	1 mechanised infantry battalion, 1 engineer battalion, 1 transport company, 1 CIMIC company		1 MCM command and support ship, Joint: 15-30 experts/ observers
France	Mechanised, light airborne (for a year) and amphibious brigades headquarters The EUROCORPS headquarter has also been offered for the force Total: 12,000 troops from a pool of 20,000	Combined Air Operations Centre, 75 combat aircrafts, 8 air-refuelling aircrafts, 3 long-range transports, 24 medium-range transports, 2 Airborne Warning and Control System aircrafts, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) helicopters	2 battle groups with one nuclear attack submarine each (SSN), 4 frigates, 3 support ships, Maritime patrol aircraft, with one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, MCM vessels, Joint: Permanent military operations headquarters at Creil, Satellite communications, Reconnaissance satellites and aircrafts
Germany	Nucleus land component headquarters, Armoured, air assault, light infantry brigade headquarters, 7 combat battalions	Nucleus air component headquarters, 6 combat squadrons with 93 aircrafts, 8 surface-to-air missile (SAM) squadrons, Air transport, support	Maritime headquarters, 13 combat ships, Joint: Permanent military operations headquarters at Potsdam

	Total: 18,000 troops from a pool of 32,000	elements	
Greece	1 operational headquarters, 1 mechanised or other brigade, 1 light infantry battalion, 1 attack and 1 transport helicopter company	42 fighter aircrafts, 4 transport aircrafts, 1 <i>Patriot</i> SAM battalion, 1 short-range air defence (SHORAD) squadron	Escorts, 1 submarine
Ireland	1 light infantry battalion, 40-strong Army Ranger Wing Special Forces unit, headquarters, observer, support elements Total: 850		
Italy	1 corps-level headquarter for six months, 1 division headquarter for a year, Airmobile brigade for up to 6 months and 3 other brigades 1 railway engineering battalion, special forces, 1 CIMIC group, 1 NBC Defence company Total: 12,500 troops from a pool of 20,000	1 Combined Air Operations centre, 26 <i>Tornado</i> , AMX combat aircraft, 6 CSAR helicopters, 4 C-130J transport aircrafts, 9 tactical transport aircrafts, 2 air refuelling aircrafts, 3 maritime patrol aircrafts, 2 SHORAD units	1 sea-orshore-based maritime component headquarter, 1 task group with 1 aircraft carrier, 1 destroyer, 3 frigates, 4 patrol ships, 1 submarine, 4 MCM ships, 2 amphibious ships, 1 oceanographic vessel, 8 helicopters
Luxembourg	1 reconnaissance company Total: 100	1 A400M transport aircraft	
Netherlands	German-Dutch Corps, 1 mechanised brigade, 11th airmobile brigade, 1 amphibious battalion	1-2 F 16 fighter squadrons, transport aircraft, SAM squadrons	Air defence and command frigates, multipurpose frigates, landing platform dock
Portugal	1 infantry brigade including reconnaissance, armoured, artillery, engineer, signals, logistics, military police and CIMIC elements, 2 teams of military observers Total: 4000	1 squadron with 12 F-16, 4 C-130 transports, 12 C212 tactical transports, 3 maritime patrol aircrafts, 4 tactical air control parties, 4 medium transport helicopters	1 frigate, 1 submarine, 1 survey ship, 1 support ship

Spain	division headquarter to co-ordinate humanitarian operations, 1 brigade headquarter, 1 brigade mountain unit, 1 light infantry battalion→immediate reaction force	1 <i>Mirage</i> F1 squadron, 1 F/A-18 squadron each of 12 aircraft, 6 transport aircraft, 2 surveillance aircrafts, 2 electronic warfare aircrafts, 2 A400M aircrafts	1 carrier group, 2 frigates, 2 support ships, 1 submarine, 1 MCM ship, Spanish-Italian amphibious force
Sweden	1 mechanised infantry battalion including intelligence, electronic warfare/signals, reconnaissance, engineer and explosive ordinance disposal units	tactical reconnaissance element of 4 AJS 37 <i>Viggen</i> replaced in 2004 by 4 JAS 39 <i>Gripen</i> multirole fighters, 1 airbase unit (225 personnel), 4 C-130 transport aircrafts	2 corvettes, 1 support ship
United Kingdom	Either an armoured or mechanised brigade, each of which could be sustained for at least a year, or 16 Air Assault brigades, which could be deployed up to 6 months Combat support forces such as artillery, air defence and attack helicopters could also be deployed, Support by logistic forces Total: 12,500	Joint: 1 permanent joint headquarter and mobile headquarters, including a Combined Air Operations Centre 72 combat aircrafts, 58 support aircrafts	1 aircraft carrier, 2 SSNs, 4 destroyers or frigates, 4 support vessels, Amphibious task group with helicopter carrier and 3 commando brigades
















Data Source: Schmitt, 2004, p. 106

Appendix 3 ECAP Panels

Attack Helicopters/ Support Helicopters
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/ Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) Units
Medical Role 3/ Medical Collective Protection Role 3
Special Operations Forces (SOF)
Carrier Based air Power
Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)
Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR)
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)
Cruise Missiles/ Precision Guided Munitions
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence
Deployable Communication Modules
Headquarters (Operational HQ, Force HQ, Command and Control HQs)
Theatre Surveillance and Reconnaissance Air Picture
Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance/ Imagery Collection
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (HALE, MALE and tactical UAVs)
Early Warning and Distant Detection Strategic Level
Strategic Air Mobility/ Outsized Transport Aircraft, General Cargo Aircraft
Roll-On Roll-Off Vessels (RO-RO)/ General Cargo Shipping

Data Source: Schmitt, 2004, p. 109

Appendix 4 Top 15 Military Spenders 2005

United States	 495
China	 99.5
Russia*	 59.6
France	 53.8
United Kingdom	 51.7
Japan	 44.7
Germany	 38.5
Italy	 31.8
Saudi Arabia	 25.4
India	 22
South Korea	 20.7
Australia	 13.2
Brazil	 13.1
Canada	 12.3
Turkey	 11.47
<p>*2004 defence expenditure in \$US and bn</p> <p><i>Data Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006</i></p>	

Appendix 5 Top Ten Military Budgets 2006

Country	Military Defence Budget 2006
US	561
UK	50.2
Japan	41.6
France*	40.7
China	34.9
Germany	28.8
Saudi Arabia	25.4
Russia	23.7
India	23.5
South Korea	23.5
Brazil	16.06
Italy	14.6
Australia	13.2
Canada	10.9
Netherlands	9.35
Israel	8.87
Spain	8.5
Turkey	7.17
*2005 defence budget figure in \$US and bn <i>Data Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006</i>	